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Introduction: Envisioning the World,
Mapping the Global
Sandra Holtgreve, Karlson Preuß, Mathias Albert
Mapping and making the global through practices of observation
Visions of the world and descriptions of the global are based on practices of
observation. Rather than working with an account of structures and connec-
tions, or with a fixed definition of ‘the global’, the contributions in this book
seek to identify narratives, images and models that are used in practices of
observation in order to address ‘the world’ or ‘the global’ and how they come
to appear as a distinct realm of the social world. In addition to considering
the conditions for the ‘emergence’ of the global in particular practices of ob-
servation, this book is also interested in the impact of these global modes
of observation on field-related discourses, processes and agents. It focuses,
therefore, on the phenomenological dimension of globalization processes. The
individual contributions reconstruct how specific visions of the world emerge
in different social fields and how various actors throughout time have tried
to map, describe and make sense of the global, thereby contributing to its
constitution, that is, to its ‘making’.
This book brings together views from Sociology, History, Literary Theory
and International Relations and takes up a range of discussions in world soci-
ety/world polity aswell as in global history research.Many disciplines involved
in the field of globalization research are witnessing an increased interest in
approaches that pursue the process of globalization at the level of local prac-
tices, discourses and strategies. Diverse as the disciplinary, theoretical and
empirical backgrounds of the contributions gathered here may be, they con-
verge in the effort to retrace ‘practices of world making’ (Bell 2013: 257) in var-
ious areas of society. The aim is to establish a connection between different
areas in order to find underlying commonalities in observational practices
that are not evident at first glance and consequently little addressed in the
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globalization literature. We particularly focus on two core issues: the prac-
tical driving forces of globalization and the relation between the global and
the local. Regarding the former, a main concern is to complement accounts
that focus on only one, or a few, ‘grand’ narratives – such as global capitalism,
legalization, digitalization etc. – with reconstructions of how a global hori-
zon emerges within the perspective of particular observers. As a corollary to
this analytical approach, we also seek to demonstrate the ways in which the
global and the local are to be understood as complementary sides of the same
processes (Werron 2012: 110; see also Robertson 1998).
The growing unease with the grand narratives of globalization
‘Grand’ narratives of globalization are usually exactly that: impressive and also
beautiful in their grandeur.The diversity of empirical reality quite often turns
out to be less beautiful in its actual messiness.The grand narratives that seem
to dominate globalization research (cf. Greve and Heintz 2005: 111; Sassen
2007: 6) focus on the emergence of institutions and organizations that op-
erate on a worldwide scale, on global networks, interconnectedness through
communication technology and global communicative structures. However,
various fields of research are experiencing a growing unease about such nar-
ratives and criticize them for being biased towards structural or even struc-
turally deterministic accounts of global social reality. Criticism has been lev-
elled at, for example, world polity theory (of the so-called ‘Stanford School’)
and its focus on ‘the institutional conditions of diffusion’ (Strang and Meyer
1993) when attempting to make sense of globally diffused cultural patterns
or sociological systems theory that ascribes the spatial decontextualization
of communicative acts to the problem-specific mode of operation of differ-
ent function systems (economy, science, law etc.) while comprehending the
emergence of a world society as a necessary corollary of the process of func-
tional differentiation (Luhmann 1991: 60; Stichweh 2000: 18). Bothworld polity
scenarios of the diffusion of global cultural goods (Greve and Heintz 2005:
111) and systems theory’s narrative of universal functional differentiation have
been pointed out for being rather insensitive towards specific empirical ques-
tions (Werron and Holzer 2009: 7). Likewise, in the field of global history the
‘preoccupation with connectivity’ (Conrad 2018: 824) has been countered by
a research agenda that is more interested in ‘the strategies of local actors’
(ibid.: 825) towards the global as well as in concrete ‘articulations of globality’
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(Bell 2013: 257). Generally speaking, current debates on globalization reveal
the impulse to empirically substantiate its grand narratives.
Different paths have been taken to theoretically articulate this general un-
ease. In sociology, the distinction between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ has turned out
to be one of themost prominent pathways taken in this respect. In research on
processes of globalization and the formation of a world society/world polity,
it has become a frequent trope to juxtapose macro- and micro-sociological
approaches to conceptualizing the global (Greve and Heintz 2005: 111; Knorr-
Cetina and Bruegger 2002: 907). In line with this seeming conceptual divide,
macro- andmicro-orientedmodes of analysis have been competing with each
other both in addressing the drivers of globalization as well as in conceptual-
izing the relationship between the global and the local.
In contrast to ‘macro-structural’ accounts of a global social reality, soci-
ologists from different theoretical backgrounds have attempted to cultivate a
perspective that shifts attention to the local phenomena that are embedded
in, and entangled with, processes of globalization. As Saskia Sassen (2007:
4) observes: ‘Conceiving of globalization not simply in terms of interdepen-
dence and global institutions but also as inhabiting the national [we could
add “the local” – authors] opens up a vast and largely unaddressed research
agenda’. In trying to redress this situation, Sassen (ibid.: 193) has called atten-
tion to the ‘microsites’ and ‘microspaces’ in which global dynamics unfold. In
this context, she (ibid.: 8) studies global cities as sites of local ‘instantiations
of the global’. Similarly, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Urs Bruegger (2002) speak
of ‘global microstructures’ when studying specific orders and patterns of so-
cial interaction which maintain global financial markets. Efforts to provide
stronger micro-foundations can also be observed within neo-institutionalist
theory. As has been critically noted, however, a micro-perspective might be
incompatible with a general research frame that still tends to overlook indi-
vidual actors (cf. Powell and Colyvas 2008; Hasse and Schmidt 2010; Kirchner
et al. 2015).
While it is generally regarded as plausible to split globalization research
along the micro/macro distinction, there exist a number of attempts to em-
ploy more complex conceptual frameworks to adequately describe processes
of globalization. Sassen (2007: 8), for instance, calls for ‘different conceptual
architectures’ which require ‘new categories that do not presuppose the cus-
tomary dualities of national/global and local/global’.1 In a similar manner,
Rudolf Stichweh (2000: 16), building on Niklas Luhmann’s reservations about
the micro/macro distinction,2 stresses that an interaction may be simultane-
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ously attributed to both the micro- and macro-levels. According to this un-
derstanding, world society actualizes itself through particular local acts: ‘The
fusion of the global and the local takes places at the local level’ (ibid.: 257).
The shortcomings of the micro/macro distinction have been addressed in
different areas of globalization research and have inspired a variety of con-
ceptual alternatives. In the field of migration studies (Faist 2018; Sassen 2001;
Basch et al. 1997; Pries 2002), scholars have recognized that the dynamics of
regular cross-border interactions sustain a space with its own right and rules.
Thus, for example, transnational social spaces in which processes in the micro
and macro dimensions intersect have come under the spotlight. In contrast
to typical perspectives on globalization, the literature on transnational spaces
primarily shifts the focus to the meso-level dynamics of everyday practices.
In a similar sense, the concept of glocalization is probably the most prominent
attempt to conceive of global and local processes as representing two sides of
the same coin. Shifting the focus from top-down perspectives that consider
globalization as separated from local, regional or national processes, the glo-
calization literature emphasizes the spatial multidimensionality of societal
phenomena (Robertson 1998; Wellman 1999; Bauman 1998).3 The literature on
glocalization envisions modes of observing the global through the local that
allow it to be shown that ‘globalization is responsible both for homogene-
ity and heterogeneity’ (Roudometof 2015: 9). The concept of glocalization has
raised awareness of the fact that globalization does not take place beyond the
local level, but operates through it.
Observation as a practice that conditions globalization
The present volume follows up on attempts to undermine the micro/macro
distinction of conventional globalization research. We acknowledge that
analysing globalization and dividing globalization research along mi-
cro/macro lines can be heuristically and analytically fruitful in many respects.
However, we think it is useful to employ a distinction that has the advantage
of covering both micro- and macro-phenomena and structures in processes
of globalization: Bettina Heintz and Tobias Werron argue that globalization
may unfold in two different, yet often related dimensions that both cover
and span the micro/macro distinction. Firstly, globalization occurs on the
dimension of global/transnational networks and connections. This means that,
in various areas of society such as the economy, transport, law, entertainment
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etc., interconnections emerge that are not confined to the borders of the
nation-state. Secondly, globalization takes place at the level of description and
observation (Heintz and Werron 2011: 361f.). The field of law is globalizing, for
example, not only through international treaties and supranational institu-
tions, but also through judges taking account of legal developments in other
countries and voluntarily aligning their decisions with foreign jurisprudence
and the idea of a world law (see the chapter by Preuss, this volume). The
discipline of Social Work does not react to an objective world in which it then
establishes itself, but rather engenders the global in manifold ways in its
own discourse and practices of observation (see the chapter by Holtgreve and
Giebeler). Geopolitical world conflicts, such as the conflict between Russia
and the West, can be traced back to competing ways of envisioning the world
(see the chapters by Akopov, Elmuradov, Vásquez, and by Sunca).
This volume thus focuses on the descriptive dimension of globalization
that has received far less attention in globalization research than the level
of connectivity. With Werron (2012: 112), we agree that it is worthwhile to
describe globalization processes independently of the dimension of connec-
tivity. Globalization phenomena are also recognizable where connectivity is
limited or even actively resisted. Phenomena such as the isolation of a state
through border protection, anti-globalization resentments, concepts of global
enemies (e.g. bankers, Jews, etc.) can thus be interpreted as globalization phe-
nomena (see the chapters by Jacobsen andWerron and by Aksakal). Moreover,
by focusing on the level of description, it is possible to identify models of
worldmaking that elude the dominant globalization narratives by drawing on
unorthodox epistemologies of the global and the world. Notably philosophy
and literature offer the potential to counter the Eurocentrism of the current
globalization discourse with multipolar and planetary alternatives (see the
chapters by Gasser and by Auer).
Sharing the impression that there is a tendency in globalization research
towards self-explanatory and universalistic narratives that are hard to pin
down empirically, we follow up on the suggestion that processes of globaliza-
tion materialize in specific local acts, discourses and practices of observation.
From this perspective, the global as a spatial framework is not self-evident,
but rather ‘constructed’ in concrete practices.The contributions gathered here
capitalize on the insights of the spatial turn in sociology. Rather than starting
from prefabricated spatial assumptions, they pursue the question of ‘how the
global is generated socially in each case’ (Epple 2018: 395). Yet, despite their
focus on concrete practices, they seek nonetheless to make a contribution to
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globalization research and attempt to avoid the shortcomings of many studies
professing a ‘micro-sociological’ perspective that tend to concentrate on local
practices of organization and interaction but neglect the question of how the
global is envisioned and observed in these practices. Although the global is
implicitly presupposed in many ‘micro-founded’ studies, it is not addressed
as an object of investigation. Rather than confronting the grand narratives
of globalization research with meticulous isolationist accounts of microsites,
our goal is to add empirical and historical depth to these narratives by ex-
amining practices of worldmaking as empirical evidence of how narratives
on the global and the world evolve and sustain themselves. The focus is thus
directed towards the conditioning practices that underlie processes of institu-
tionalization, diffusion, and functional differentiation among others.
There are various societal domains in which it is far from evident that
agents would be likely to position themselves in relation to the global (Heintz
and Werron 2011: 361). For instance, it seems highly unlikely that a Consti-
tutional Court would transcend its national legal framework by quoting the
decision of a foreign court. Likewise, a claim that educators all over the world
take global educational standards into account when implementing reforms
at local schools and universities would require explanation. The existence of
global modes of observation visible in various social fields and areas comes
with prerequisites attached and is, from a historical standpoint, relatively
new. Stichweh stresses that (2019: 517): ‘Observation was tied to closely cir-
cumscribed localities for a long time’. From this point of departure, global-
ization research has commonly called attention to the various ways in which
new communications technologies have had deterritorializing effects on prac-
tices of communication and observation. While this is a valuable perspective,
research tends to neglect to reconstruct how exactly modes of observation in
specific social domains have transformed in the course of globalization dy-
namics. To which problem does the globalization of specific observational
practices respond? How is the global conceived in these practices?
The aim of this book is to identify and contextualize specific modes of ob-
servation and communication by which the global is addressed. Each contri-
bution analyses a ‘special type of communications […] that explicitly address
the world as an issue and are thereby constitutive of the world’ (Stichweh
2000: 240). Professing a broadly constructivist understanding of processes of
globalization,we acknowledge that the world/the global is created in practices
of communication and observation. We thus seek to retrace globalization on
the level of these practices. In this context, the communicative conditions
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necessary for the perspective of the global are to be brought to the fore. We
are interested in ‘the way in which humans fabricated symbolic systems, how
they constructed and reconstructed worlds’ (Bell 2013: 258). Through which
narratives, images and models have different agents created the discursive
horizon of the global?
Fields and theories
By focusing on practices that envision the global from field-related stand-
points we attempt to retrace how the global is created by different agents in
different fields and discourses. Generally, this means that the global is in-
scribed as the relevant horizon of meaning, which needs to be distinguished
from any structural definition of the global. It says nothing about the struc-
tural establishment of connections on a global scale (cf. Albert 2016: 27ff.).
While, arguably, it has historically often been the case, there is no necessity
for a ‘phenomenological globalization’ to precede a ‘structural’ one. Durable
connections might very well be established and actualized before they are in-
scribed into the meaning horizon of the global. This phenomenological ap-
proach is neither defined by, nor restricted to, a specific discipline or a fixed
theoretical frame. Numerous disciplines are capable of adopting a ‘second or-
der’ perspective and retracing practices of worldmaking in a phenomenolog-
ical manner.This applies to social science disciplines as well as the domain of
cultural theory – for instance the field of literary studies which, as illustrated
by Lucy Gasser’s contribution to this volume, may comprehend literature as a
‘world-making activity’ (Cheah 2016: 2).
In this sense, the present volume responds to a research interest that has
become particularly pronounced in the field of global history. In this field,
conceptual problems such as the micro/macro divide and the global/local dis-
tinction are regularly discussed (cf. Conrad 2016: 129ff., 230ff.). In tangible
proximity to the sociological discussions outlined above, the advocates of a
new global history distance themselves from the universal narratives of his-
torical globalization research, conventionally known as world history. In the
course of this reorientation, criticism is also directed at approacheswithin the
field of global history that primarily deal with the reconstruction of transna-
tional networks and the global interconnectedness of structures, goods, ideas,
etc. (for a description of this current, see Moyn and Sartori 2013: 9ff.). Global
historians like Sebastian Conrad and Duncan Bell challenge this ‘diffusionist
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bias’ (Conrad 2018: 824) with a research agenda that explores globalization
from the perspective of particular actors, practices and strategies (Conrad
2018: 825; Bell 2013: 257). As part of this ‘second order approach’ (Moyn and
Sartori 2013: 5), categories like ‘the global’ or ‘theWest’ become the object rather
than a fixed spatial frame of analysis (Bell 2013: 273).The emergence of a global
consciousness and its requiredmeans of representation and imagination then
themselves become a problem of global history (Moyn and Sartori 2013: 16f.).
The perspective on the world and the global suggested here allows the
following chapters to take their inspiration from a variety of theoretical
backgrounds, such as systems theory, neo-institutionalism and postcolonial
theory. Many theoretical traditions possess the heuristic potential to pin
wide-scale processes of globalization to concrete practices and processes of
communication and observation. This also holds true for systems theory and
neo-institutionalism, even though both theoretical traditions, as mentioned
above, run the risk of being empirically insensitive and/or giving structural-
deterministic accounts of processes of globalization. The notion of ‘obser-
vation’ provides systems theory with a key concept for phenomenologically
reconstructing how the global has become a distinct category in particular
observational practices (Stichweh 2019: 517). Likewise, by stressing that the
diffusion of cultural ideas depends, at least to a certain degree, on their
‘theorization’, neo-institutionalist scholars have displayed a great deal of sen-
sitivity to the epistemological preconditions that underpin the diffusion of
global cultural goods (Strang and Meyer 1993: 492). A common denominator
of the conceptual frameworks employed in this volume may be found in their
shared constructivist understanding of global social reality. Globalization
depends on models, narratives and categories by which the global/the world
is observed. The theories drawn upon allow us to investigate empirically how
the global is instantiated in particular practices of observation.
The ‘second-order’ approach pursued here requires the question of
whether practices of observation address global matters conceptually as the
world or as the global to be initially left open. In sociology, the notion of world
serves to establish a phenomenological lens different from the diffusionist
grand narratives of globalization.World in this sense can be understood as a
projective representation of a global horizon created by a social system using
its own means and resources (Stichweh 2000: 234). In historical scholarship,
by contrast, universal narratives of globalization are ascribed to the field of
world history while the ‘actor’s category approach’ (Bell 2013: 257) finds its
place in global history.
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The focus on concrete practices follows attempts to apply insights from
sociological practice theory to research on globalization (Epple 2018). It is
concrete practices that consolidate social structures through routinization.
Applied to the theme of this book, the task is to locate small-scale practices
that are constitutive of globalization processes (ibid.: 406). Thus, if one con-
centrates on practices as ‘drivers of globalization’, the grand narratives typical
of globalization research may be fruitfully backed up by diverse empirical ac-
counts. Such an approach holds the potential to combine a phenomenological
notion of the global with structural accounts of global social reality, thus also
potentially avoiding the seeming reluctance of micro-sociological approaches
to engage in theory (building). Global trends, which at first glance may seem
to follow a uniform pattern, can thus be analysed with regard to the possi-
ble heterogeneity of their constituent practices. As Epple (ibid.: 404) rightly
points out, the praxeological perspective sensitizes to the different practical
reference problems of certain global developments.
On the basis of case studies, the contributions to this volume thus recon-
struct how the global manifests itself in particular practices of observation.
Each chapter questions the master narrative of globalization prevalent in the
field in question and adds empirical as well as historical depth to it. The in-
dividual contributors retrace why, how and in what contexts different sorts
of agents and actors position themselves in relation to the global. They at-
tempt to observe how the global is envisioned by different agents and how
the specific vision of the global has informed and shaped discourses. This
phenomenological stance allows us both to place the spotlight on the driving
forces of globalization and to undermine the dichotomy of the micro/macro
divide in globalization research. We attempt to comprehend how globaliza-
tion unfolds in the eyes of the observer. Hence, the focus is on the actors and
agents of globalization (Holzer et al. 2015: 5; Epple 2018: 394).
Empirical inspirations
Assuming such a perspective,Werron andHolzer (2009: 13) highlight the field-
specific methods of theorizing and modelling that have proven essential for
the disembedding of entire social fields from local, regional and national con-
texts. This angle has the potential to identify the schemes and models that
allow field-specific global publics to be addressed. For instance, in order to
understand the globalization of economy, attention has to be paid to the field-
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intrinsic modes of observation which have broadened the scope of economic
communication and transaction: ‘Economic theorization as a condition of the
disembedding of the economic field starts with basic schemes such as prices
or product categories that allow for the “commensuration” […] of formerly
unique or incomparable products and lead to increasingly complex and ab-
stract models such as market statistics or neoclassical concepts of the market’
(ibid.).
In a similarmanner, it has been demonstrated how certain narratives have
been pivotal for the emergence of a global mode of observation in the world
of sports. Narratives of comparative competition and theoretical models such
as tables, records and rankings have been the necessary prerequisites for the
idea of simultaneous global competition (ibid.: 14). On the basis of these con-
ditions, modern sport has been driven towards the global. At the turn of the
20th century, the ‘projective inclusion’ (Stichweh 2000: 234) of the global was
palpably present, for instance in the decision to refer to the final competition
in the baseball season as the ‘World Series’ (ibid.; Werron 2005). Certain se-
mantic and media conditions were essential for this turn towards the global.
For the development of sport into world sport, the ‘local limitation of com-
parative horizons’ (Werron 2008: 105) had to be overcome.
Sebastian Conrad has convincingly illustrated how the field of global his-
tory may harness the ‘second order’ approach sketched above in order to crit-
ically engage with the master narratives of globalization research. He exam-
ines the practical motives and strategies that led the Japanese to adapt the
Western temporal regime in the 1870s. He refutes the assumption that the
change in the temporal regime was the product of colonial ‘top-down imposi-
tion’ (Conrad 2018: 840) and the direct ‘result of [global] transfers and of con-
nections’ (ibid.: 842). As the spread of Western clocks and calendars in Japan
well before the 19th century proves, mere cultural transfer cannot satisfacto-
rily explain the Japanese adoption of themodern understanding of time at the
end of the 19th century. Rather, as Conrad points out, the ‘sweeping societal
transformations’ (ibid.: 842) within Japan must be closely examined in order
to find a plausible explanation for the sudden change of temporal mentality.
The overcoming of traditional notions of time through modern temporal rep-
resentation may then be understood as ‘one of the ways historical actors re-
sponded to a series of fundamental social changes triggered by technological
innovation and large-scale mobility, by projects of state building and empire,
by capitalist production and global market integration’ (ibid.: 847)
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In a similar manner, Angelika Epple has demonstrated how a construc-
tivist perspective on the observation- and communication-based ‘making of
the global’ may be combined with an approach that takes into account ques-
tions of social agency. Tracing the process of how Stollwerck Gold chocolate
has become a global brand, Epple investigates in great detail ‘how a global
visual language has appeared to be reasonable from a company-internal perspec-
tive’ (Epple 2007: 14, emphasis added). In so doing, she not only shows how
the global view in modern marketing and advertising strategies depends on
the ‘invention’ of a universal and spatially decontextualized product brand (a
‘world brand’), but also, taking a functionalist perspective, demonstrates that
the idea of a product brand emerged as a reaction to new forms of commu-
nication in the sale process, notably the fact that the personal relationship
between the salesman/producer and the consumer had been rendered obso-
lete by changing economic dynamics in the 19th century.The preconditions for
global marketing strategies may thus be studied at a local level, taking into
account the motives that have driven a company to detach a product from its
regional and national context (ibid.: 19).
We take these empirical studies as inspirations to further investigate how
the globalmanifests itself in empirical practices of observation. Turning to the
fields of social work, literature, philosophy, law, anti-Semitism, foreign poli-
tics and international diplomacy, revolutionary politics and migration stud-
ies, the contributions to this volume do not simply reiterate broad narratives
on how the respective fields and the corresponding agents have turned global.
Rather, choosing the ‘actor’s category approach’ (Bell 2013: 257), every contri-
bution empirically retraces how the global has emerged as a specific theme in
the respective discourse under investigation and how different agents posi-
tion themselves in relation to this global horizon.
Overview of chapters
Each of this volume’s chapters takes a perspective on envisioning the global in
a range of cases and from different disciplinary perspectives, namely IR/po-
litical science, sociology, Social Work, literary studies and philosophy.
In her chapter, Gladys Vásquez discusses the vision of the ‘New World’ es-
poused during the first half of the 19th century in Latin America. She asks
how diplomats compared the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ world, and demonstrates the
contradictions inherent in the intra-regional discussions on the reconfigura-
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tion of power after the end of formal colonialism. Her chapter shows how the
political representatives of the Americas used visions of the ‘old’ and ‘new’
worlds in order to establish a new balance of power. Practices of comparison
are used as a theoretical approach in global historical research in order to ex-
amine the discourses of the American political elites who attempted to create
an American Confederation.
Marc Jacobsen and Tobias Werron discuss the emergence of modern nation-
alism as a worldview both particular and comprehensive.They show how anti-
Semitism must not only be understood as hostility towards Jews, but also as
a lens for interpreting world affairs and a vision of ‘how the world should
be’. From a perspective of historical sociology, they outline the connections
between globalization, nationalism and anti-Semitism between the late 18th
and the mid-19th century. Focusing on examples from German discourse, they
show how nationalism is not only a reaction to, but also a product of, global-
ization. In addition, they trace the historical entanglements between nation-
alism and anti-Semitism.
Assuming a sociological perspective, Karlson Preuß’ chapter investigates
how the discipline of Comparative Law embraced the notion of world law at
the turn of the 20th century. Critically engaging with the cosmopolitan aspira-
tions of comparative legal literature, his contribution historically contextual-
izes the popular idea that legal practice will induce the global harmonization
of different jurisdictions. He detects hidden discursive motives and strategies
underlying the ostentatious universalism of early-20th-century comparative
lawyers. The chapter demonstrates how many legal scholars invoked the idea
of a ‘world law’ in order to justify a politicized model of judicial decision-
making.
Sandra Holtgreve and Cornelia Giebeler discuss four dimensions of contem-
porary Social Work discourse’s approaches to ‘the global’. They ask which un-
derstandings of the concept prevail in discussions of social work practice and
theory. Their chapter demonstrates how social workers can be understood as
world political actors ‘frombelow’, and argues that the global serves firstly as a
professional rationale for responding to the effects of globalization, secondly
as a perspective from which to respond to heterogeneous lifeworlds, thirdly
as a common ethical base for the profession, and fourthly as a global arena for
professional action.These four dimensions characterize the particular way in
which social work can observe the global from the margins of society, making
the profession unavoidably pluralist and critical in relation to universalizing
arguments in globalization studies.
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Yasin Sunca studies the Kurdish case in order to analyse global politico-so-
cial and historical processes in the emergence of revolutions, asking how the
revolutionaries’ observations of their global environment shaped the events in
Rojava. From a perspective of historical sociology, he elaborates on three pro-
cesses: international relations in the struggle for nation-state formation; the
international leftist ideology that underlies radical-democratic social trans-
formation; and global geopolitics during the Syrianwar,which opened a space
for renegotiating regional hierarchies. These three aspects lead Sunca to the
central argument that ‘the international’ was an integral part of the vision that
drove the Rojava revolution from its very beginnings.
Mustafa Aksakal observes how global policies and politics are perceived,
and replied to, at local, national and regional level as regards the relation
between migration and development. The chapter provides an overview of
debates on the migration–development nexus in Latin America. Their inher-
ent focus on structuralism in the 1950s, dependency theory in the 1970–80s,
neo-structuralism in the 1990s, and Buen Vivir from the 2000s on provided
key narratives that promoted a particular way of observing the world. In this
context, he is able to develop a counter-narrative to hegemonic discussions
on the nexus.
Sergei Akopov analyses practices of mapping the global in contemporary
Russian politics. His contribution establishes ‘loneliness’ as a key factor in
reading international relations with regard to Russia. Akopov argues that
Vladimir Putin has paved the way for a ‘politics of loneliness’ that informs
Russian claims to sovereignty and the right of intervention, while Russia has
reinvented itself as a lonely entity in current world politics in the past decade.
Engaging with Russian politics as well, Aziz Elmuradov describes the con-
frontational dynamics between Russia and the European Union as a conflict
of competing visions of the world. Analysing contemporary testimonies from
Russian political philosophy and political discourse, Elmuradov demonstrates
that the idea of a ‘multipolar world’ underpins current Russian foreign policy.
His contribution retraces the geopolitical, historical and civilizational dimen-
sions of the concept of multipolarity.
The final two chapters draw on literary studies and philosophy in order to
develop conceptual alternatives to Eurocentric ways of envisioning the world.
Lucy Gasser focuses on literature as an imaginative practice of worldmak-
ing. Taking a postcolonial perspective, she explores travel narratives from the
Global South that challenge the Eurocentrism of imperialist globalization nar-
ratives by recentring the global and creating novel horizons for the world. Her
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contribution pays tribute to literature from the Global South as a resource for
imagining new global centres and pluralistic alternatives to colonial narra-
tives of globalization.
Michael Auer turns to the writings of the philosopher Kostas Axelos in
order to propose the notion of ‘the planetary’ as a conceptual alternative to
‘the global’.The chapter reconstructs how Axelos took the planetary paradigm
from the philosophical discourse of theWeimar Republic and developed it into
a postcolonial alternative to the canonical narratives of European modernity.
Opposing the burdened legacy of globalization discourse, Auer honours plan-
etary thinking as an alternative methods of worldmaking that transcends the
centrism of Western narratives of modernity.
The present volume in its entirety, and most of its individual chapters,
emerged from work carried out within the Research Training Group ‘World
Politics:TheEmergence of Political Arenas andModes of Observation inWorld
Society’ at Bielefeld University. This group’s research agenda has two main
streams: ‘modes of organization’ and ‘modes of observation’. This distinc-
tion reflects the fact that, like all social systems and contexts, modern world
politics, like other globalized fields, can and needs to be characterized and
analysed in terms of the formation both of distinct structures and of dis-
tinct frames of reference. By providing insights into the phenomenological
dimension of globalization, the present volume falls squarely into that latter
thematic area.
Notes
1 Remarkably, Sassen herself does not seem to fully live up to this call
when, for example, she distinguishes between ‘the formation of explic-
itly global institutions and processes’, for instance the WTO, on the one
hand, and local/national dynamics that involve ‘processes that do not
necessarily scale at the global level as such yet […] are part of globaliza-
tion’, on the other hand, thereby suggesting a clear cut between macro-
sociological andmicro-sociological grasps on globalization (Sassen 2007:
5f.). We argue that the global manifests itself at the same time, yet dif-
ferently on the micro- and on the macro-level.
2 ‘The micro/macro distinction reduces the complexity of the description
of an object, disregarding reciprocal interdependencies among the levels’
(Luhmann 1987: 126).
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3 On the relation between this multi-dimensionality and conceptualiza-
tions of world society as a social ‘whole’, see the debate Albert 2007,
Robertson 2009 and Albert 2009.

From Region to World, and Back Again
How Latin Americans Envisioned the Global (1810-1840)
Gladys Vásquez
Following the independence of many Spanish colonies in America in the
early 19th century, the new American diplomats began seeking to integrate
their new states into the international system.1 To do so, they intensified
their diplomacy through congresses and conferences where they created a
discourse to integrate with the world as independent states. In 1822 Simón
Bolívar summoned the leaders of the former Spanish colonies to the Congress
of Panama, the first to initiate the routinization of the American congresses.
Bolívar explained that the Congress’s objective was to establish an American
system that would trace the course of their relations with the world (Bolívar
2010 [1824]: 40ff.). Discussing the American system allowed diplomats to
construct a world regional framework that provided a platform to envision
the world and to think about global affairs.
How did American diplomats envision the global world through the lens
of the regional world? They envisioned it as divided into the New World and
the Old. Even though this vision was from a long tradition (Epple 2019: 137ff.),
the relationship between the two worlds had changed since American inde-
pendence. Spain refused to accept the independence of its former American
colonies and the other European powers hesitated to accept them as sovereign
equals (Petersen and Schultz 2018: 111). Observing this relationship of conflict,
diplomats negotiated an American system that conceived international rela-
tions as a search for world equilibrium. To understand the world regional
framework, it is therefore necessary to examine the comparative practices
of the American diplomats, based on their observations of the world. This
chapter evaluates the significance of observing and comparing both worlds
as these diplomats attempted to construct their system of international rela-
tions by examining the communications, essays, acts, and treaties resulting
from their interaction. These comparisons supported actors in constructing
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images and narratives in which conceptualizations like ‘the New World’, ‘the
Old World’, and ‘civilized and uncivilized’ were reconstituted.
The focus of this analysis is not on a dichotomy between the New World
and the Old but on a triadic relation shaped by diplomats. According to Epple,
when people compare ‘they always imply a criterion that enables them to place
differences and similarities in a comparative relation.This criterion in respect
to which entities are compared is the tertium comparationis’ (Epple 2019: 141).
Through their interaction, the diplomats made comparisons between two en-
tities, the New World and the Old, which became the two comparata. While
these comparata were not new, independence made political order an impor-
tant tertium, so actors shaped comparisons between both worlds in relation
to it. Leal states that the notion of ‘order’ became fundamental in Iberoamer-
ica due to the radical political transformations of the early 19thcentury. It was
then that the notion of a ‘new order’ – understood as ‘a new order of things’
or ‘a new political order’ – was developed in contrast to ‘the old order’ or ‘the
previous order’ (Leal 2017: 16).2 Leal based these notions of order on the terms
used by historical actors. In their discourses, diplomats compared the two
worlds in terms of their political order: the ‘old order’ was represented by the
absolute monarchy that had subordinated the New World in a colonial hier-
archy, but independence had transformed the Americas into a world region
that would institutionalize ‘a new political order’ opposed to this monarchy
and that would reorder the world.The political order became the criterion for
distinguishing the New World from the Old.
The chapter is structured as follows: I explain first the context of conflict
and negotiation in which the diplomats were situated as well as the perspec-
tives and purposes that conditioned their observations and comparisons of
the world; then I consider the reconstruction of the New World based on a
world regional discourse.
American diplomats and the post-independence context
The Hispanic American wars of independence were an irregular and violent
process that began with the fall of the Spanish monarchy in 1810 and lasted
through the first decades of the 19th century (Lynch 1986: 1). It was a conflict
that marked the new relationship between the two worlds. While the Amer-
ican colonies were declaring their independence, Spain still claimed owner-
ship over these territories. The conflict that initially arose between Spain and
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its colonies was reinterpreted by the actors of independence when the Holy
Alliance supported the return of the absolute monarchy in Spain. From then
on, these actors observed a threat that spread from Spain to a broader Old
World. Conversely, in an effort to resolve this conflict, the actors – American
diplomats – attempted to negotiate with the Old World to recognize Amer-
ican independence. It should be noted that the professionalization of diplo-
macy did not occur in most parts of America until later in the 19th century.
Early American states often required their representatives to engage in a va-
riety of activities throughout their careers taking on, for example, both mil-
itary and diplomatic roles. For this reason, when I use the term ‘diplomats’,
I mean those responsible for planning, organizing, and establishing interna-
tional relations. The negotiation proposals were discussed in the American
Congresses of these years. Bernardo de Monteagudo, an independentist from
a territory that is now Argentina, constructed a vision of a Hispanic Ameri-
can nation and stressed that a Hispanic American Congress should be held to
end the war with Spain, consolidate independence and to confront the threat
of the Holy Alliance (Monteagudo 1825: 16f.). It was precisely at the Congress
of Panama that the formation of a large American confederation was pro-
posed to enter into negotiations with the Old World on equal terms (Bolívar
2010 [1824]: 40ff.). Proponents of the confederation aimed to institutionalize a
new political order in the NewWorld whose authority was based on a General
Assembly of American States that was going to create a new order of things
in the world.
This section focuses on how American diplomats positioned themselves
in relation to the world in the post-independence context of conflict and ne-
gotiation. It shows who these diplomats were and why they observed and
compared. Diplomats belonged to the Criollo elite of lettered men. Anderson
describes the Criollo as a person of European descent (at least in theory) born
in America. Criollos shared a common language and ancestry with the Span-
ish (Anderson 1993: 77). Even so, because they were born in America, Criollos,
unlike the Spaniards, were not allowed to hold principal civil and ecclesias-
tical positions in the colonies. This is explained by the fact that America be-
came part of Iberian globalization in the 16th century (Gruzinsky 2010: 51ff.),
at which time a hierarchical relationship was built on its political subordina-
tion to Europe (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992: 584ff.)
Diplomats participated in a ‘Criollo legal consciousness’ that Obregón
(2006: 820) defines as a limited set of shared discourses and practices
concerning their awareness of regional unity. Obregón explains this con-
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sciousness on the basis of two interpretations. First, they assumed that they
were part of the metropolitan centre as descendants of Europeans at the
same time as they challenged the centre with their regional uniqueness. They
defined themselves in opposition to Europeans by claiming a sense of Amer-
icanness (ibid.: 815, 818). In his famous Letter from Jamaica, Bolívar wrote that
Americans were ‘neither Indian nor European, but a species midway between’
(Bolívar 2015 [1815]: 17). Second, they also assumed that law in the region
originated in Spanish law, but believed in the uniqueness of an American
interpretation of that law (Obregón 2006: 815). To Bolívar, Americans derived
their rights to the NewWorld from Europe; however, they had to assert these
rights against those same Europeans (Bolívar 2015 [1815]: 17).
The asymmetrical relationship between the two worlds represented the
political hierarchy between America and Europe. After all, ‘it was European
authors who prescribed what it was to be understood as “old” and what it was
to be viewed by comparison as “new” and how the relationship between the
two was to be evaluated’ (Epple 2019: 144). Feres recalls that the asymmetrical
is defined as the condition in which one group names and another is named,
but the named group is at the same time unable to react to the act of nam-
ing. The named group is almost always excluded from the political commu-
nity (Feres 2017: 93). Nevertheless, from the 18th century on, it was American
scholars who questioned the legitimacy of this asymmetrical relationship and
claimed a new comparability assumed by them. Later, wars of independence
increased the tendency to make comparisons from observations of the worlds
in conflict. Because of American achievements in war, scholars observed a
new order in the world where America, according to Feres (2009: 56), received
a political identity.Thatmeant the loss of legitimacy of the former power rela-
tion between the two worlds. The observation of this political transformation
encouraged these scholars to shape a world regional discourse that recreated
the old practices of comparison initiated by Europeans.
Hamnett (2013: 40) argues that independence transformed America into
‘a new factor in international politics’, but the lack of recognition of its in-
dependence by Europe became a cause of conflict that continued during the
first decades of the 19th century. Criollos, who in the new context were already
able to hold a government position, appointed their diplomats to negotiate
this recognition. The preservation of independence was the maintenance of
the new order (Leal 2010: 46). With this aim, they travelled in different dele-
gations to Europe and presented themselves as Americans and no longer as
subjects of Spain. They negotiated a shift from the former criterion of com-
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parison that excluded America from the international political community.
The break with the monarchical political order transformed the asymmetric
relationship and made both worlds equal before the international community
– this even though the Old World defended the old order and the New World
assumed a political order formed by governments legitimately constituted by
the ‘will of the peoples’ (la voluntad de los pueblos) (Monteagudo and Mosquera
2010 [1822]: 14), peoples who ‘had broken the chains that cruel Spain had im-
posed on them from the [Old World]’ (Bolívar 2010 [1822]: 3). The will of the
peoples replaced the will of the monarch that founded the old order.The term
‘people’ could be understood at the same time as a set of inhabitants and as
the place populated with inhabitants (Melo Ferreira 2009: 1120). This double
meaning influenced the use of the term. However, when the diplomats men-
tioned ‘peoples’ they were referring mainly to the Criollo inhabitants led by
their local political elites. During the negotiations, they displayed a vision of
the world in which America and Europe no longer had a hierarchical relation-
ship.
The incorporation of Spain into the Holy Alliance in 1816 in support of
restoring Spanish absolute monarchy shifted negotiations. Until that time,
comparisons regarding the conflict had been based primarily on observations
of America and Spain, but when Spain requested the support of the Holy Al-
liance at the Congress of Aachen in 1818 to regain control of its colonies, Amer-
icans began to observe the Old World beyond Spain. Monteagudo reflected
that, until then, their struggle had been against ‘a nation that was impotent,
discredited and sick with anarchy’ but from then on ‘the danger that threat-
ened themwas to enter into conflict with the Holy Alliance’ (Monteagudo 1825:
10). For this reason, negotiations by means of delegations were no longer suf-
ficient because, as Monteagudo continued, Americans had to consider ‘the
probability of a new conflict and the mass of power that (the Holy Alliance)
could use against us’ (ibid.: 10).
Maintaining the pre-independence balance of power was the goal of the
Holy Alliance (ibid.), according to the new leaders of the American govern-
ments. Faced with this situation, diplomats discussed new arguments for ne-
gotiation that would construct a balance of power where America’s indepen-
dent position would be retained. The importance of establishing a balance of
power to keep America frombeing subjugated again had already been stressed
by Bolívar (2012 [1813]: 36):
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The ambition of the nations of Europe carries the yoke of slavery to other
parts of the world, and all these parts of the world should seek to establish
a balance between them and Europe [...] I call this the equilibrium of the
Universe, and it must enter into the forethoughts of American politics.
Following this vision, while representatives of the Holy Alliance relied on old
order comparisons to sustain the legitimacy of the former balance of power,
American scholars intensified comparative observations to legitimize the po-
sition and power they had achieved through independence. I will give more
details of these comparative observations in the next section. Power was an
important issue in this post-independence context; in particular, American
leaders were very aware that their actual capacity to support their claims was
limited. According to Robert Burr (1995: 38) the Criollos took their cue from
observing the European experience which conceived international relations
as a search for an equilibrium in power.
Americans analysed their position and considered their opportunities in
a conflict between America and the Holy Alliance.This way they sustained the
formation of an American alliance that would create a new international bal-
ance of power. Considering the European experience, Americans found the
Congress of Vienna a successful diplomatic event but ‘for the monarchies
of the Old World’ (Monteagudo 1825: 19), setting down laws of alliance and
union through which they obtained successful results against France (Belis et
al. 2010 [1826]: 159). For this reason, Bolívar summoned the American lead-
ers to the Congress of Panama to create a great American confederation. He
wrote that the congress was destined to establish ‘a truly new order of things’
through the formation of an extraordinary league against which the Holy
Alliance could be inferior in power (Bolívar 2010 [1826]: 51f.). According to
Leal (2017: 16), the first elaborations of a new order were shaped in debates
that highlighted the struggle between constituted power (the old order) and
a power in the process of being constituted (a new order). In contrast to the
aims of the Congress of Vienna, stated Pedro Gual, Colombian Foreign Min-
ister and author of the constitution of the Republic of Florida:
this confederation should not be formed simply on the principles of an ordi-
nary alliance for offence and defence: it should be much narrower than the
one that has been formed recently in Europe against the freedoms of peo-
ples. Ours must be a Society of sister nations… (Gual 2010 [1821]: 8)
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When diplomats discussed the construction of a confederation, they intended
to distinguish their confederation from the characteristics observed in the Eu-
ropean experience. To begin with, unlike the Congress of Vienna, the Amer-
ican gathering would create a permanent assembly. Then, the Congress of
Panama would be the first of many congresses that would establish the rou-
tinization of diplomatic interaction.Thanks to this confederation, the nations
of the New World would be linked by a common law that would fix their in-
ternational relations (Bolívar 2010 [1826]: 52). Under this common law, the
diplomats would resume their negotiations, representing not a single nation
but a whole world region. The attendees at this first congress were the Re-
publics of La Gran Colombia (currently Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and
Panama), Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and the Central American Federation (cur-
rently Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El Salvador).
To the American diplomats, the Congress of Vienna defended the legiti-
macy of the order of the ancien régime by which Spain claimed possession of
its former colonies, whereas the Congress of Panama defended a new order
of the world based on the legitimacy of American independence. At the same
time, this truly new order would establish a perfect balance (Bolívar 2010 [1826]:
52). Bolívar understood this perfect balance as resulting from actions taken
by the Confederation to prevent any power from dominating the American
states and altering both their internal and external order; in the first case the
confederation would be the arbiter that would prevent any American state
from accumulating more power with respect to the other American states,
and in the second the Confederation would combine the efforts of the Ameri-
can states to prevent any European power from seeking to return America to
the old order. For Monteagudo, the Congress was a necessity, a view that he
sustained in his essay ‘On the Necessity of a General Federation among the
Spanish-American States’ when he was Minister of Government and Foreign
Affairs for Peru. He explained the two purposes of the confederation: to unite
the resources of the American peoples against the common enemy and sec-
ondly, to gather the representatives, who until then had problems communi-
cating, in one place to organize an American system directed by a permanent
assembly (Monteagudo 1825: 5ff.).
As a result, when considering their own system of international relations,
the diplomats created a world regional framework. Excluded for centuries
from public positions, this framework allowed Criollos to justify their position
as leaders of the New World and a new order of the world. To construct the
American system, they assumed comparability from a political point of view.
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In this sense, to demonstrate that America and Europe were equal political
actors in the world order, the diplomats placed similarities and differences
in a comparative relation by focusing on the political order and their relation
with morality, history and the standard of civilization.
The reconstruction of the New World
The vision of the New World before independence was built on comparisons
whose most ‘prominent topics were comparisons of climate, of nature, of the
role of European antiquity, religion and customs, of the level of art culture and
sciences; and of physique, disease and sexuality or the relationship between
sexes’ (Epple 2019: 153). While these comparisons may have recognized some
advantages for the NewWorld, they were not meant to break the hierarchical
relationship. However, independence changed the topics of the comparisons.
Leaders of the new republics that emerged, like Monteagudo, presented in-
dependence as an event that changed their ‘way of being and existing in the
universe’, that is to say, it canceled all the colonial obligations and indicated
their new relationships with the world (Monteagudo 1825: 5). As Epple and
colleagues understand it, ‘the onewho claims comparability and detects or de-
termines the perspective, the tertium comparationis, holds the power to con-
front and to evaluate the comparata’ (Epple et al. 2020: 16). American diplo-
mats then set their standard for comparing the world, discouraging compar-
isons that legitimized the colonial relationship and encouraging those that
provided the New World with a political identity in the new order. It should
be stressed, as Feres (2009: 54) argues, that during the first decades of the 19th
century there was a period of high politicization and conceptual change. This
section focuses on the work of diplomats to reconstruct the world order and
the image of the NewWorld –more specifically, on how they put America in a
new relationship with Europe when the legitimacy of independence was both
a cause of conflict and a motive for negotiation with the Old World.
Before continuing, I should mention the geographical vision of both
worlds generated by the diplomats. The Old World was not clearly defined.
On some occasions it represented only Spain, but then this vision was ex-
tended to the members of the Holy Alliance. The position of Great Britain
as part of Europe was also not fixed. However, they made a distinction for
Southern Europe (Mediodía de Europa) even though they did not clearly define
it. The European South was seen as a victim of the principles of the Holy
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Alliance. The New World, meanwhile, was better defined, mostly understood
as the America that had been colonized by Spain (la America antes Españo),
but they also had a more extended vision of the continent that generated
controversy. Some argued about including the United States, Haiti or Brazil,
while others, for political and cultural reasons, thought that these republics
should not be included.
Once independence was obtained, America was assumed to be similar to
Europe because it became a ‘subject of international law’ (Chiaramonte 2016).
Both worlds were equal (or almost equal): ‘We are constituted in states with
rights equal to those of the Europeans’ (Vidaurre 2010 [1826]: 189), was a state-
ment constantly reproduced by the diplomats. Even though the two world re-
gions pursued different political orders, their political ordersmade them both
legitimate subjects of international law, having the same rights before the in-
ternational system. It should be stressed that ‘comparing begins with an as-
sumption that the two comparata are in some way similar’ (Epple 2019: 142).
As actors assumed this new comparability, they began to relate similarities
and differences between the New World and the Old, based on two levels of
observation: the act of observation and the act of self-observation. In the first
case, they emphasized similarities between the two worlds for the purposes
of negotiation while in the second case they emphasized their differences in
view of the conflict between them.
For the Americans, the threat of the Holy Alliance, the presence of the
Spanish army in their territory and its confrontations with the liberating
armies, the sending of military reinforcements from Spain and the Span-
ish resistance to recognizing independence, confirmed the continuing con-
flict between both worlds. The conflict increased reflexive comparisons in
which diplomats distanced America from Europe creating an insight that
made them politically superior to the Old World. This distance was created
from self-observation, from observing what was specific to them through
which they shaped their image of America. It was then that the criterion of
political order was used to distinguish forms of government and their po-
litical system. In this sense, diplomats identified two forms of government:
monarchical government situated in the Old World and republican govern-
ment situated in the New. On the other hand, both worlds sustained the le-
gitimacy of their governments by the formation of international systems, one
created at the Congress of Vienna and the other at the Congress of Panama.
When diplomats discussed the institutionalization of the American interna-
tional system, they created a self-image of a unique New World. Obregón
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states that American regionalism in international law is a consequence of
a Criollo legal consciousness that assumed a belief in American uniqueness
(Obregón 2006: 815, 817), since it was a big nation that became independent
and a subject of international law by the will of the people and not by will of a
monarch. For them, Europe defended the return of absolutism while America
defended the institutionalization of liberalism. In his analysis of liberalism in
the Ibero-American Atlantic, Fernandez (2009: 706) affirms that in those years
liberal had a political-moral sense associated with freedom and equality and
opposed to tyranny and despotisms. Diplomats transformed the perception
of the New World through images of a world ideally placed to develop liberal
principles through a system that would balance the world, namely the Amer-
ican Confederation. During their interaction, the main differences reflected
were based on two topics: the political system and its relation to history.
According to the Criollo legal consciousness, differences were self-in-
terpreted as advantages vis-à-vis a monolithic European view of the world
(Obregón 2006: 817). In this interpretation, European order was recon-
structed as the political system of the ancien régime but American order was
constructed as a liberal system made up of nations that had fought together
for freedom, and eventually transformed themselves into a single nation, the
American nation. These qualities made America the ideal place to establish
a successful confederate system. The Colombian scholar Miguel Pombo
described European forms of government as monarchies characterized by
‘tyranny and despotism’ (Pombo 2010 [1811]: 32f.). Pombo was executed in 1816
during the Spanish reconquest of New Granada for his publications defend-
ing a federal system in America, like ‘Principles and Advantages of the Federative
System’ of 1811. He argued that America was a place that secured freedom
for the people in opposition to Europe that preserved the privileges of a few
(ibid.: 43). His negative description of the political features of Europe comes
out when he (ibid.: 32f.) asks himself if America will follow any particular
European people’s system:
Will it be that of the indolent Spaniard, perpetual slave of his aged habits,
eternal victim of his kings and of a ministry necessarily corrupted? Will it be
that of the Portuguese, ignorant and always degraded under the tutelage of
England?Will it be that of the Prussian in his military slavery? Will it be that
of the German with his numerous masters? To the Pole under the despotism
of the nobles? To the Muscovite with his still barbaric luxury and his slavery?
To Italy with its misery and its palaces? To France with its despotic emperor
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on the ruins of the Republic, or to England in short that with itsMagna Carta,
its constitution and its liberties, still has the vices of feudal tyranny?
In addition, the American system would be superior because it was formed
by a family of nations. Since they were a family, they had stronger ties than the
European nations united only by vicious institutions (ibid.: 43). It should be
noted that diplomats sustained America’s new image by reappropriating con-
cepts such as legitimacy, freedom, and nation (Fernandez 2009: 43). During
these years, political concepts were transformed into singular collectives (Fer-
nandez 2007:169), for example ‘freedoms’ became ‘freedom’, ‘the American na-
tions’ became ‘the American nation’. Diplomats also referred to the American
system as ‘the great American family united in a federal pact’ (pacto de la grande
familia americana) (Guadalupe Victoria 2010 [1827]: LX). On the other hand, the
NewWorld had as an advantage its knowledge of the European confederal ex-
perience. Manuel Lorenzo Vidaurre – who wrote American Letters, and Plan of
America with a dedication to Bolívar – affirmed that diplomats sent to the
Congress of Panama had analysed Europe’s ‘errors and sciences, virtues and
vices of sixty-two centuries’ (Vidaurre 2010 [1826]: 185f.).Other analyses estab-
lished, for example, that the association of the 13 cantons of Switzerland was a
union that did not defend the new rights but preserved the old ones (Pombo
2010 [1811]: 43), while the bases of the American confederation were liberal
principles (Alamán 2010 [1831]: 262). Likewise, there was no routinization of
the Swiss conferences (Pombo 2010 [1811]: 43). Conversely, however, America
would have a permanent assembly that would promote constant conferences
in established places (Gual 2010 [1821]: 9). The Belgian confederation had the
vice of very dispersed sovereignty among its provinces (Pombo 2010 [1811]:
44), while the American confederation would form an assembly that would
function as an intermediary among the provinces (Pando 2010 [1826]: 68).
When diplomats observed their history, they looked for reasons that made
the NewWorld a unique place to establish a successful confederation; for this
reason, they wanted to present the history of the political evolution of the New
World. Guillermo Zermeño (2017 [2009]: 575) explains that history became a
set of new experiences after independence because, according to Javier Fer-
nandez (2009: 13), the experience of time changed and people became aware
of the historicity of societies. Carole Leal (2017: 23) also states that the acceler-
ation of historical time was defined by the actors as a revolution that divided
the waters between the past (the old order) and expectations of the future (a
new order to be created).Thus, the results of two important historical moments
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describedmodern American politics: the civilizations before the Spanish con-
quest and independence. As far as the colonial past was concerned, it was seen
as an interruption in their historical evolution. Reflecting on their past, diplo-
mats observed that confederalism had existed in America before the conquest.
Bolívar wrote that independence restored the old confederalism (Bolívar 2010
[1824]: 41). Similarly, Pombo stated that this system was not foreign to the
New World, he affirmed that ‘the Swiss, the Dutch in the old continent had
the idea of federal government, but we also established it among the different
nations of the America at the time of their invasion’ (Pombo 2010 [1811]: 39),
like the federation of the Tlaxcaltecas and the barbarian and federative state
of the heroic Araucanos (ibid.: 40). During independence a ‘concept of history
emerged and it was marked by the consciousness of a historical actor who
is making history (for) posterity’ (Almarza 2009: 685); in this way, diplomats
were making history in their present by organizing the Confederation that
would defend the future of independence which, according to Vidaurre (2010
[1826]: 185), was an incomparable moral and political revolution. When they
reconstructed their history, it was the combination of a glorious past, a liberal
present and a hopeful future that reshaped the image of the New World.
Being accepted into the family of civilized nations was the best way for
diplomats to guarantee their new political order. They wanted to continue to
negotiate political equality with their European peers, so they focused on the
similarities between the Old and New World, which made them both sub-
ject to international law. When American diplomats compared both political
orders, they observed that both worlds were constituted by states (monar-
chical and republican) who created principles and norms that regulated their
international relations. That made them subjects to international law. Also,
both worlds had formed international systems (Concert of Europe and Amer-
ican Confederation) that relied on the continuation of their congresses. Both
organized congresses (Congress of Vienna and Congress of Panama) that en-
couraged the interaction of their diplomats to create regulations. Both in-
ternational systems aimed to preserve their internal orders because the in-
ternational order depended on internal order. However, the Old World’s sys-
tem defended the principle of intervention to maintain internal order in the
event of a threat to its monarchical legitimacy. For American diplomats, the
principle of intervention was a threat to the legitimacy of their independence
before the civilized world. By considering these similarities, they sought to
demonstrate that American order was created not by barbarians, but rather
by peoples who had gained their freedom and deserved acceptance with full
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rights in this civilized world (Vanegas 2009: 1044). They found in the notion
of civilization an argument to support their discourse of political equality.
According to Obregón (2006: 823f.), civilization was also part of the Criollo
legal consciousness and a power discourse that assigned political, cultural
and moral virtues. There were already differences between the Old and New
Worlds with regard to the first two virtues; however, morality was a virtue
that could enable greater comparability. Consequently, they highlighted two
aspects of their political similarities: their standards of civilization and of
morality.
Independence reopened a dispute over the New World’s place in the his-
tory of civilization (Gerbi 1955). During the colonial era, Spain was ‘quoted
as example of civilization in relation to its colonies in America’ (Feres 2017:
97). However, as Monteagudo (1825: 19) put it, America acquired, through the
war of independence, indisputable rights in accordance with the forms of civ-
ilized countries. As the diplomats claimed, America was in an advanced stage
of civilization inspired by the ‘republican spirit that is the soul and the in-
visible agent of the civilized world, that manifests itself and sprouts above
all’ (Roldán 2017 [1831]: 2120). American uniqueness fostered the spirit used to
reshape the image of the New World; nevertheless, to legitimize this image
before the Old World, they must establish their own institutions to present
themselves to the world as civilized (Actas del Congreso de Cucuta 1821). During
these years, the concept of civilization was understood as a model to imi-
tate: civilized families were contrasted with the barbaric peoples of the world
(Feres 2017: 96f.). It was then that the civilized served to ‘make comparisons
between nations and peoples’, and ‘to produce a dualistic geography of the
world, divided between civilized and uncivilized’ (ibid.: 97). In this sense, the
advanced state of civilization of the New World allowed diplomatic negotia-
tions as equals.
To prove that the NewWorld was at a high stage of civilization, the aboli-
tion of slavery throughout the confederate territory was one of the first points
to be discussed on the Congress of Panama’s moral agenda.The agenda’s main
points, in fact, were the will to avoid war (Monteagudo and Mosquera 2010
[1822]: 11) and the end of slavery (Revenga 2010 [1825]: 76). In his speech for the
inauguration of the Congress of Panama,Manuel Vidaurre expressed the sen-
timent that the Confederation must be based on ‘peace with the universe, re-
specting the governments established in European countries, even when they
are diametrically opposed to the general one that is adopted in our America’
(Vidaurre 2010 [1826]: 186). Likewise, slavery could not be part of the civilized
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world. José R. Revenga (2010 [1825]: 76f.), Colombian minister of foreign af-
fairs, was very clear in his instructions to Congress of Panama diplomats,
Pedro Gual and Pedro Briceño, when he specified that
the interest shown by the civilized world in the abolition and suppression of
the slave trade in Africa also demands that the Assembly of American States
deal with it. This matter presents our Republics with a beautiful opportunity
to give a splendid example of the liberality and philanthropy of its principles.
Many members of the Criollo elite owned slaves and found the proposal to
abolish slavery a threat to their economic interests. Although diplomats were
highly interested in proving that they followed the customs of the civilized
world, the original idea of abolishing slavery was replaced by the idea of ban-
ning the slave trade, also established at the Congress of Vienna.
Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted the impact of the reconstruction of the New
World by observing and comparing. Diplomatic interaction created a vision
of the world based on a new relation between the New and Old Worlds in
light of the independence process. In this context, diplomats desired to legit-
imize America’s independence, so their comparisons were used as a strategy
to negotiate their vision of being integrated into international society. Their
main interest was the establishment of a new global order, in that sense, they
were determined to negotiate the tertium that would move the comparata to
a new political order and change the relationship between the two worlds.
Diplomats encouraged a new comparability on the basis of a political per-
spective, their own political perspective, since the New World was conceived
of as a unique political entity that had created a new symmetrical power rela-
tion that regulated interaction between the two worlds. In this way, the global
world was developed within world regional discourse.
By creating an American Confederation, they sought to generate a new
balance in the world. Consequently, comparative practices became politicized
in discussions about the distribution of power. It was through regional global
discourse that the Americans diplomats tried to assert their arguments about
the distribution of power in the world. Having carried out this analysis, I
would like to highlight some of the issues raised by the process of reconstruc-
tion of the New World and the world order among American diplomats. The
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first thing to be noted is the development of a new space for discussion as
a result of the diplomatic interaction that began with the process of inde-
pendence. This process was characterized by an intense politicization of the
semantics inherited from colonial times. Thus, these discussions encouraged
a reappropriation of the concept and image of the New World. These trans-
formations have previously been studied above all from a conceptual point
of view.This chapter was intended to be a contribution to understanding this
reappropriation of theNewWorld and its impact on theworld regional frame-
work not only as a conceptual transformation, but also as a transformation of
its image, one that, in Anderson’s words, lives in the mind of every member
of a nation (Anderson 1993: 23).
Notes
1 The term Latin America was not created until the second half of the 19th
century. As this chapter considers how the regional framework provided
a platform for thinking about global affairs, I have stayed true to the
terminology of the historical actors I am studying. I use ‘America’ to des-
ignate what is now commonly known as ‘Latin America’.
2 All translations in this chapter are my own.

The World of Anti-Semitism
A Historical-Sociological Analysis of the Global Element
of Hostility Against Jews in Germany (1780-1925)
Marc Jacobsen and Tobias Werron
Introduction
This chapter analyses an important change in the history of modern anti-
Semitism that dates back to the mid to late 19th century. Our argument is
predicated on the observation that modern anti-Semitism is more than hos-
tility to and prejudice against Jews. It is a comprehensive worldview that of-
fers an interpretation of world affairs and a vision of how the world should
be.This affords anti-Semites the ability to re-evaluate everything that is going
on in the world from an anti-Semitic point of view. On this basis, we show
that certain observations and interpretations of the globalmanifest themselves in
the image of the Jew as the ‘universal other’. Anti-Semitism therefore rep-
resents a specific practice of observing the global. While we cannot discuss the
global diffusion of anti-Semitism here, we agree with the introduction to this
volume in suspecting that this phenomenological dimension of the global is an
important factor underlying the spread of modern anti-Semitism through-
out the 19th and 20th centuries and is still relevant today. In other words, we
need to understand ‘the world’ of anti-Semitism in order to understand the
globalization of anti-Semitism.
The global dimension of the anti-Semitic worldview is often neglected
or studied in limited, largely ahistorical ways. Modern anti-Semitism is
commonly understood as an expression of aggressive nationalism that arises
when national homogeneity and sovereignty are challenged by globalization
(e.g. Bonefeld 2005; Jacobs 2011; Weitzman 2017). While such descriptions
rightly emphasize historical relationships between nationalism and glob-
alization, they are problematic in that they conceive of nationalism and
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anti-Semitism as fundamental opposites of globalization. In so doing, they
underestimate the degree to which nationalism and anti-Semitism are
global phenomena in and of themselves, connected not just through their
ideological content but also as modern ways of envisioning the world.
While research on globalization has already shown that nationalism
and globalization are mutually reinforcing phenomena (Mann 1997; Bayly
2004; Pryke 2009; Werron 2012, 2021), research on anti-Semitism has only
just started to recognize that enmity towards Jews is a multifaceted global
phenomenon (e.g. Braun and Ziege 2004; Rabinovici et al. 2004; Salzborn
2020). With few exceptions, however, the empirical focus is on developments
after 1945, while processes of globalization and their consequences before
that are hardly considered. The theory of ‘national anti-Semitism’ stands out,
because it emphasizes both the nationalist foundation of anti-Semitism and
its international implications by describing modern anti-Semitism as having
invented ‘the Jew’ as a fundamental threat to a national world order in the
19th century (Holz 2001; Weyand 2016).
This chapter draws on, connects and complements these discussions and
insights. We argue that there was a connection between anti-Semitism, na-
tionalism and globalization as early as the 19th century, when Jews were al-
ready described as rootless and cosmopolitan. But the main problem relating
to the so-called Jewish question back then was the supposed seclusion of Jews
as ‘a state within the state’; the stereotype of a ‘Jewish world conspiracy’ be-
came more popular only at the end of the 19th century. Its increasing popular-
ity at that point in history reflects intensifying global connections, relations
and structures that became manifest, among other things, in the emergence
of a globalizing system of nation-states. We therefore propose to distinguish
between two phases in the development of national anti-Semitism: first, the
phase of emergent national anti-Semitism between the late 18th andmid-19th cen-
tury; second, the phase of universalizing national anti-Semitism starting in the
1870s. It is against the background of this distinction, then, that we should
re-evaluate the formation and global diffusion of anti-Semitism in the 20th
and early 21st centuries.
The chapter is structured as follows: We will first present the idea of na-
tionalism and globalization as mutually reinforcing phenomena, highlighting
the universal element of modern nationalism itself. We subsequently intro-
duce the concept of national anti-Semitism, arguing that the formation of its
universal element has not been studied yet as a historical phenomenon in its
own right. Our chapter aims to fill this gap. Drawing on examples from Ger-
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man anti-Semitic discourse between 1780 and 1925, we show that the world-
view of anti-Semitism ‘globalized’ from the 1870s and how it did so. We focus
on the German discourse of anti-Semitism as the emergence and universal-
ization of national anti-Semitism was particularly evident in Germany, often
preceding similar developments in other world regions. In this way we hope
to contribute to a better understanding of anti-Semitism as a specific practice of
observing and envisioning the world that reflects historical connections between
the histories of nationalism and globalization. The conclusion draws atten-
tion to some general insights and research questions that follow from this
analysis, arguing that our view adds urgently needed historical perspective to
the current discussion on global anti-Semitism.
Nationalism and globalization
Globalization scholars tend to assume that nationalism will lose its signifi-
cance because of globalization (e.g. Albrow 1996; Beck 2002), leading them to
repeatedly declare the ‘end of the nation-state’, only to be surprised by the
persistence and resurgence of nationalism over and over again. In contrast
to this ‘presentist’ view, historical research on globalization and nationalism
has pointed out that the relationship between the two phenomena is by no
means a zero-sum game: more globalization does not necessarily mean less
nationalism and vice versa. Nationalism over the last two centuries has be-
come established throughout the world as the primary legitimizing basis of
political organization. In other words, the history of nationalism is a global-
ization story in its own right. From this perspective, it is no surprise to learn
that there is no significant evidence that globalization profoundlyweakens the
nation-state (Mann 1997). Nationalist ideas of collective identity and political
sovereignty have been woven into the basic structures of global modernity, in
often ‘banal’ (Billig 1995) ways that let them appear as natural.
Sociologically, then, nationalism can be described as a global institution
(Werron 2021). Some scholars locate its origins in revolutionary France, oth-
ers in the anti-colonial Americas. Irrespective of such differences, in the early
to mid-19th century two basic models for the construction of national identi-
ties and their political ambitions were ready for copying: a primarily political
model that aimed at legitimizing and stabilizing a given state structure, and
a primarily cultural model that aimed at the founding and legitimizing of
new states. Based on these models, nationalism spread around the world in
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the 19th and 20th centuries, almost completely dividing the globe into nation-
states (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010).
The global character of nationalism, however, results not only from glob-
alist worldwide diffusion but also from the universalist imaginary built into it.
Modern nationalism can be interpreted as a discursive model that comprises
a cultural, a political and a universal or global element (Werron 2021; Calhoun
1997; Özkirimli 2010). Nationalism entails the construction of collective iden-
tities to legitimize claims of political sovereignty over a territory; however,
it also includes the idea that all ‘nations’ of the world may pursue their own
claims to political sovereignty. This, in turn, implies the idea of a world order
consisting of, and based on, a multitude of nation-states.1
The universal element in nationalism points to the historical process by
which nationalism contributed to transforming the early modern state sys-
tem into a global nation-state system. By anchoring the principle of national
legitimacy in a universalistic worldview, nationalism has helped extend the
borders of the initially European ‘international society’ so that the external
borders of the state system have indeed become congruent with the entire
world (Mayall 1990). Building on the institutions of the early modern state
system (‘international society’) such as sovereignty, diplomacy and interna-
tional law, nationalism introduced a universal source of legitimacy for them.
For this reason, it soon attracted all kinds of social groups looking to legit-
imize their state-building projects in an increasingly globalized environment
– including, most notably, anti-colonial movements outside Europe.
The success of nationalism is also a result of its in-built universalism as
a model of political organization. Nationalism not only constructs collective
identities and legitimizes their claims of independent statehood. It is also an
idea of a global order which implies a multitude of national collective identi-
ties. Nationalism is, therefore, also a form of observing the world: the whole
world is observed and interpreted through the lenses of nationalism. This
worldview also informs what we associate with society in everyday language
today: a culturally and politically integrated unit that shares the surface of
the earth with numerous other units of this type. From any nationalist’s per-
spective, there is a German society, French society, Argentine society, Haitian
society, etc.
The combination of particularism and universalism within the national-
ist worldview is a defining element of both modern nationalism and modern
world society. The epochal achievement of nationalism lies in having devel-
oped and enforced a universalist notion of a world ordered by national par-
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ticularisms. Thus, all forms of nationalism are both inclusive and exclusive at
the same time. Nationalism is exclusive because it must always draw a line
between the in-group and various out-groups. It is also inclusive in that it
affords, at least in principle, all nations a right to claim their own state. This
does not preclude hierarchies, discrimination, competition or conflicts be-
tween nation-states (Werron 2012; 2015). But, fundamentally, all these phe-
nomena are based on the perception of social groups as nations and on the
perception that all of these nations have an equal right to rule their own na-
tion-states.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule of equality between nations.
Anti-Semitism points to one of them. In the worldview of anti-Semitism,
which developed from the late 19th century and is still with us today, Jews
are both related to and excluded from the world of nations. Modern anti-
Semitism is based on nationalism. It adopts nationalism’s view of the world
but adds to it the antithesis of ‘the Jew’ as the ‘ultimate enemy’ of the national
principle. On this basis, it radically excludes Jews from the world of nations,
denying them both the right to be part of an existing nation and the right of
national self-determination.
Nationalism and anti-Semitism
Modern anti-Semitism is not merely a kind of prejudice, but also a com-
prehensive worldview (Salzborn 2012). Anti-Jewish stereotypes condense into
an overarching ‘explanation’ for numerous social phenomena and processes
(Rürup 1975). For anti-Semites, all the ills of theworld are caused by themachi-
nations of malicious Jews. This implies a clear, profound and binary distinc-
tion between good and evil (Haury 2002: 105ff.). The alleged group of (Jewish)
perpetrators is always related to an alleged group of (non-Jewish) victims.
The construction of collective identities is, therefore, also an essential part of
anti-Semitic ideology (Holz 2001).
With the emergence of nationalism, collective identities were increasingly
constructed and contrasted on the basis of national identities, so that me-
dieval anti-Judaism was ‘transformed’ into modern anti-Semitism (Weyand
2016). Religious discrimination was replaced by an ethnic distinction and the
Jews were re-invented as a threat to the nation. This historical link between
modern anti-Semitism and nationalism quickly became a research consen-
sus among scholars (Stögner and Schmidinger 2010: 387). For this reason,
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researchers often tended to view anti-Semitism as an expression of extreme
and aggressive nationalism that excludes Jews.
In line with the latest trends in the study of nationalism, however, re-
search into anti-Semitism has also begun to focus on the relationship between
nationalism, internationalism and anti-Jewish hostility (e.g. Braun and Ziege
2004; Goldhagen 2013; Aly 2017; König and Schulz 2019). A notable contribu-
tion is the systematic analysis of the relationship between anti-Semitism and
nationalism by Holz (2001), who also highlights the international and uni-
versal implications of this interconnection. A key insight here is that Jews
are not only regarded as enemies of one’s own nation but are more generally
perceived as enemies of all nations. Thus, anti-Semitism, like nationalism,
contains both particularistic and universal elements. The anti-Jewish concept
of the enemy is related to a national self-image, but this national self-image
implies that there are many other national collectives that are also threatened
by the Jews. For this reason, Jews are not regarded as a nation like others, but
as something fundamentally different: a threat to the very idea of a national world
order. Modern anti-Semitism is therefore based on two main distinctions: the
first distinguishes one’s own nation from others, the second distinguishes all
nations from the Jews (Holz 2000).
On these grounds, then, it appears that anti-Semitism solves a fundamen-
tal problem of nationalism. As many scholars have argued, national identities
are constructed in contradistinction to other national identities. Usually, his-
torical and genealogical narratives assert (fundamental) historical, political,
cultural, ethnic and even biological differences between individual nations
and their populations, from which friendships, enmities and hierarchies may
be derived and on the basis of which conflicting interests and conflicts can be
legitimized (Weyand 2016: 137ff.). But, despite all these differences, nations
share the fact that they are nations. National images of oneself and others
are, therefore, symmetrical pairs of opposites (Richter 1996). The same cate-
gory, ‘nation’, is used to describe both sides of the distinction. Any assertion
of asymmetries and hierarchies between nations has to accept this funda-
mental symmetry. However, distinctions between nations presuppose, rather
than explain, what ‘nations’ are. To determine the shared characteristics of
all nations, therefore, nationalists of all colours might be inclined to look for
opposites to the very idea of the nation, thus specifying what nations are not in
order to specify what all nations have in common.
Modern anti-Semitism provides a specific solution to this problem by in-
venting ‘the Jew’ as a counter-concept to the nation. It is not by coincidence,
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then, that most characteristics ascribed to Jews are the exact opposite of what
constitutes legitimate nationality and nationhood (as conceived by certain na-
tionalists): Jews are described as international, rootless, cosmopolitan, ex-
ploitative, impure, artificial, selfish and so on (Haury 2002: 84ff.). On this
basis, Jews are regarded by anti-Semites as being incapable of integrating
themselves into any existing nation or of forming a nation on and of their
own. The ‘wandering Jew’ is portrayed as a parasitic entity that by its very
nature contradicts and threatens the fundamental principles of nationalism.
The paradox that Jews are nevertheless often described as a ‘peculiar people’
or a ‘scattered nation’ is based on the universal logic of nationalism, accord-
ing to which non-national elements of any kind are not compatible with the
national world order (Holz 2000: 283ff.).
By imagining ‘the Jew’ as an evil third party, anti-Semitism serves another
important function for certain variants of nationalism: Everything that ques-
tions the validity of the nation can be personified in ‘the Jew’. Anti-Semitism
conceals the manifold ambivalences and conflicts of nationalism by means
of externalization. All dangers and uncertainties can be transformed into an
external threat. In this respect, anti-Semitism expresses implicit doubts, un-
certainties and crises in the (global) reproduction of nationalism (Haury 2002:
48ff.). While anti-Semitic descriptions of Jews may serve to stabilize nation-
alism, they are also a constant reminder of the contradictions and fragility
of nationalism. As non-national elements, they personify the possibility of a
worldwithout nations,which in turnmakes them appear as the ultimate enemy.
They need to be combated, expelled and/or eliminated not only to save one’s
own nation, but to save the national world order as such. Thus, both in the
description of the enemy and the self, and in the possible strategies against
the omnipresent threat of the Jews, the problem is by no means limited to
the national sphere. Rather, it reflects the fact that the distinction on which
anti-Semitism is based is not only that between Jews and Germans (or other
nations), but between Jews and all nations (Holz 2000: 270).The so-called Jew-
ish question is, therefore, always an international question. The perspective
of anti-Semitism is global.
These considerations are based on a formal analysis of anti-Semitic se-
mantics that appears plausible on a theoretical level but, in its original for-
mulation, has been relatively insensitive to the history of anti-Semitism and
to historical changes in anti-Semitism’s ideological content. Only recently has
the emergence of national anti-Semitism been evidenced in detail as a result
of the socio-historical process of secularization and nation-building in the
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late 18th and 19th centuries (Weyand 2016). The establishment of the modern
state with a centralizedmonopoly on the use of force and a secular self-under-
standing led to the erosion of religious self-images. Discrimination against
Jews solely on religious groundswas therefore no longer plausible.While Jews,
at first, experienced more legal equality, anti-Jewish animosity did not disap-
pear. Instead, anti-Jewish hostility slowly adapted to the new social context
and transformed itself. Throughout the 19th century, the basis of anti-Semitic
images of Jews shifted from religion to nation.
Weyand (ibid.: 189) argues that the figure of ‘the Jew’ as the enemy of all
nations plays a central role inmodern anti-Semitism from the late 18th century
to the present day. Descriptions of Jews as an international collective that is
fundamentally different from other nations are particularly relevant here. He
also claims that notions of Jewish ‘internationality’ and ‘world conspiracy’ had
been present since the late 18th century but became more prominent in the
late 19th century.This suggests that the universal dimension of anti-Semitism
is not static but is transformed from an implicit to an explicit dimension of
national anti-Semitism over time.
However, the universal and global character of anti-Semitism has never
been studied as an object of analysis in its own right. The question there-
fore remains when, how, to what extent and to what effect anti-Semitism has
incorporated ideas and meanings of the international and the global. By recon-
sidering previous research findings and re-examining important examples of
modern anti-Semitism in light of this question, we aim to show that the sig-
nificance of the universal dimension did indeed increase in the course of the
19th century and how it did so.
National and universal elements in German anti-Semitic discourse
(1780-1925)
In this section, we look at how the nationalist and universal dimensions of
anti-Semitic ideology developed in Germany from 1870 to 1925. We do not
aim at a comprehensive overview of the history of anti-Semitism.Our focus is
on when and how anti-Semitic stereotypes played a role in the construction,
description and observation of the national and the global. We find that the
imagined ‘internationality’ of Jews was described early on. However, in the
late 18th to mid-19th century the focus of anti-Semites was on the internal
affairs of the (emerging) nation. Only later in the course of the 19th century,
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did the observation of the global (from a nationalistic perspective) become
increasingly relevant, slowly developing into a full-blown element of modern
anti-Semitism.
The national locus of the Jewish question: a ‘state within a state’
Since the late 18th century, when religion in Europe was slowly losing its
significance as an ordering principle and as secularization and liberaliza-
tion were fundamentally altering social relations in society, the religiously
legitimized exclusion of the Jewish minority became increasingly difficult to
maintain. The transformation from a static societal system of status to a dy-
namic class society, whose contradictions were quasi-suspended in the emer-
gent idea of a shared nationality, formed the basis of Jewish emancipation
(Grab 1991: 13). With the demand for legal equality for Jews, first advocated
by Christian Konrad Wilhelm von Dohm in 1781, discussions about the condi-
tions, possibilities and limits of the integration of the Jewish minority started
all over Europe (Hettling et al. 2013). The changing social environment did
not lead seamlessly to a change in attitudes towards Jews. Rather, the latter’s
(gradual) emancipation formed a new field of conflict in which anti-Jewish re-
sentments were re-articulated (Erb and Bergmann 1989). With secularization
and the emergence of nationalism, religious images of Jews were successively
recrafted to bring them in line with nationalist ideas of ethnicity, descent
and identity (Weyand 2016). But in the context of early nation building, the
debate on Jewish emancipation was not only about the Jews. It was also about
the identity of one’s own nation and who legitimately belonged to it (Schulin
1999).
The so-called Jewish question was not a specific German phenomenon.
However, the German debate on the Jewish question not only had a great ex-
ternal impact, but was also of enormous intensity, expressed in public cam-
paigns and petitions, numerous pamphlets and even street violence (Hettling
et al. 2013: 11; Bergmann et al. 2002: 19; Pfahl-Traughber 2002: 50ff.).
Although the rejection of the emancipation of Jews was advocated by dif-
ferent political groups from various social backgrounds and is therefore char-
acterized by a variety of motives, anti-Jewish agitation and accusations con-
verged in the allegation that Jews posed an internal threat to the emerging
German state. At the heart of this was the idea that Jews would form ‘a state
within the state’ because they either could not or were not willing to assimilate
(Katz 1980: 88ff.). The animosity towards Jews was further based on the belief
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that Jews formed the antithesis to ‘Germanism’, which became an important
topic in the process of nation building and the construction of a collective
identity (Harket 2019: 183).
A closer look at influential texts of this early phase of modernizing anti-
Semitism reveals that universal elements and conspiracy accusations already
existed.2 Immediately following Dohm’s demand, the ability of Jews to inte-
grate and thus their right to emancipation was questioned. As early as 1784,
the philosopher Johann H. Schulz formulated the accusation that Jews form a
‘state within a state’ in his response to Dohm (Katz 1971). Schulz accused the
Jews of not being able to form a loyal relationship to the state in which they
lived. Rather, they remained an exclusive community with their own customs,
religious and cultural traditions, which they did not want to give up (Schulz
1784: 218ff.).The accusation that Jews formed a ‘state within the state’ was ini-
tially based on their religiousness but became increasingly ‘ethnicized’ in the
course of the 19th century (Weyand 2016: 182ff.). Central to this assumption
was a concern for Jewish disloyalty, but also for Jewish influence and power
within the state – a concern that distinguished anti-Semitic prejudices from
the majority of racist prejudices in that Jews were not considered inferior but
superior.3
In the period immediately after the Congress of Vienna there was a new
wave of chauvinist writings in which hostility towards Jews was embedded in
nationalist rhetoric.The rejection of Jewish equality escalated for the first time
around 1819 in the violent Hep-Hep riots. In the years between 1830 and 1870
the debate on the Jewish question intensified, as manifested in an increase
of pamphlets and violence (Purschewitz 2013). In these years, the phantas-
magoria of Jewish national seclusion posing an inner threat to the developing
German nation became a central topic of anti-Semitic discourse.
In 1814, the influential historian and writer Ernst Moritz Arndt positioned
himself as an opponent of the emancipation of the Jews: ‘The Jews as Jews
do not fit into this world and into these states, and for this reason I do not
want them to procreate unproperly in Germany. I also do not want this be-
cause they are alien people and because I wish to keep the German stock as
free from foreign elements as possible’ (Arndt 1814: 188f.).4 Arndt also agitated
against Napoleon and the French. But he regarded them as external enemies.
The Jews, in contrast, were the inner enemy. In 1831 the theologian Heinrich
Paulus even published a book explicitly dedicated to the alleged problem of
Jewish ‘national seclusion’ (Nationalabsonderung), which triggered a big contro-
versy (Sterling 1969: 81). Paulus argued that Jews could not obtain citizenship
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rights because Jewry itself wanted to stay ‘an isolated nation, which believes
that it is its religious duty to remain a nation separated from all other nations’
(Paulus 1831: 2f.).
Similar characterizations can be found in other works by known oppo-
nents of Jewish emancipation during that time (Hortzitz 1988: 255ff.). Espe-
cially in the first half of the 19th century, it is striking that religious attributions
were by no means obsolete. However, they were successively being woven into
a nationalistic semantic in which they gradually became a secondary element.
Religious affiliation no longer stood for itself but specified affiliation to a na-
tion (Weyand 2016: 205ff.).
The examples from the early period of modern anti-Semitism make it
clear that the intersection of particularistic and universal elements was ev-
ident early on.The idea that Jews had not integrated themselves into the Ger-
man nation, which, according to some authors, the Jews simply did not want,
or were even unable, to do, was usually accompanied by the assumption that
Jews did not integrate into other nations either. Everywhere in the world, they
kept themselves to themselves and were only committed to themselves. This
was considered a problem because Jews were assumed to have numerous neg-
ative characteristics that were contrasted with one’s own national character.
Central accusations weremoral vice, claims to superiority and the ruthless as-
sertion of their own interests at the expense of others, on the basis of which
conspiracy myths were formed.
There are several examples of pamphlets in the early 19th century accus-
ing Jews of striving for power and even of international machinations, es-
pecially in the context of the economy. As early as 1819, the notorious anti-
Semite Hartwig vonHundt-Radowsky wrote in hismuch-noticed ‘Judenspiegel’
of ruthless enrichment as the ‘collective national goal’ (gemeinschaftliches Volk-
sziel) of the Jews,whomhe described as being characterized by a ‘hostile,mali-
cious isolation, bywhich, after the destruction of Jerusalem, all Jews separated
themselves from all the people among whom they lived’ (Hundt-Radowsky
1821: 12f.). Furthermore, he even describes how Jews exert power in the world
due to their economic capabilities:
With their immensewealth, Jews […] canunhinge theworld. Emperors, kings
and princes are deep in debt to them, they have lent money to whole na-
tions at high interest, money which they did not earn in a righteous, charita-
ble manner but with lies and deception, sleight of hand, robbery and theft.
(ibid.: 13)
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What is striking, however, is that in the early to mid-19th century the Jewish
question was usually presented as being solvable at the national or state level.
Jews should integrate or would have to be discriminated against and excluded.
Proposals for an international solution to the Jewish question seemnot to have
played an explicit role yet.
Parallel to the peak of Jewish emancipation in the 1870s, the German
Empire saw a rise of political mobilization and organization of anti-Semites
(Pulzer 2004). Many scholars consider this politicization of Jew hatred a new
phase in the history of anti-Semitism (e.g. Levy 1975; Massing 1949). Some
point to the full-blown secularization and racialization of the Jewish question
as a new stage in the radicalization of Jew hatred (Benz 2015: 42ff.). Others
argue that anti-Semitism was changing because, after legal equality for the
Jews had been achieved, it was moving away from a (to some degree) real con-
flict. Consequently, anti-Semitism was no longer only directed solely at Jews
but became a general model for explaining the world (Rürup 1975).
Still, in this period the Jews continued to be regarded primarily as an
enemy who was damaging the nation from within. Thus, anti-Semitism in
the German Empire showed clear parallels to previous manifestations of Jew
hatred. According to anti-Semites, legal equality should have been revoked,
since, for various reasons, Jews basically could not be part of the German na-
tion. Even if they seemed to have been assimilated and to have given up their
peculiar rites, in reality they would still undermine and destroy German cul-
ture from within, endangering the homogeneity and sovereignty of the na-
tion.
The Berlin anti-Semitism controversy from 1879 to 1881, for example, was
sparked when Heinrich von Treitschke expressed sympathy with the idea of
revoking Jewish emancipation as he identified Jewish seclusion within Ger-
many as a cause of several domestic problems (Stoetzler 2008: 3ff.). Treitschke
demanded the Jews become Germans, because he did not want ‘thousands
of years of Germanic civilization to be followed by an era of German-Jewish
mixed culture’ (Treitschke 1879: 573). He feared the ‘flock of ambitious young
men selling trousers’ that crossed ‘over our eastern border, year after year,
from the inexhaustible Polish cradle’ and ‘whose children and grandchildren
would in time dominate Germany’s stock exchanges and newspapers’(ibid.:
572f.). Although the dispute was among educated elites and is therefore not
representative of the anti-Semitic movement (and its opponents), Treitschke’s
remarks were a crucial instance in the development of anti-Semitism after the
legal emancipation of Jews (Stoetzler 2008: 4).
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The universal dimension of the Jewish Question: ‘International Jewry’
The problem of the Jews within Germany remained a central concern of anti-
Semites, but the period after 1870 was also characterized by the rising im-
portance of the idea of an internationally operating Jewry. With the notion
of a ‘Jewish International’ gradually gaining importance in the second half
of the 19th century, the universal dimension of anti-Semitism became more
explicit. While the activities of Jews in other countries were already being
addressed at the beginning of the 19th century, these ideas were now elabo-
rated more concretely. Concepts of an international conspiracy became more
elaborate and the phantasmagoria that Jews were also an external enemy of
all other nations was postulated more explicitly. Connected with this was the
view that Judaism was striving for world domination, that a secret organi-
zation existed which directed the fate of the Jews and the world, and that it
was attempting to subjugate all non-Jews (Weil 1924: 15). Even though there
were numerous forerunners of this idea, it was not until the 1870s that it was
condensed and popularized into the assumption of a conspiracy with interna-
tional reach. Accordingly, the battlefield for the fight against anti-Semitism
was no longer primarily national but international. And indeed, anti-Semitic
texts after the 1870s show a heightened awareness of the globalizing relations
of an emerging world society.
An example is the term ‘Golden international’, which became established
in the 1870s as a description of Jews and their activities in finance (Lange 2011:
112). The term was apparently first used by Ottomar Beta in his work on ‘Dar-
win, Germany and the Jews or Jew-Jesuitism’ [Darwin, Deutschland und die Juden
oder der Juda-Jesuitismus] (1875), but it was Karl Wilmanns, a lawyer and mem-
ber of the German Conservative Party, who popularized the term in his book
on ‘The Golden International and the Necessity of a Social Reform Party’ [Die
‘goldene’ Internationale und die Notwendigkeit einer socialen Reformpartei] (1876), in
which he connected Judaism with financial capitalism and thereby explained
Jewish dominance in society. In the second half of the 19th century, the term
‘golden international’ became frequently used to describe Jewish activities
on the (financial) world market.5 In 1881, orientalist Paul de Lagarde (1920:
388ff.) not only uses the notion of a ‘Golden International’ for Jews but also
the more explicit term ‘Jewish International’ to describe the ‘Alliance Israélite
Universelle’ which he characterizes as ‘an international conspiracy, similar to
freemasonry, aiming at Jewish world domination’ (ibid.: 278).
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While at the beginning of the 19th century anti-Semitic literature was still
directed essentially against Jews as internal enemies and a state minority,
from the 1870s there was an increasing emphasis on Jews being both an
internal and an external threat. Pamphlets dealing with ‘Jewish cosmopoli-
tanism’ and ‘internationalism’ became popular. Hermann Ahlwardt’s (1890)
books about the ‘Desperate Struggle of the Aryan peoples with Judaism’
[Verzweiflungskampf der arischen Völker mit dem Judentum], or Carl Paasch’s book
on ‘Secret Judaism, Secondary Governments and Jewish World Domination’
[Geheimes Judenthum, Nebenregierungen und jüdische Weltherrschaft] (1892) are
characteristic examples of this formative era of an increasingly globally
oriented anti-Semitic discourse.
With the increasing emphasis on the ‘international Jewish threat’ also
came a heightened awareness of a common struggle of Western culture, (Eu-
ropean) nations and/or the Aryan race against the Jews. As early as the 1880s,
attempts were beingmade to organize internationally against the alleged Jew-
ish peril. The character of these meetings was by no means as international
as intended since it was mostly Germans, with some Austro-Hungarians and
Russians, who attended them (Wyrwa 2009).6 Still, the goal of a common
international struggle against the Jews declared at these meetings is remark-
able. In the ‘Manifesto to the Governments and Peoples of the ChristianWorld
Threatened by Judaism’ [Manifest an die Regierungen und Völker der durch das Ju-
denthum gefährdeten christlichen Staaten], issued at the first anti-Jewish interna-
tional congress in 1882, Jews were described as striving for world domination
and wanting to bind the European Christian peoples in chains.The purpose of
the congress was said to be the confidential consultation ‘regarding the next
objectives of the anti-Jewish movement and the means needed in the battle
against the Jewish position in high finance and trade, in agriculture and craft,
in politics and local relations, in the press and in the arts and sciences’ (Istôczy
1882: 10).
After the failure of the first attempts at a European anti-Jewish organi-
zation, Otto Böckel’s short-lived political rise began. Among the anti-Semites
of the 19th century, Böckel was probably the one with the strongest focus on
the European dimensions of the fight against the Jews. Although other anti-
Semites were already referring to the worldwide or European dimension of
the Jewish question, it was Böckel who gave the European vision of doom a
programmatic character (Wyrwa 2009). Under the pseudonym ‘Capistrano’,
he published a work that explicitly dealt with the ‘Jewish Danger to Europe’
[Die europäische Judengefahr] (Capistrano 1886) in the late 1880s.This explicit in-
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ternational orientation remained characteristic of anti-Semitism in the fol-
lowing decades. The comprehensive presentation of Jewish influence in all
areas of society on an international level became a central topic. However,
despite myths about a Jewish world conspiracy, the focus here was clearly on
Europe.
During the Weimar Republic, anti-Semitism increased once again (Benz
2015: 86ff.). The tendency, already apparent at the end of the 19th century,
to regard Jews as both an internal and external enemy, continued to grow
in the aftermath of World War I. Besides allegations that Jews were unpa-
triotic traitors or profiteers (Pfahl-Traughber 2002: 83ff.), descriptions of the
internationalmachinations of Jews and their alleged secret plans became even
more popular and were specified in numerous anti-Semitic writings.
Of great importance was the publication of the infamous ‘Protocols of
the Elders of Zion’, which first appeared in Russia in 1902 and subsequently
spread throughout the world.The ‘Protocols’ allegedly contained evidence of a
Jewish world conspiracy. They were represented as being an authentic source
documenting the main features of Jewish world politics and the strategies to
be applied in order to achieve world domination. The ‘Protocols’ became an
international success, thereby popularizing the phantasmagoria of a Jewish
world conspiracy on a global scale (Webman 2011).
From the 1920s on, Alfred Rosenberg, who was to become Hitler’s ‘chief
ideologist’ (Piper 2005), also spread the legend of a Jewish–Masonic world
conspiracy in countless writings. His essay on ‘Jewish World Politics’ [Jüdis-
che Weltpolitik] (1924), published in the journal Der Weltkampf, which was de-
voted to the ‘Jewish question of all countries’, gives a concise summary of
his anti-Semitic worldview.The fundamental problem for Rosenberg was the
‘international idea’ that manifested itself especially in socialism and social
democracy but also in international finance, all products of Jewish machina-
tions. According to Rosenberg, the aim of ‘the Jews’ is to establish an inter-
national all-Jewish private syndicate by promoting socialism, Marxism and
social democracy. Jews tried to create a Jewish World Bank or a World Syndi-
cate, which at its core was ‘a financial system that was united above all states’
(Rosenberg 1924: 8). The process of establishing this supranational organiza-
tion had been accompanied by wars and crises, which Rosenberg described
as a means of ‘economic enslavement of all peoples’ (ibid.: 5). Jews, he warns,
‘long since constituted themselves everywhere as a state within the state and
at the same time as a state above the state’ (ibid.: 8). He is therefore certain
‘that we all have a common enemywhich is first and foremost: the Jewish Red-
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Golden International and its political pimps, as embodied in professional par-
liamentarians and professional journalists’ (ibid.: 11). Rosenberg argues that
international Jewish machinations prevented other nations from interacting
harmoniously, or at least naturally, with each other.They were all victims of a
supranational organization that must be fought together in order to restore
a natural and peaceful world order of race and nationalism: ‘But one thing
should become clear to all: that peoples can and should fight for their free-
dom and their right to exist, but that the long-standing situation must finally
be eliminated, whereby they murder each other for the benefit of one and the
same laughing foreign-bred third party’ (ibid.: 11).
Rosenberg’s remarks summarize quite well how the anti-Jewish discourse
in Germany had changed since the early 19th century. Whereas, in the rejec-
tion of Jewish emancipation, Jews had been denounced for being disloyal,
unpatriotic, foreign, they were now characterized as a supranational conspir-
acy as well. They were still accused of being a threat from within because
they did not want to assimilate, but their international connections, espe-
cially in economics and politics, were emphasized much more forcefully after
the turn of the century. The explicit notion of ‘Jewish world politics’ used by
Rosenberg was another indication of this. Its use pointed to the necessity of a
common effort by all nations against the Jews.This makes it particularly clear
how much anti-Semitism was based not only on particularistic assumptions
about one’s own nation, but also on a universal idea of a national world or-
der, which must be actively and collectively restored by fighting the Jews on a
global scale. The arena of this (imagined) conflict had shifted from a primar-
ily national to an international level. That this belief – that the solution to the
Jewish question required an international approach and could not be solved
simply at the national level – would become a cornerstone of anti-Semitism
was by no means obvious at the beginning of the 19th century. Although the
universal dimension of anti-Semitism was there from the very beginning, it
became much more pronounced in the course of the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies.
Conclusion: Towards a historical perspective on the globalization
of anti-Semitism
In this chapter we have argued that modern anti-Semitism should be seen not
just as a reaction to, but also as a genuine product of, globalization. We have
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also tried to show that nationalism and anti-Semitism are closely connected
through processes of globalization. Let us conclude by highlighting the main
conceptual implications of our analysis, concerning,firstly, the history of anti-
Semitism itself and, secondly, the relationship between nationalism and anti-
Semitism.
Analysis of anti-Semitic discourse in Germany in the 19th and early 20th
centuries suggests that two periods should be distinguished in the history of
modern anti-Semitism. In the first, taking shape in the late 18th and largely
dominant during the 19th century, anti-Semites perceived the Jews (only) as
a rootless, parasitic people who formed a state within the state. This could
be called the period of emergent national anti-Semitism. In the second, develop-
ing in the late 19th to early 20thcentury, Jews were increasingly (also) seen as a
supranational quasi-organization and international conspiracy. In this period
anti-Semitism redefined its world as one where international Jewry posed a
threat to all nations alike. In such a world, hatred of Jews became much more
than a local reaction to alleged parasitic behaviour; it became a fundamen-
tal way of sense-making shared by anti-Semites around the world. With this
thinking, then, we enter what could be called the period of universalized national
anti-Semitism.
This view also implied a new perspective on the relationship between
modern nationalism and modern anti-Semitism. In both periods, anti-
Semitism was closely connected to nationalism. Only in the second period,
however, did anti-Semitism and nationalism become connected through
processes of globalization and a common endeavour to make sense of the
globalizing world. Both found common ground in reimagining themselves as
worldviews that defined the world as a space that should consist of nations.
Anti-Semitism, however, added to this the depiction of Jews as a ‘rootless’
people that did not fit into the world of nations as defined by nationalism.
Our analysis is, of course, only a first step towards an understanding of
this ‘self-universalization’ of nationalism and anti-Semitism and the ways in
which both are connected through processes of globalization. Beyond the
examples from the German discourse used here, we need empirical studies
of anti-Semitic discourses in various languages and countries to understand
how, when and in which varieties ‘universalized national anti-Semitism’ ac-
tually came into being in the late 19th and early 20th century. We also need
empirical studies of how both nationalists and anti-Semites used the emerg-
ing global infrastructure of communication in the 19th and 20th century to
connect with each other and work on their ideologies. Most notably, on this
62 Marc Jacobsen and Tobias Werron
basis, we need studies investigating the longue durée of universalized national
anti-Semitism, including the global diffusion of this worldview from the late
19th century to today. We need such studies not just to make new sense of the
history of modern anti-Semitism but also to understand its current forms.
Our aim was to outline a starting point for such studies by showing that the
global character of anti-Semitism is not just a reaction to recent globaliza-
tion dynamics but a product of long-term globalization processes that can be
traced back to the late 19th century.
Notes
1 Since the universal dimension refers to a global order of nation-states,
we use the terms ‘global’ and ‘universal’ as well as ‘international’. How-
ever, we do not use these terms interchangeably. Rather, the addition
‘global’ denotes a spatial limitation of the universal dimension: at least
for the time being, the universality of nationalism refers only to our
planet as a place differentiated into territorial and sovereign nation-
states. The term ‘international’ refers to how the global is spatially and
politically ordered according to the universal principle of nationalism.
2 This is not surprising in so far as already in the Middle Ages numerous
conspiracy theories about Jewswere in circulation (Heil 2006).Within re-
search, however, insufficient emphasis is placed on amore precise analy-
sis of what is meant by ‘world’ and what geographical scope the assumed
conspiracy has. An analysis of the changing meanings and semantics of
the world within the anti-Semitic discourse is still missing. For a short
history of conspiracy myths in the 19th century, see also Gregory (2012).
3 For a more detailed description of the (ideal-typical) differences between
racism and anti-Semitism, see Haury (2002: 116ff.). For a critical discus-
sion of connections and disconnections in the study of racism and anti-
Semitism within sociological inquiry, see Cousin and Fine (2012).
4 All translations in this chapter are our own.
5 In a speech in 1882, anti-Semitic preacher Adolf Stoecker warned that
Jews ‘remain [...] exclusive, in the international context they build the
great golden international which covers the world with its networks’ [‘sie
bleiben [...] exklusiv, in internationalem Zusammenhangmiteinander in
der großen goldenen Internationale, welche mit ihren Netzen die Welt
umspannen’] (quoted in Mumm 1914: 213). Wilhelm Marr, co-founder of
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the ‘Antisemitenliga’, also uses the image of the ‘golden International’
which according to him ‘knows no fatherland’ (Marr 1879: 43).
6 Since the 1920s, however, international congresses by anti-Semites were
held on a regular basis and became an important meeting point for Eu-
ropean demagogues (Hagemeister 2017: 59ff.).

Envisioning a World Law
Reflections on the Congrès international de droit
comparé (1900) and the Latent Underpinnings of
Comparative Legal Practice
Karlson Preuß
Constructing a world law through legal practice?
This chapter discusses the jurisprudential vision of world law. Since the end
of the 19th century, jurisprudence has been advocating its own thesis on the
globalization of law. According to popular belief, legal practice drives the har-
monization of national legal systems. By quoting and borrowing from foreign
courts and legislations, judges introduce foreign law into domestic jurisdic-
tion and thus pave the way for harmonizing different legal systems. In what
follows, the cosmopolitan dreams of Comparative Law will be dampened. Re-
sponding to the scepticism towards universalistic globalization narratives un-
derlying the contributions to this volume, this chapter challenges the narra-
tive popular among legal scholars according to which legal practice possesses
the normative potential to unify the different national legal systems. To this
end, the idea that legal practice gradually realizes a world law will be histor-
ically contextualized. Current debates on the legal borrowing of foreign law,
which are mainly conducted in the field of Constitutional Law, are examined
against the background of the first International Conference on Compara-
tive Law, which took place in Paris in 1900. Similar to contemporary debates
in constitutional law, prominent participants in this conference, which was
mostly dominated by issues of private law, placed great hopes in legal prac-
tice for the gradual realization of a uniform world law. Around 1900, the fig-
ure of the judge already embodied the cosmopolitan projections of eminent
comparative lawyers.These projections will be dissected as part of the ‘second
order approach’ described in the Introduction to this volume. Instead of tak-
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ing the legal idea of a world law for granted, I will scrutinize the discursive
context in which the world became the analytical scope of comparative law.
The field-specific dynamics underlying the discursive ‘construction’ of a global
legal space will come under the spotlight.The following sections will examine
the visible and latent motives and strategies behind current and early-20th-
century Comparative Law’s preoccupation with world law. Taking up the re-
search question of this volume, I will pursue the field-immanent motives and
problems that historically brought about the ‘projective inclusion’ (Stichweh
2000: 234) of the world in comparative law literature.
Two conflicting hypotheses on law’s contribution to globalization
The belief in law’s potential to normatively integrate world society contin-
ues unabated among a great many legal scholars. This belief is often under-
pinned by an activist tonality and an ostentatious commitment to normative
universalism. Particularly in the field of Constitutional Law, there are visible
efforts to promote the harmonization of different national legal systems. Re-
markably, the hopes of many cosmopolitically oriented lawyers are directed
towards legal practice. As often stressed by progressive constitutional lawyers,
national courts assume a crucial role in gradually implementing a transna-
tional legal sphere by quoting from foreign legal systems, thus enriching do-
mestic law by external legal experiences. The (progressive) judge enjoys the
utmost trust in these intellectual circles. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004: 65, 69),
for instance, charges constitutional judges with the task of constructing a
‘global legal system’ through ‘constitutional cross-fertilization’. The globaliza-
tion of law is envisioned as a process taking place in domestic court rooms,
cutting across national parliaments and international or global institutions.
Current developments seem to support such hopes and predictions as to-
day there is indeed a ‘growing horizontal communication between constitu-
tional systems’ (Halmai 2012: 1346). In many jurisdictions, judges quote for-
eign law to decide domestic legal issues, especially in the realm of consti-
tutional adjudication. Judicial ‘legal borrowing’ or ‘legal transplants’ are no
longer a taboo, if they ever were one.1 This legal trend seems to refute an
older thesis of globalization research. Niklas Luhmann (1991 [1971]: 63) sug-
gested that worldwide interaction is primarily established in areas of society
that maintain a style of cognitive as opposed to normative expectation. Cogni-
tive expectations are characterized by a willingness to adapt in the event of
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disappointment.This style of expectation prevails, for example, in the fields of
science and economy where involved actors are prepared to modify their ex-
pectations in response to economicmarket fluctuations or scientific progress.
By contrast, normative expectations are sustained in the event of disappoint-
ment. In the domain of law, for instance, the violation of a statute usually does
not lead to its amendment, but to its implementation. Now, the suggestion
that law as a field based on a normative style of expectation is less susceptible
to globalized modes of interaction seems to be refuted by the continuously
growing entanglement of constitutional and ordinary courts. Legal practice
appears to be a driving force of globalization.
In order to take sides in this controversy on law’s contribution to global-
ization, I will take a step back and examine the function that comparative law
fulfils in cosmopolitical legal literature. To this end, the next section outlines
the current debate on legal borrowing in Comparative Constitutional Law.
This debate will then be linked to the First International Conference on Com-
parative Law (1900).Three contributions to this conference,which are strongly
committed to the cosmopolitan cause, will be examined in more detail. As I
will argue, there are two motives which led these early legal cosmopolitans to
the field of Comparative Law. First, the method of comparative law is openly
praised as a necessary means for the realization of world law. Behind this os-
tensible motive, however, hides a second function of comparative law, which
the presenters at the conference mostly kept latent but which can, nonethe-
less, be distilled from their contributions. According to this, comparative law
provides assistance for teleological decision-making in court. At the turn of
the 20th century, reform-oriented lawyers ofWestern jurisdictions established
the view that, in the event of legal gaps, the judge should first and foremost
consider the consequences of the decision when reaching a verdict. In the
context of this teleological conception of judicial decision-making, compar-
isons to experiences in other jurisdictions may provide a welcome orientation
to better assessing the consequences of certain decisions. Remarkably, many
legal scholars who preach a normative universalism simultaneously advocate
a teleological model of judicial interpretation; this is the case both for Com-
parative Law around 1900 and for today’s literature. This impulse to engage
with comparative law undermines the cosmopolitan pleas forworld law voiced
at the international conference.
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The current constitutional debate on legal borrowing in court
Among many constitutional courts, it is a widespread practice to turn to for-
eign jurisprudence and foreign law in order to resolve domestic legal issues.
Since the 2000s, this practice has attracted a lot of attention within the dis-
cipline of (Comparative) Constitutional Law. Particularly in the US, triggered
by two Supreme Court decisions in which the Court’s majority partly relied
on foreign legal sources to settle delicate human rights issues, a fierce debate
over the legitimacy of turning to foreign law to resolve domestic legal disputes
has evolved. Some courts and judges have been fiercely attacked for relying
on foreign legal material.2 Among constitutional scholars, there is an intense
debate over the epistemic status these foreign sources assume in domestic
courts.
Next to the case Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the decision rendered by the
US Supreme Court in Roper vs. Simmons (2005) has fuelled this debate. In
Roper, the Court declared it unconstitutional to impose the death penalty
on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were
committed. Justice Kennedy, who delivered the majority opinion, drew crit-
icism from countless constitutional lawyers for backing the ruling with in-
ternational treaties that the American government had explicitly declined to
adopt.3 The majority’s strategy of building on treaties that had not been rati-
fied by the US constituted the main point of contention. In a dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Scalia attacked the majority’s line of reasoning from a separation
of powers perspective by pointing to the legally non-binding nature of the
legal sources invoked by Justice Kennedy: ‘Unless the Court has added to its
arsenal the power to join and ratify treaties on behalf of the United States, I
cannot see how this evidence favours, rather than refutes, its position’ (Roper
v. Simmons, 2005).
Even though constitutional scholars had already encountered the issue of
comparative constitutional interpretation on an earlier occasion (Choudhry
1999), the Roper case spurred on the controversy over the legitimacy of legal
borrowing in court. What is interesting here, is the fact that in legal scholar-
ship this issue has been construed as a debate between normative universal-
ism and normative particularism. For instance, it is customary to distinguish
particularist constitutional cultures such, as that in the US whose courts tra-
ditionally are rather reluctant to turn to foreign case law and literature, from
those pursuing an open-minded or universalist approach, such as the highest
courts in Canada, Israel and South Africa, which seek judicial guidance from
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foreign legal experiences on a regular basis (Choudhry 1999; Markesinis and
Fedtke 2006). Similarly, the normative question of the legitimacy of legal bor-
rowing in court is raised in identical terms. Among proponents of practised
legal comparison, universalism is invoked as a normative argument. Defend-
ing the Supreme Court’s outreach to foreign legal material, constitutional
scholar Vicky Jackson (2005: 118) claims that ‘foreign or international legal
sources may illuminate “suprapositive” dimensions of constitutional rights’,
thus highlighting their universal nature. She argues that the resistance to
drawing on foreign law in constitutional adjudication cannot be justified in
light of the ‘universalist components’ (ibid.: 122) of the US Constitution. In
a similar spirit, Sujit Choudhry identifies a judicial style of ‘universalist in-
terpretation’ and stresses that ‘the constant use of foreign jurisprudence will
serve to remind not only courts, but other actors in the legal system as well –
governments, legal counsel, and private litigants – that a nation’s particular
constitutional guarantees are shared with other countries’ (Choudhry 1999:
888).
Conversely, legal scholars taking a critical stance towards transnational
legal borrowing pursue the same conceptual approach. Richard Posner (2005:
85) resents the normative universalism onwhich Justice Kennedy’s judgments
were allegedly based:
I do not think the citation of these foreign decisions is an accident, or that it
is unrelated tomoral vanguardism. It marks Justice Kennedy […] as a natural
lawyer. The basic idea of natural law is that there are universal principles of
law that inform – and constrain – positive law. If they are indeed universal,
they should be visible in foreign legal systems and so it is ‘natural’ to look to
the decisions of foreign courts for evidence of universality.
This is an attitude that Posner describes as unacceptable. Normative univer-
salism is rejected as the theoretical manifestation of a bygone era, that is, the
era of natural law.The debate thus amounts to a dispute over normative con-
victions. Both opponents and supporters of using comparative law as a source
in court conceive of this debate in identical terms, namely as an argument be-
tween universalism and particularism. Likewise, neutral observers like Mark
Tushnet or JeremyWaldron construe this debate as the fight of constitutional
patriotism against normative universalism (Tushnet 2006) or as the alterna-
tive of ‘law as will’ and ‘law as reason’ (Waldron 2005: 146).
It is perfectly understandable to present this issue in these terms. How-
ever, universalist lawyers must have noticed by now that judicial borrow-
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ing is not just a cosmopolitical success story. The Hungarian Constitutional
Court, which played an inglorious role in underpinning Orban’s path to illib-
eral democracy, invoked, whether justifiably or not, a ruling by the German
Federal Constitutional Court when defending the ‘constitutional identity’ of
Hungary against European impositions (Halmai 2017). Some critics of this
legal borrowing in court have recognized that the cosmopolitan promises of
many constitutional lawyers and judges may conceal other motives, most im-
portantly personal ‘political preferences’ (Posner 2005: 85). In a conversation
with Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice Antonin Scalia dispelled the universalistic
claim of his opponents. Mockingly, Scalia put himself in the shoes of a judge
who looks for legal sources all over the world to solve a domestic legal dispute:
I as a judge am not looking for the original meaning of the Constitution,
nor for the current standards of decency of American society; I’m looking for
what is the best answer to this social question in my judgment as an intel-
ligent person. And for that purpose I take into account the views of other
judges, throughout the world. (Dorsen et al. 2005: 526)
According to Scalia, the political inclination of the judge rather than a norma-
tive interest in a globally shared legal framework forms the basis of practised
legal borrowing. Scalia recognizes that another dimension is hidden behind
the displayed universalism. The constitutional judge applying comparative
law does not try to interpret the domestic constitutional framework, but to
find an answer to a particular social question. According to Scalia, the dif-
ferent approaches to legal borrowing stem from different conceptions of the
judge. Behind the dispute between constitutional particularism and univer-
salism – this is also recognized by the progressive side – lie different images
of judicial decision-making.
This two-dimensionality has accompanied Comparative Law since its in-
stitutional foundation. The following sections historically retrace the current
constitutional debate by analysing key contributions to the first International
Conference on Comparative Law in 1900. The historical comparison will re-
veal that today’s advocates of world law reproduce commonplaces that were
already firmly anchored in Comparative Law around 1900. During that time,
prominent legal scholars used similar arguments in their pursuit of a world
law realized through legal practice. As will be demonstrated, the pioneers of
modern comparative law have not only excelled in normative universalism.
Rather, these authors stand for a general change of mentality within legal
methodology, which has been decisive for the emergence of practices of legal
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borrowing. Contextualizing current debates on practised comparative law in
historical terms will reinforce the suspicion of some critics that today’s par-
tisans of legal borrowing are driven by more than cosmopolitan motives.
Visible and latent motives of early Comparative Law:
The Congrès international de droit comparé (1900)
Throughout the 19th century, jurists of the Western legal sphere were on the
lookout for legal developments in other countries.The departure from natural
law towards the end of the 18th century created the necessary epistemic lee-
way for the discipline of Comparative Law. While in the pre-modern period
the problem of legal comparison in the narrower sense did not arise because
of the absolute claims of religiously or rationalistically grounded natural law,
the early 19th century experienced the complete implementation of a volun-
tarist understanding of law,whichmade the comparison of different legal sys-
tems of equal status possible in the first place. As early as the first half of the
19th century, the first journals dealing with foreign and comparative law were
founded (Gordley 2006: 760; Zweigert and Kötz 1998: 55). In the greater part
of the 19th century, during which national jurisprudences established them-
selves as scientific disciplines in the modern sense, perspectives on foreign
law were typically taken in order to foster the systematization and autono-
mization of a national jurisprudence rather than to promote the assimilation
of different legal orders (Steinmetz 2005: 38). Even though from the early 19th
century jurists were inspired by the legal trends of other countries, the na-
tional legal sciences maintained the idea of a national legal system tied to
conceptual entities such as the Volksgeist, the Code Napoléon or the American
Common Law.
In the second half of the 19th century, the discipline of Comparative Law
became increasingly institutionalized through the founding of learned soci-
eties, professorial chairs and further journals, particularly in France (Zweigert
et al. 1998: 58). The discipline took a decisive step forward in 1900, when
the Congrès international de droit comparé was organized on the occasion of the
World Exhibition, thus assembling jurists from all over the (Western) world in
Paris (Frankenberg 2018: 44).The great interest in comparative law originated
primarily from the field of private law, owing to intensified trade and the en-
suing problem of international legal harmonization. As can be seen from the
1888 treatiseDie Anfänge einesWeltverkehrsrechts by Georg Cohn – an important
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author for early comparative law – international trade relations established
the need for global unification of railway law,maritime law, copyright law and
many other legal domains. In the context of this diagnosis, Cohn advocated
the idea of a ‘world law’ [Weltrecht] for the domain of traffic law (Cohn 1888:
137). At the turn of the 20th century, legal scholarship distanced itself from
the national conceptual foundations of 19th-century jurisprudence. The great
projects of the classical era of modern jurisprudence – for instance James
Kent’s Commentaries on American Law (since 1830), Savigny’s System des heuti-
gen römischen Rechts (since 1840) and Charles Aubry and Charles Rau’s Cours de
droit civil français (1839) – had been written with the intention of giving a solid
jurisprudential basis to national legal systems. Towards the end of the 19th
century, new talking points emerged.
Visible function of comparative law: Realizing a common law of mankind
This conceptual reorientation is also noticeable at the Paris Conference. Some
of the lectures given at this conference will now be examined in more de-
tail. A glance at these contributions reveals that it is not a new strategy to
rely on comparative law in order to drive forward the project of normative
universalism.The main protagonists at the conference, not least the organiz-
ers Édouard Lambert and Raymond Saleilles, opted for exactly this strategy.
The participants were aware that the conference was a milestone for their
discipline. Therefore, many speakers used their lectures to elaborate on the
function of comparative law for jurisprudence and society in a programmatic
fashion.The vision of a global legal system plays a special role in this context.
As demanded by Saleilles, the discipline of Comparative Law must ultimately
contribute ‘to the formation of a common law of civilized humanity’ (Saleilles
1905 [1900]: 181).4 Similarly, Lambert embarked on an activist agenda. He dis-
tanced himself from a purely scientific way of treating comparative law,which
he labels as the sociological path and proposes a legal approach which con-
strues ‘comparative law as an instrument of action on the progress of law’
(Lambert 1905 [1900]: 46). Lambert charged this variant of comparative law
with nothing less than the approximation of different legal systems by ‘grad-
ually eliminating the differences between legislations governing peoples of
the same civilization’ (ibid.: 38). According to Lambert, who evokes Cohn’s
notion of Weltrecht (ibid.: 34), comparative law fulfils the same function as
the ancient jus commune, for instance the Deutsche Gemeinrecht, did in the pre-
modern period by transcending the legal patchwork stemming from the plu-
Envisioning a World Law 73
rality of sovereign political powers (ibid.: 39). Comparative lawmay thus assist
in creating a new kind of transnational ‘common legislative law’ [droit commun
législatif ] (ibid.: 39) that is capable of aligning the different legal systems of
similarly developed nations. The contributions of both Saleilles and Lambert
at the Conference conjure up the cosmopolitan utopia of ‘a common law of
mankind’ (Zweigert and Kötz 1998: 3).
Similarly, Ernst Zitelmann and Josef Kohler, two important representa-
tives of German civil law, appealed to the goal of global legal unification in
their contributions to the conference. Mirroring the stance taken by Lambert,
Zitelmann (1905 [1900]: 194) considered the discipline of Comparative Law as
themost powerful means of preparing for the unification of different national
systems of private law. Kohler’s speech (1905 [1900]: 227) takes a similar direc-
tion while not lacking a peculiar universalist pathos:
The science of comparative law is a product of modern legal science; it goes
beyond thefields of local lawand is at the forefront ofworld law, the lawof all
peoples. Each jurist, while maintaining a sense of his or her own nationality,
at the same time feels as a citizen of humanity and perceives in his or her
heart the pulsations common to all peoples.
It is thus a proven strategy to emphasize the cosmopolitan underpinnings
of comparative law. In contrast to classical foundations of legal provisions in
nationalist concepts such as the Volksgeist or the Code Civil, comparative pri-
vate law in the late 19th century takes an angle towards the global. Among the
above-mentioned participants in the conference, comparative law is regarded
as themost promising instrument for the realization of a globally shared legal
space.
But on what assumptions is this universalism based? As will now be
shown, the contributions made by the above-mentioned participants at
the International Conference evince very specific ideas about the nature of
judicial decision-making. The next section produces evidence that late-19th-
century discourse in comparative law is partly sustained by a latent motive
that may undermine its universalist aspirations.
Latent function of comparative law:
Assisting teleological decision-making in court
The authors previously considered draw on comparative law for another pur-
pose besides its claimed contribution to realizing world law. This purpose is
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not apparent but remains latent. There are two conspicuous aspects which
lead me to the assumption that the pursuit of a world law is not the only driv-
ing force for the comparative lawyers under investigation. First, it is strik-
ing that major protagonists of the International Conference were affiliated
to a very similar movement of reform in late-19th-century jurisprudence.This
movement was transnational in nature, but operated domestically in the cri-
tiques of jurists targeting their respective national legal traditions. From the
late 19th century on, Lambert, Saleilles, Kohler and Zitelmann, among other
participants at the conference excelled in criticizing the legal methodologies
of their domestic legal traditions.
At the turn of the century, the French and German legal discourses cul-
tivated the derogatory terms ‘conceptual jurisprudence’ [Begriffsjurisprudenz]
and ‘exegetic school’ [école de l’exégèse] in order to disparage the classical pe-
riod of 19th-century jurisprudence. First and foremost, the transnational up-
rising revolved around the theory of judicial interpretation.The central ques-
tion is how the judge should act in cases of legal lacunae (Gängel and Mollnau
1992: 299). In essence, reform-oriented jurists campaigned for the teleologi-
cal nature of judicial decision-making to be acknowledged. According to this
spirit of reform, the evaluation of the possible consequences of a verdict must
become an explicit and determining factor in the process of judicial inter-
pretation. In reformed legal methodology, teleological concepts such as the
purpose of the law or individual and social interest assume a prominent sta-
tus. Legal reformers from the late 19th century were the first to elaborate the
notion of functional or teleological judicial decision-making (Schelsky 1980:
173; Zweigert 1970: 244). As mentioned above, many of the participants of the
Conference on Comparative Law in Paris embraced this reformist mindset
too.
The second striking feature, related to the first one, is that none of the
above-mentioned participants involved in the conference advocated an un-
derstanding of comparative law dedicated exclusively to the comparison of
different national statutory frameworks. It is important to realize that there
are different ways of practising comparative law. One very obvious way is to
compare the laws of different jurisdictions. A cosmopolitan legal vision could
then be expressed through proposals for legislative reform. In the lectures that
were given, the comparison of different domestic legislation and the possible
influence exerted by comparative lawyers on parliaments is only recognized
as a minor task of comparative law. This task is accompanied and completely
outshone by another. As contended by eminent participants at the Confer-
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ence, comparative lawmust be practised in court by providing assistance in the process
of judicial decision-making. Not the legislature, but the judge was in the fore-
ground of the contributions to the conference.
The fact that the lecturers advocated the reform of judicial interpretation
in similar fashion and dedicated their contributions mainly to the judge indi-
cates, in my opinion, an interest in comparative law which was not primarily
based on the objective of realizing a world law. Subliminally, but nevertheless
visibly, the authors defended the stance that comparative lawmainly assists in
findings answers to certain domestic problems. According to this view, com-
parative law is an effective instrument for filling legal gaps, not a cosmopoli-
tan end in itself. The understanding of comparative law as a useful element
for judicial interpretation was the product of the legal reform movement of
the late 19th century. Zweigert and Siehr (1971: 220) credit Rudolf von Jhering
with the insight that comparative law and renewed judicial methodology were
interconnected:
his idea that the judge, in his law-applying functions, does not always act
like a machine but plays an actively creative role, opened the way for com-
parative law to aid in interpreting statutes, and evenmore in finding the law
in areas which are void of established legal rules.
Comparative law may provide support in a judicial judgement which is ex-
plicitly oriented towards criteria of usefulness. It was particularly reform-
oriented legal scholars around 1900 who turned against the stereotypical im-
age of the judge as a mere subsumption machine. Comparative law, among
other tools, is then seen as a valuable instrument for solving certain social
problems that arise due to gaps in the legal system. In this way of addressing
comparative law, the idea of a world law has no conceptual place. This latent
aspect of comparative law can be extracted from the lectures given by Kohler,
Lambert and Saleilles.5
As Kohler (1905 [1900]: 234) emphasized, current developments in the field
of international law evoke new duties for the legal profession:
We recognize that we contribute to the improvement of civilization [...];
moreover, we know that we can hold ourselves, by our intelligence and
thoughtful action, the flag of progress; we also know that we can find in
foreign law important materials that can benefit our people and render
considerable services to the development of law. We now recognize that
the jurist is not only a researcher of law, but also a politician of law, that his
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experiences can be put to good use for the advancement of law; in particular,
the jurist who practises comparative law is able to refer to foreign law, and
thereby indicate the most appropriate means to benefit our own law and
the nation to which we belong.
This passage is interesting for two reasons. First, Kohler takes up central topoi
of the movement to reform judicial interpretation.This is particularly evident
in his conception of the jurist as a legal politician. In this context, he distances
himself from traditional jurisprudence which ‘denied the jurist the compe-
tence to engage in legal politics and considered that his only business was
to honour and worship positive law without taking into account its value or
merit’ (ibid.: 234). Hereby, Kohler reproduces a widely disseminated precon-
ception of legal reformists regarding traditional 19th-century jurisprudence.
At the International Conference, Kohler did not explicitly refer to the tasks
of the judge, but elaborated on the general duties of jurisprudence. However,
reading these statements against the backdrop of his own doctrine of judi-
cial interpretation, in which he defends the notion of judge-made law (Kohler
1886: 60),wemay assume that his general expectations of the jurist announced
at the conference were addressed mainly to the judge. Echoing a general sen-
timent around 1900, Kohler resisted a rigid notion of separation of powers by
highlighting the political responsibility of judicial decision-making.The value
of comparative law is connected to a new understanding of the judge. If the
judge is released from his role as a legal scientist and recognized as a politi-
cian, comparative law assumes major importance. As described by Kohler,
comparative law becomes a powerful tool in the context of such political con-
siderations of expediency, which ought also to be practised by judges.
Second, Kohler’s speech reveals that comparative law is first and foremost
an instrument for solving national problems. It is true that human civilization
as a whole is said to benefit from it, but comparative law is meant to directly
promote the advancement of ‘our people’ and ‘our own law’. Kohler thus sets
a new focus: comparative law is not, as pretended, conceived in terms of the
goal of a world law, but rather serves as a means of progressing domestic law
and society. A look abroad may help the jurist, or the judge, to implement
better legal solutions in his own legal system.
In the lecture by Lambert, the conceptual linking of comparative law and
reformed judicial methodology becomes more obvious. As described above,
Lambert considers the approximation and gradual unification of different le-
gal systems to be the main task of comparative law. How is this ‘common leg-
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islative law’ [droit commun législatif ] (Lambert 1905 [1900]: 39) to be realized?
Lambert puts all his hopes in the judge. As argued, the harmonization of dif-
ferent legal systems must be achieved by means of judicial interpretation.
Just as common customary law and the Deutsches Privatrecht were applied
by the courts in the silence of local customs and particular laws, common
legislative law may be introduced in each country through the gaps of do-
mestic case law. It will not only be used by the courts as evidence of written
reason, but as an expression of the common understanding of domestic and
parental law. The work of interpretation continually brought the provisions
of our old customs closer to those of customary common law, which seemed
to better reflect the present spirit of the whole of these customs; at the same
time, it slowly brought the provisions of the Landrechte closer to the rules of
Deutsches Privatrecht (ibid.: 45).
Lambert connects the general theme of comparative lawwith the issue of legal
lacunae, the linchpin of legal reform literature. Against this background, it is
instructive to compare Lambert’s lecture with an article he published in the
same year. In this article, he approaches comparative law starting from the
problem of judicial interpretation rather than from the perspective of world
law. Reform-oriented legal scholars around 1900 pursued different method-
ological agendas to solve the problem of legal gaps. Francois Gény, for exam-
ple, countered the ‘traditional method’, which he attributed to 19th-century
jurisprudence, with ‘libre recherche scientifique’, by which the judge further ad-
vances the legal system in a socially and morally beneficial way. Lambert,
by contrast, draws on comparative law as an methodological alternative for
Gény’s libre recherche scientifique (Jamin 2010: 382), proclaiming: ‘Where will we
find the directions, the indispensable points of support to guide the course
of case law in this way? In the science of comparative civil law’ (Lambert
1900: 240). Within the conceptual framework of teleological decision-mak-
ing, comparative law provides the orientation that many of Lambert’s con-
temporaries (for instance, Roscoe Pound, Raymond Saleilles, Eugen Ehrlich
and Ernst Fuchs) saw in sociology.The consequences of a legal decision, as as-
sumed by Lambert, can be better assessed through the experience that other
jurisdictions have had in dealing with similar problems. Thus, in this article,
the line of argumentation is reversed compared to his lecture at the Inter-
national Conference. Comparative law does not primarily serve to establish a
world law. Rather, it is intended to assist in interpreting an incomplete body
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of laws and thus to provide illustrative material for the resolution of certain
social problems.
Nevertheless, Lambert’s contribution to the International Conference was
alsomarked by features that run counter to his ostentatious cosmopolitanism.
The great importance Lambert attached to the dimension of legal practice in
this lecture reflects his idea that comparative law provides an answer to the
problem of legal lacunae. The relevance of this motive is also expressed in
the fact that Lambert instructs the comparative lawyer to consult foreign law
in order to find the best ‘solution’ to certain social ‘problems’ (Lambert 1905
[1900]: 50ff.). This functionalist language is indicative of his actual concern.
The main function of comparative law is to provide the judge with instruc-
tive templates for solving certain problems. In this context, world law forfeits
its absolute claim: ‘When, with the help of these instruments, the compara-
tist sees the definite superiority of one of these solutions – and only then –
will he lend it the character of a provision of common legislative law’ (ibid.:
52). Approaching comparative law in functionalist terms, common legislative
law, Lambert’s expression for world law, is simply defined as the best possi-
ble solution to a particular problem. In his lecture at the conference, world
law is not pursued as an end in itself. The cosmopolitan charisma vanishes in
this instrumental definition of world law. By defining the function of com-
parative law as a means of providing illustrative material for the solution of
certain (domestic) problems, the discipline as a whole is placed in the hands
of domestic factors.
Saleilles’s contribution to the International Conference pursues a similar
line of reasoning. By analogy with Lambert, he sets an activist tone stating
that comparative law must not be limited to a purely historical and sociolog-
ical role, it ought rather to pave the way for ‘legal politics’ (politique juridique)
(Saleilles 1905 [1900]: 177). While the diversity of legal cultures is to be re-
spected, the objective of the political initiative advocated by Saleilles is to pro-
pel the unification of different legal systems (ibid.: 178). Comparative law is
supposed to assume a pioneering role in this process: ‘Jurisprudence [droit]
studies the existing law, comparative law seeks to deduce the law that ought
to be [la loi qui doit être]’ (ibid.: 179).
Saleilles’s idea of politique juridique, as described above, envisages the ideal
of a common law of mankind (ibid.: 181). Even though he distinguishes three
mechanisms by which this ideal state may be accomplished, namely legisla-
tion, scientific doctrine and judicial interpretation (ibid.: 182), his greatest in-
terest by far is in the mechanism of legal interpretation. Here too, the project
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of comparative law is linked to the issue of legal gaps. Comparative law, he
contends, assumes a crucial function in supplementing the gaps in the le-
gal system. Most importantly, foreign law thus becomes a significant tool in
teleological interpretatory practice:
The idea that must prevail in this case, where the law no longer applies for-
mally, is that the interpretation must be made in the sense of the practical,
economic and social purpose of the law, in accordancewith all the legal prin-
ciples on which it is based. Now, the practical, economic and social purpose
of a law becomes increasingly apparent to the extent that it concerns institu-
tions responding to general and permanent needs, thus moving away from
the narrowness of locally applied law in order to draw inspiration from the
progress achieved throughout the civilized world. This is particularly true
when it comes to remedying ills or inconveniences of a public nature, or to
satisfying needs that meet a principle of superior morality (ibid.: 183f.).
The teleological language betrays that comparative law is not simply placed
in the service of a world law, the judge must be concerned with finding an-
swers to certain ‘needs’ and realizing the ‘purposes’ of certain laws. As with
Lambert, looking at the legal experiences of other jurisdictions is not an end
in itself. Comparative law is a source of ‘inspiration’ for the domestic legal
system. Legal comparison thus provides valuable assistance to the process
of outcome-oriented judicial decision-making. Like many conference partic-
ipants, Saleilles set himself apart from the traditional methodological notion
of judicial interpretation and propagated the ideal of a policy-driven judi-
ciary. Comparative law thus turns into an instrument to judicially ‘loosen the
law’ (ibid.: 187). The variety of foreign legal sources provides the judge with a
wide range of material that allows him to take the ‘organic initiative’ (ibid.:
187) for the further development of the legal system.
Like Lambert and Kohler, Saleilles represents a model of purposive ju-
dicial interpretation. Judicial decision-making must be guided and founded
upon considerations of social expediency. In Saleilles’s lecture, too, this un-
derstanding is echoed by functionalist terminology. Discussing the mecha-
nism of judicial interpretation, he does not instruct the judge to transcend
the national legal horizon in order to access an area of transnationally shared
legal norms, but to find solutions to certain social problems:
The question is [...] whether the interpretation of national lawmust and can
be carried out in accordancewith the guidance provided by comparative law,
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and therefore in line with the solutions which, at a givenmoment in history,
constitute the ideal type of legal progress. (ibid.: 182)
Taking up a fundamental trope of the late-19th-century legal reform move-
ment, it is a general trait of the conference lectures examined here to embed
law and judicial interpretation in a functionalist conceptual framework (next
to Lambert, see also Zitelmann 1905 [1900]: 193). It is crucial to note that this
functional/teleological understanding of law is not limited to the sphere of
the legislature, but refers to the process of judicial decision-making.The pro-
liferation of functionalist terminology at the Conference on Comparative Law
may be read as the manifestation of a newly established mentality in judicial
methodology. Comparative Law then becomes a crucial factor in the context
of a theory of interpretation according to which the judgemay or must openly
profess a policy-oriented attitude in the process of applying the law.
Deceptive universalism
In the three lectures, two distinct problems are blended together. Firstly, the
authors claim to pursue the normative goal of a universalist world law. Sec-
ondly, this goal is repeatedly flanked by the completely different issue of ju-
dicial interpretation. This second question puts the cosmopolitan vision of a
universal world law into perspective. It is one thing to pursue the goal of a
common law of mankind as an end in itself; another to consult comparative
law as part of an attractive teleological mechanism for filling legal gaps. In
the latter case, comparative law and with it the idea of a world law are har-
nessed as resources for policy-oriented modes of judicial decision-making in
the absence of a clear legislative basis.The utopia of a common law of mankind, to
which the comparative lawyers of the International Conference seem to be committed,
is at odds with an understanding of comparative jurisprudence that serves to provide
illustrative material for resolving certain social problems.The great attention paid
to legal practice as opposed to statutory law, especially in the case of Saleilles
and Lambert, is self-exposing in this regard. If the normative goal of a world
law were driving these authors, then we would not be witnessing a one-sided
fixation on the judge. This feeds the suspicion that the normative universal-
ism often propagated in comparative law at the turn of the 20th century was
oblique. At the conference, the authors discussed above advocated a certain
idea of judicial decision-making that had not primarily evolved out of a ju-
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risprudential interest in comparative or world law. Their contributions indi-
rectly served another jurisprudential cause, which, in turn, had an impact on
their cosmopolitan aspirations.
In order to understand the peculiarity of combining these two motives,
one should be aware of alternative approaches to comparative law. As de-
scribed above, modern jurisprudence had already encountered the idea of
comparative law before the late 19th century. Rudolf von Jhering, for exam-
ple, in his early period of writing during which he had not yet polemicized
against the classical methodology of so-called ‘conceptual jurisprudence’ [Be-
griffsjurisprudenz], had already called for lawyers to look abroad to solve do-
mestic legal issues. His motto, announced in 1866, has become a frequently
quoted topos in the field of Comparative Law:
The question of the reception of foreign legal institutions is not a question
of nationality, but simply one of expediency, of need. No one will fetch a
thing from abroad when he has as good or better at home; but only a fool
will reject the bark of the cinchona because it did not grow in his vegetable
garden. (Jhering 1866: 8f.)6
In contrast to the legal discourse around 1900, however, the young Jhering did
not understand comparative legal research as a mandate for the judge. Jher-
ing’s remarks may be read as an appeal to the legislature to look abroad before
passing a law. Although this approach to legal comparison reveals a utilitarian
understanding of law it is not a plea to base judicial decision-making on tele-
ological considerations.There is a crucial difference between conceptualizing
law in general in teleological terms and doing the same for judicial decision-
making, a difference usually neglected in historical research on legal thought
(for instance Kennedy 2006: 22). Only the late 19th century saw a teleological
theory of interpretation emerging which, as described in the last section, was
strongly represented at the International Conference in Paris.
Strikingly, the discipline of Comparative Law was institutionalized at a
historical juncture in which jurisprudence established a new image of the
judge and judicial decision-making. Traditional legal theory conceived judi-
cial interpretation as a process in which legal norms were either directly ap-
plied or, in the case of legal lacunae, in which the legal system was further
developed from within on the basis of existing legal principles and in accor-
dance with scientific standards. From the late 19th century, by contrast, the
political dimension of judicial decision-making came to the fore. The judge
was increasingly perceived as a figure responsible for solving certain social
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problems and who, for this purpose, ought to take appropriate policy consid-
erations into account. The scope of applying comparative law thus noticeably
widened for reform-minded legal scholars of late 19th century. Legal compar-
ison appears to be of particular interest for jurisprudence in the context of
a legal theory that grants judges the opportunity to build on foreign legal
experiences in order to pursue certain policies. This does not imply that con-
sulting comparative law as a source of inspiration for the domestic legislature
disappeared at the end of the 19th century. Christophe Jamin claims that most
French legal scholars of the early 20th century continued to practise compar-
ative law along these conventional lines, Lambert and Saleilles being the ex-
ception (Jamin 2010).
Undisputedly, the global emerges as a central category in the discourse
of comparative law around 1900, for instance in the shape of a Weltrecht or
the droit commun de l’humanité. Central actors at the Congrès international de
droit comparé, which in 1900 brought renowned jurists from all over the world
together in Paris, transcended classical national legal conceptions by plac-
ing comparative law at the service of envisioning a global horizon of law.
However, the normative universalism frequently displayed among compar-
ative lawyers disintegrated due to their idea of teleological interpretation, as
the cosmopolitan potential of the underlying theory of judicial interpretation
is limited. The spirit of legal reform takes as its starting point the alleged
inability of classical legal methodology to meet social problems, for instance
in the field of labour law, in a satisfactory manner. The dispute between tra-
ditional and reformed jurisprudence was conducted within a national frame
of reference despite the international entanglements of the involved jurists.
In response to the problem of legal lacunae, legal reformers have developed
different agendas to achieve specific social objectives through the courts. The
world or the global did not play a role here. The evocation of a world law oc-
curring at the International Conference is thus accompanied by a concept that
was fashioned for unrelated purposes. This unrelatedness is reflected in the
twofold recourse to comparative law in the lectures. On the one hand, com-
parative law is used as a path to world law. On the other, it is drawn upon as
a useful tool for judicial decision-making.
In the conference lectures examined above, the notion of world law is built
on unstable ground.The globalist vision of a world law degenerates into a nor-
mative appeal addressed to the judge. As stipulated, it is incumbent upon the
judiciary to gradually enforce universal world law. Even leaving aside ques-
tions of global law, there is already enough reason to doubt whether the high
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level of trust placed in the socio-political capacity of the judiciary by reform-
oriented jurists around 1900 was justified.The cult of the judge, however, was
completely exaggerated when comparative lawyers around 1900 placed their
hopes in the judicature to ensure the harmonization of different national legal
frameworks. Empirically, confidence in a cosmopolitan cause pursued by the
judiciary was refuted. National Socialist jurisprudence demonstrated how the
achievements of the legal reform movement could be harnessed for its own
purposes. Instead of paving the way for a world law, German jurisprudence
of the 1930s took advantage of the insight into the political nature of judicial
decision-making to exempt domestic courts from the formal pressure exerted
by the legal system and let them openly pursue fascist policies (Schröder 1985:
114ff.). The comparative lawyers of the late 19th century tied the project of a
global law to prerequisites that potentially led astray from their universalistic
inclinations.
World law: The bad conscience of the progressive lawyer?
Putting the constitutional debate on comparative legal practice into a histor-
ical context, we may register that the current issues dealt with in the field
of Comparative Constitutional Law are basically repetitions of issues that have
been present in Comparative Law since the late 19th century, particularly in
the field of Civil Law.The differences between civil and constitutional law can
be neglected here. For the purposes of this chapter, it is irrelevant whether
the comparative lawyer turns to foreign legal sources in order to examine
problems of copyright law or to verify the constitutionality of criminal law in
dealing with minor offenders. Both at the International Conference around
1900, which took place under the auspices of private law, and in the constitu-
tional debate on legal borrowing carried on since the 2000s universalist and
teleological motives have run side by side. In my estimation, for both time pe-
riods it can be stated that especially advocates of a teleological interpretation
preach a normative universalism.7 It is certainly no coincidence that the con-
stitutional lawyer Aharon Barak, who drives forward the agenda of practised
legal comparison as few others do, at the same time stands out as a central
author of reference for a contemporary model of a ‘Purposive Interpretation
in Law’ (Barak 2005).
If this speculation holds up, how could the connection between the two
motives be explained? Why do jurists who support a teleological model of ju-
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dicial interpretation in particular tend to solemnly declare their commitment
to world law? To give a speculative answer to this question, let us resume Luh-
mann’s above-mentioned thesis that globalization is particularly prevalent in
fields with cognitive as opposed to normative styles of expectation. Judging
by the self-description of numerous comparative lawyers, this thesis is unten-
able, since their discipline holds the potential to normatively integrate world
society. Rephrasing their stance in Luhmannian terms, one could say that
comparative law practitioners implement normative expectations on a global
scale by horizontally connecting the legal systems of different countries and
opening up a global legal space.
However, the evidence gathered in this chapter supports rather than un-
dermines the thesis advanced by Luhmann. The preceding analysis dispels
the claim of comparative law to establish a universal, disappointment-proof
style of expectation. Many advocates of a world law are associated with a re-
formist agenda that has vehemently challenged the dominance of normative
expectation structures in the judiciary. At the turn of the 20th century, count-
less reformist legal scholars campaigned for an open and adaptive judicial
methodology or, in Luhmann’s terms, for opening up the process of judicial
interpretation in favour of a style of cognitive expectation. In its most radi-
cal manifestations, for example among some representatives of the living law
doctrine [Freirechtsdoktrin], a doctrine of interpretation is being propagated by
legal reformists in which the normative expectation stipulated by law must
be occasionally ignored or virtually rewritten so that the judge can reach a
socially desired goal (Fuchs 1970 [1910]: 464). But even the less radical repre-
sentatives of the reformmovement are making selective efforts to change the
style of expectation prevalent in law. Legal scholars who, like the participants
in the Parisian Conference discussed above, instruct the judge to look abroad
for legal solutions to certain problems, are not advocating a normative but a
cognitive style of expectation.
In my view, it is no coincidence that Comparative Law embraced the idea
of a universal law of mankind at a historical juncture when an influential
reform movement tried to establish a cognitive expectation style in jurispru-
dence alongside the traditional structure of normative expectation. Such de-
mands represent a departure from the traditional promise of law in general,
namely to ensure reliability of expectations. Policy-oriented decision-making
in court transcends the normative style of expectation bywhich law as a field is
generally characterized.The emphatic advocacy of world law is the normative
compensation for this rupture. The concept of world law then serves to legit-
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imize the contestable model of purposive legal interpretation. Breaking with
the expectation structure peculiar to law is cushioned by the metaphysical as-
sumption that the teleological orientation of the judge is normatively secured
by an existing world law. The normative universalism proclaimed by many
comparative lawyers is a proven discursive strategy to semantically stabilize
the newly developed political understanding of judicial decision-making.The
fact that the model of teleological interpretation is concealed by an ostenta-
tious commitment to a common law of mankind may explain the intensity
of the reactions to the transnational expeditions of the American Supreme
Court. Against this backdrop, the concerns of Scalia and other critical judges
and legal scholars cannot be dismissed. Behind the promise of a world law
hides the bad conscience of the politicized judge.
Notes
1 In comparative law literature, there are numerous metaphors and ter-
minologies to describe the process of transferring foreign law into a do-
mestic legal system. I am aware of the weaknesses of the term ‘legal bor-
rowing’ and I realize that it carries other connotations compared to the
term ‘legal transplants’. Terminological debates of this kind will not be
resumed or addressed here. The following analysis takes some termino-
logical liberties by providing an external perspective on current debates
in comparative (constitutional) law. For an informative overview of the
diverse terminologies, see Perju (2012: 1306ff.).
2 The majority’s reliance on foreign legal sources has been heavily crit-
icized going so far that conservative politicians proposed a bill in
Congress which would prohibit the use of foreign law in American
Courts. In this context, even calls for impeaching the liberal Justices
have been issued.
3 Justice Kennedy invoked the Convention on the Rights of the Child which has
never been ratified by the US and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which has been ratified by the US, however under the con-
dition that the US may reserve the right to impose capital punishment
on minors.
4 The translations of all passages taken from contributions to the Congrès
are provided by the author.
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5 Unfortunately, Zitelmann’s contribution is too short to dare a substantial
analysis.
6 For the translation, see Zweigert and Siehr (1971: 215).
7 This presumption needs to be examined more closely, for example by
analysing contributions to the international conference that do not sub-
scribe to the teleological method of interpretation.
Determining the Global
from a Social Work Perspective
Sandra Holtgreve and Cornelia Giebeler
Introduction
The present chapter envisions perceptions of the global in Social Work de-
bates.1 It answers the question as to which understandings of the global pre-
vail in discussions of the practice and theory of social work. It also addresses
significant lacunae in globalization research, where the unique views of so-
cial workers as world political actors from below receive almost no attention.
Furthermore, it responds to the lack of systematic endeavours in Social Work
debates to classify existing literature and propose conceptual work on posi-
tions adopted in Social Work with regard to globalization. How do authors in
the field observe the global? How do actors in the field make sense of such a
framework and what conclusions can be drawn to determine imaginaries of
the global within the discipline?
Our questions align with the other contributions to the present volume,
all of which engage with the inquiry into how different groups of people such
as lawyers, travellers or revolutionaries make sense of the world. The per-
spectives of Social Work are particularly valuable in this regard, because they
occupy a unique position in the global arena – at themargins of societal exclu-
sion, which connect the global and the local. Professional social workers exist
in almost every country of the world, where they deal with the negative conse-
quences of globalization.They advocate for its ‘losers’ and use the global arena
to (re)negotiate their sphere of influence and pursue social transformations.
However, social workers cope with different conditions (and constraints) than
the other groups mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph.They not only
defend the interests of their clients; they also have to respond to the objectives
of their employers.This is not without conflict andmakes it highly interesting
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to analyse how perceptions of the global relate to the in-between position of
social work and the purpose of its mediating this professional double role.
This chapter shares the overall objective of the volume: to look at prac-
tices of observation. We pay attention not only to what Social Work schol-
ars observe, but also to how they observe, including the subtle meanings that
underlie their observations. This systematic focus on practices of observing
the global challenges a debate that too often presupposes a clear and com-
monly held understanding of the subjectmatter and therefore underestimates
the conceptual variety characterizing the field. For example, discussions on
the effects of globalization are often framed in terms of ‘international so-
cial work’. Sometimes texts juxtapose or interchange ideas on the ‘interna-
tional’, ‘transnational’, ‘intercultural’ or ‘global’ elements in social work, failing
to differentiate the nuances and to determine more precisely the epistemo-
logical starting point(s) for carrying out ‘global social work’. Like doctors who
first study human anatomy in order to define the treatment, we conceptual-
ize the latent understandings of the global first in order to substantiate the
strategic planning, coordination and execution of social actions in response to
global phenomena.This gives amore differentiated view of global social work.
Against this background, the chapter encourages its diverse readership to en-
gage further with the basic characteristics of the profession and discipline of
Social Work, the challenges that are faced in this field and the underpinnings
of the global that prevail in the contemporary debate.
To address the conceptual frames of the global in Social Work literature,
we distinguish four subtle functions: (a) positing globalization as the root of
social inequalities grants legitimacy to the profession; (b) the global method-
ological paradigm responds to the heterogeneity and multidimensionality of
social reality from global to local in social work research and practice; (c) the
global frame of reference enables social workers to defend common interests
as a community, and (d) the global arena as a working field demands partic-
ular skills of them and poses new challenges for social work. The remainder
of the chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, we give an introductory
overview of the main literature and lines of argumentation in current debates
in the field of Social Work. We then review contemporary literature to scruti-
nize the four above-mentioned dimensions. Whereas the first two have to do
with ways in which social workers observe the world, the last two indicate the
ways in which social workers react to the world based on their perceptions
and organize themselves within it. We conclude that the position of social
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work at the margins of exclusion makes its view on the global unavoidably
critical and plural.
The nexus of global and local in the emergence of social work
Social work can be described as a profession that develops interventions on a
scientific basis serving to support and assist people, groups and communities
in different life contexts in various areas.These include psychiatry, education,
impairment, the penal system, social counselling and families. The profes-
sionalization of social work and social pedagogy in different nations evolved
as a consequence of crisis-ridden eruptions of social conditions in which hu-
manitarian aid or domestic – usually female – obligations to provide support
were no longer sufficient.These eruptions were, in particular, the wars in Eu-
rope in the 19th and early 20thcenturies, but also dramatic economic events
such as the abolition of nitrate extraction in northern Chile, which caused
the rapid impoverishment of thousands of working families. Historically, so-
cial work evolved constantly as a result of the mutually dependent interface
between welfare state developments and social upheavals embodied by the
emergence or rise of mass poverty and infirmity as well as the neglect of chil-
dren and young people (the classic target group of social education).
The emergence of the profession can be explained, on the one hand, as a
reaction to the atrocities resulting from capitalist modes of production. On
the other hand, its evolution was based on an increasing understanding of the
social rights of all individuals to a barrier-free life with all its consequences.
Striving for equality, for practices of recognition, for the abolition of oppres-
sion, exclusion and incapacitation and – at the same time – for competent
help with the implementation of needs, support of all kinds is at the heart
of the profession. Nevertheless, implementation differs in different national
contexts, significantly depending on the legal situation. In consequence, fields
of intervention vary depending on national decisions, but the aims, theoreti-
cal approaches andmethods adopted in the teaching of social work are widely
similar. Thus, the profession is characterized by a holistic approach to sup-
porting people in a globalized range of fields, only embedded in the national
conditions of welfare states and in international organizations.
One of the internationally recognized ethical premises is that social work
is fundamentally rooted in its so-called triple mandate. Firstly, profession-
als must act on behalf of their public or private employers. Secondly, they
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represent their addressees and defend their interests. Thirdly, they commit
themselves to unique, internationally shared agreements on what constitutes
professional working competence. Even if the legal context varies nationally,
certain professional principles remain internationally binding – for example,
the orientation towards human rights principles, which the international or-
ganizations of social work have erected as central pillars. At the same time,
the profession reacts sensitively to global developments such as the conse-
quences of the financial crisis in 2008, migration flows in Europe in 2015 or
in Mexico since 2006 and the Coronavirus crisis in 2020. It responds to natu-
ral disasters resulting from climate change and to demographic changes such
as the disintegration of intergenerational family care systems and the associ-
ated emergence of poverty and disability in elderly people. It is also reacting
to the release of labour through the relocation of production, to the flexibi-
lization of the world of work and to women’s movements all over the world
promulgating female care-work as the basis of society.
Against this background, three approaches to social work come to the fore
in relation to its emergence within the global. Social work first emerged in re-
sponse to the international processes of war, migration, the release of wage
labour and the associated injuries to individuals, groups and communities.
Then, the internationalization of human rights became a matter of funda-
mental agreement between peoples after the Second World War, associated
with the conviction that cultural, social and economic human rights must be
implemented. Finally, the local practice of social work encountered ever new
challenges from destructive international markets, a diverging social gap be-
tween wealth and poverty, and an unresolved colonial history. The victims of
this colonial history on one hand aim for recognition and reparations and
on the other are part of migration processes into the former colonizing re-
gions provoking decolonizing processes and asking for social work support
as refugees or migrants.
Reliant on these historical roots, Social Work is inextricably linked to the
global. But scholars and professionals in Germany, in contrast to those in
other countries, have lagged behind in incorporating this link into their dis-
cussions. Until the end of the 20th century, scholars considered social work as
predominantly a locally acting profession. This perception has only recently
been questioned (Wagner and Lutz 2018; Giebeler 2003) and contested by a
more transverse understanding of how social workers act in concrete local
settings, use the possibilities and limits of national law and respond to global
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problems, adapting to the broader context of publications in other countries
(Friesenhahn and Thimmel 2012; Bähr et al. 2014).
Beyond the German setting, links to global research are a particularly
salient feature in current debates covering professional practice and ed-
ucation in Social Work to a similar extent. Scholars emphasize the need
to take indigenous knowledges into account (Mafile´o and Vakalahi 2016),
point to linguistic imperialism and further power differentials (Midgley 2016;
Dominelli and Lorenz 2017), highlight regionalization, provincialization and
decolonization efforts (Sałustowicz 2009; Gómez-Hernández 2018), or discuss
the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Global Agenda 2030 as profes-
sional frameworks. Given the increasing number of articles, journals, book
series, handbooks and conferences with an explicit international focus (Bunk
et al. 2019), concepts in the discourse such as the transcultural, international,
postcolonial etc. diversify and get blurred. Despite their manifold meanings,
these terms for describing the global in Social Work are sometimes used
interchangeably by scholars without further differentiation or concretization
of the underlying understandings of the world that they embody.
The practices of observation of the global in the field of SocialWork,mean-
ing the way that the profession uses the global to define its standards, visions,
objectives, mandate and frame of actions, can take different forms. Social
workers, as a rule, act as agents of the state (or its subsidiary agencies) or on
behalf of private organizations with specific support objectives, for example
in development cooperation, international migration or globally networked
anti-racist, feminist or ecologically based endeavours. In contrast to the other
mentioned professional groups and political actors, social workers contribute
to the regulation and execution of politics. To understand the political func-
tion of social work, it is important to recognize that it arose as a response to
the context of the social question. The group became an important force of
political control for states that was originally intended for the regulation and
cleaning up of the massive, devastating social transformations that accompa-
nied the installation of the capitalist social system.Thus, social work is highly
politicized as a practice for implementing political decisions.
In all fields of social work, the global is visible and invisible at the same
time. Global trends in film, theatre or music such as hip hop, treated as an ex-
pression of youth culture, may become the basis for concepts of youth work.
New Zealand, for example, constructs and runs differentiated services for dif-
ferent ethnic groups, the separate refuges for battered Maori women being
a case in point (cf. Watson 2019). Social workers elsewhere, for example in
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Germany, assume concepts based on difference theory to be a form of gen-
dered culturalization. Here scholars consider that practices of differentiation
promote racism and so they criticize separate women’s refuges for migrants.
Thus, these concepts can be applied globally, but must always be viewed crit-
ically in light of local conditions. Sometimes, the global in social work is
not directly visible, but can be approached through concepts of the unknown
and of frightening strangeness (Konzeptualisierung beängstigender Fremdheit, cf.
Giebeler 2019). Both can latently underlie the phenotypical perception of in-
dividuals, groups, communities and polities, favelas and barrios. Thus, the
global is invisible, but accessible through experiences of strangeness in the
unknown lifeworlds of clients.2 The same applies to institutional assistance
given to victims of violence, as well as work with children and youth, psychi-
atry and penitentiary work. Such insecurity and fear of strangeness brings
professional social workers to the limits of their capabilities and forces them
to learn about the appearance of the global in all cases of social work (Giebeler
1998). Finally, what do these examples from professional practice tell us about
the global?
Four perceptions of the global in Social Work
Globalization’s effects: focusing on inequalities
as a professional rationale
The first way to address the global is as a way of explaining the need for social
work. Thus, the world appears as the root cause of problems. In academic de-
bates, the main concern remains the ways in which social workers deal with
the negative consequences of economic, political, and cultural interactions
worldwide. On the one hand, social workers discuss the effects which glob-
alization has on the lives of their clients with the intention of developing ap-
propriate ways of dealing with individuals, groups or local communities and
mitigating the negative impacts of globalization. On the other hand, they look
at the consequences of globalization for the system of professional aid itself.
As a result of this development, social workers increasingly take on a double
role: they find themselves acting not only as representatives of their clients
but also as members of a professional group which itself is affected by the
transnationalization of the care and social service sector.
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Through the lens of inequalities, the first perspective emphasizes how
globalization (re)produces or aggravates social problems at the levels below.
Staub-Bernasconi (2003: 2) shows by means of the emblematic case of a dis-
abled woman from Kosovo, how social workers address social problems re-
sulting from chains of exclusion across borders, which start as globalization
phenomena (in this case migration) and end up affecting the lifeworlds of
their target groups. Excluded from the job market, security and an appropri-
ate level of public safety (being subject to repeated rapes), without the right to
public healthcare and hidden from society because her family was ashamed
of her disability, the woman fled alone to Switzerland. She was told that the
country was ‘rich’ with promising job prospects, the opportunity for financial
security for her and her family back home, with access to health assistance
and insurance, and where she could live ‘safely’ without discrimination due
to her disability. But in Switzerland she was also excluded, although for dif-
ferent reasons, namely, her residence status. Apart from international migra-
tion, other factors such as the uncontrollability of global risks, climate change
and its consequences, the supremacy of neoliberal ideologies, social spaces
and contested identities, refugeemovements, urbanization and rural poverty,
the systematic violation of human rights and political violence, animals being
used as objects of mass production and global water scarcity produce similar
dynamics and effects and are challenges that social workers have to cope with
(Spitzer 2019).
A second perspective surveys the influence of globalization on the social
support system. Here, the focus shifts from target groups/recipients to the
organization of aid itself. It is noticeable that discussions are less diverse,
primarily criticizing neoliberal changes. Authors describe not only how
global competition produces scarcity of resources for social programmes
and the erosion of welfare state structures, but also the way in which struc-
tural changes influence working dynamics in social organizations such as
increased work pressure in reaction to global economization (Bartley and
Beddoe 2018; Lyons 2016; Lutz 2007). The latter especially has a significant
impact on legal conflicts between national and supranational social policies
regulating social work and care work. Contributions from these authors fur-
ther focus on the question of how social services structures transnationalize
through programmes of civic engagement in, for example, au-pair schemes,
voluntary services abroad, the recruitment of foreign staff, and transnational
service concepts, which diversify the landscape of social support services and
challenge the understanding of professionalism in the field. These studies
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critically discuss the quality of professional services under pressure to econ-
omize or the social effects of an increasingly transnationalized care system
on the wellbeing of clients (Lyons 2016; Schröer and Schweppe 2013; Winker
2018).
Analyses of the effects of globalization on both people’s living conditions
and the aid system have a common basis: the global appears as a threatening
space and a motor of multiple inequalities which take on different shapes and
are fraught with numerous challenges. Destructive effects must at the same
time be decisively countered (Bartley and Beddoe 2018; Schirilla 2018) – a per-
ception that equips social work to advocate for the ‘losers of globalization,
the excluded of modernity, the new precarious proletariat’ (see Spitzer 2019).
During the World Social Work Conference in 2012, Friesenhahn and Thim-
mel (2012) shed light on the consequences of this recognition. They highlight
an ambivalence between normatively charged idealism and hopeless overbur-
dening that leads to resignation. Globalization as a challenge exacerbates so-
cial work’s task of engaging in damage control, but at the same time under-
lines the need for action.
Global perspectives: addressing heterogeneous living realities
in research
The recognition of the need to counteract the effects of globalization goes
along with the need to develop appropriate tools for research and intervention in
globalized social realities. Scholars do not take an active but an indirect po-
sition vis-à-vis the global, which acknowledges that national and even inter-
national frames of observation are insufficient for research and intervention.
Thus, this section does not address a direct way of envisioning the global, but
a way to see it through the abstract idea of delimitation of spaces of inter-
vention. By delimitation we mean that the spaces in which social workers are
active are less and less defined by clear boundaries. Instead, they take onmore
and more dynamic forms (e.g. through transnational family structures).
Following an overall trend in the social sciences since the 2000s, scholars are
seeking to reframe social problems and overcomemethodological national-
ism. In this sense, shedding light on the global through an analytical view
of inter- and transnationality and inter- and transculturality appears a safe
strategy for scholars in Social Work. They widely agree that national frame-
works are limiting in light of constant cross-border flows of goods, informa-
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tion and people. At the same time, they hesitate to apply a holistic, global
perspective in the sense of a ‘global social work’ to design and try to imple-
ment approaches with the goal of a theory-driven homogenization and a
‘global profession’. Rather it [social work] should perceive and make differ-
ences among diverse groups’ ethnicities, interests and forms of social sup-
port in its local, regional and (trans)local contexts. (Gray and Coates 2010: 23
cit. from Bähr et al. 2014: 19f.; authors’ translation)
At the same time, the popularity of cross-national and cultural comparisons
remains large (see Bartley and Beddoe 2018; Feize and Gonzalez 2018). These
studies have contributed to the global understanding of social work since its
beginnings. But both strategies are contested by critical scepticism. Critics
argue that terms such as inter- or transnationality re-emphasize the cate-
gory of the nation-state instead of overcoming it. Furthermore, those critical
voices point to the centrality of legal frameworks which underline the im-
portance of constitutional and national social laws, a line of argumentation
which aims to foreground the limitations of transnational analysis. There are
also scholars who have explored border identities and border spaces before
debates on transnationalism in Social Work even gained prominence. Con-
crete alternative approaches to Social Work research are often marginalized
in current debates,whereas the nation-state remains a crucial axis in research
perspectives on the global.
A different type of research and different methods of intervention are
central to the understanding of lifeworlds. In these analyses, which entail
a strong focus on interpersonal relations, culturalist, power-critical views,
which are sensitive to diversity, prevail. They critically review the construc-
tion of otherness. Contributions here cover a broad range of issues. They
range from macrolevel conceptions to microlevel concerns and practical im-
plementation. Some review underlying conceptions of being human, room
and space and foreignness (Gómez-Hernández 2018) or include discussions
on terminology and discriminatory language (Harrison 2006; Dominelli and
Lorenz 2017). Others provide case studies of social organizations (Muy 2018;
Duscha 2016), conceptualize practical forms of intervention (Midgley 2016),
apply them to social problems (Fereidooni 2017), or produce didactic material
and templates for social pedagogical workshops. Reflecting on ascriptions of
the self, one’s own professional role, and the other in heterogeneous work-
ing fields is considered a key competence. This implies an understanding of
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and self-reflection in unfamiliar contexts (cf. Giebeler 2008 and 2009; Pawar
2017).3
Preparing students for these realities appears a particular concern of
scholars in Social Work. Many publications on the impacts of globalization
already discuss how to prepare future social workers to work in highly
complex, multicultural and entangled environments. Discussing the role of
internships in the so-called Global South is therefore not new (Midgley 2016;
Nagy et al. 2019). The educational aspects of Social Work often address the
strangeness experience of aspects of the global that we mentioned in the
beginning. By learning a combination of skills that can become important in
heterogeneous working environments, students are equipped with the ability
to gain increasing confidence by dealing repeatedly with different forms of
unknown settings during their training. For example, they discuss topics
such as anti-racism, expand their language skills by learning a local/foreign
language, develop pedagogical methods for dealing with diversity, practice
communication in transcultural settings again and again, and self-reflect on
their own experience of foreignness in an unknown environment (Giebeler
2003 and 2019). This should reduce reservations and counteract prejudices
through students developing their professional attitude towards intercultural
settings.
Nowadays, students often gain experiences abroad as volunteers or in-
terns before starting their studies. This is a more recent trend that has devel-
oped over the past decade. But it raises new challenges for lecturers as to how
to enhance students’ intercultural competencies, how to guide them in reflect-
ing on their experiences in order to develop professional skills out of them,
and how to speak with authority on issues of globalization, interculturality
and strangeness. Studies range across regional settings, highlight the impor-
tance of self-reflexive competences and the capacity to establish contact, and
mainly explore formats of internship projects or specialization programmes
that increase students’ cultural awareness and sensitivity for other people’s
lifeworlds (Feize and Gonzalez 2018; Pawar 2017; Giebeler 2009; Rehklau and
Lutz 2009; Nagy et al. 2019).
The global appears as an abstract space, which is less threatening from a
scientific point of view but remains highly complex. It comprises social com-
plexity in its entirety but is hard to grasp due to its elusiveness, which is
based on the strong subject-oriented lifeworld orientation of social work. All
social interaction, every dynamic, is a part of this global totality, which is also
referred to as world society. At the same time, the global becomes accessible
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through the particularity of social cases. In this sense, the social workers’ view
of the global acquired through research and action is comparable with the
view through a prism where the light is refracted again and again, depending
on the angle of blink, position and time. Each case produces a unique image
that may be similar to others in some or even all aspects but is at the same
time never the same. Thus, plurality becomes the central principle of social
workers’ global social reality.
Global frame of reference: building a common ethical base
for the profession
So far, we have discussed how the perception of the global as an inequality-
producing space gives legitimacy to the profession of social work as such.
We have further shown that a desire to find adequate responses to this com-
plex space nurtured the ambition to reframe methods. In contradistinction
to both, where observation is the protagonist, the third perspective addresses
the global as an arena. Here, social workers actively position themselves as a pro-
fessional group through a shared frame of reference for the benefit of the commu-
nity – a reference frame that forms part of the debates on colonialism (Salus-
towicz 2009) and is based upon the latest Global Definition of Social Work,
established in 20144, which conveys the core mandate, principles, and under-
standing of knowledge and practice, a code of ethics (IASSW 2018), educa-
tional guidelines and a decennial Global Agenda (Jones 2018). Written down
in official documents, this shared code and guidelines relies on values that
the profession acknowledges as universally valid. In addition, the profession
gives voice and life to this normative frame through common position pa-
pers on current political decisions, thus further increasing the visibility and
recognition of the social work community as a globally operating actor and
unit (IFSW 2014).
Scholars agree that the global reference frame is beneficial inasmuch as
it represents the social work community and strengthens its standpoint as
an external advisor for international aid organizations such as the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Staub-Bernasconi 2008; Lyons
2016; Healy and Hall 2009). Silvia Staub-Bernasconi (2008: 11) highlights the
special relevance of the documents for future social work. In her eyes,
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above all, they are a response to the fact that the framework conditions for
social work are influenced not only by national (socio-political) legislation,
but also by the structure and dynamics of world society and its laws as em-
bodied in UN conventions, directives of the WTO, IMF and the World Bank,
the Geneva Convention, EU legislation, GATS, TRIPS etc. For this reason, na-
tional self-sufficiency and ignorance cannot be good advisors inmatters con-
cerning international developments in the future. (authors’ translation)
The discussion has significant overlaps with debates on colonialism, where
‘theworldwide spread of social work [is considered] a consequence of the colo-
nialization process in two senses of the word’ (Sałustowicz 2009: 62). Besides
being a direct consequence of the colonization process, it is also an indirect
consequence in that European curricula have been transferred to countries
outside the region. These – as well as further power-sensitive approaches –
regard the diffusion of a global normative set of rules critically. The Inter-
national Federation of Social Workers (IFSW), the International Association
of Schools of Social Work (IASSW) and the International Council on Social
Welfare (ICSW) state clear ambitions to play an active role in global social
policies.
However, internal opinions on how to carry out the world political
mandate are controversial. Numerous regional and national supplementary
comments on the global definition and position papers (IFSW 2014) depict
the global as a space for negotiations. The power distribution within the
professional community and in collaboration with external actors has to be
balanced. Members discuss this discrepancy between public perception and
power divisions within the associations extensively. They weigh the opportu-
nities for making political impacts against the costs of homogenization. The
latter simplifies the plurality of different regions and reproduces hegemonic
relations within social work.
Next to institutional frameworks, social workers use theoretical frame-
works which rely on shared values and principles. The idea of human rights
is the most striking and prevalent example of such a framework (see Staub-
Bernasconi 2008; Kandylaki and Kallinikaki 2018).5 Others argue that these
global frameworks help social workers enact their indignation and resistance
against global inequalities (Prasad 2019) and strive for more professional
autonomy. By relying upon global ethical standards or principles of human
rights, professional social workers allow themselves to intervene, where
employers or authorities do not (sufficiently) assume their duties or where
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intervention would even oppose the interests of these authorities. The sig-
nificance of self-responsibility in social work increases to the degree that
social security systems, principles of the rule of law and separation of powers
decrease. This happens when transnational corporations prefer policies of
compensation for damage claims to respecting acts or law governing working
conditions or preventing forced relocation, or when the state cannot or does
not want to guarantee minorities protection against persecution and ag-
gression. But self-responsible intervention applies also to comparably ‘trivial
offences’. Sebastian Muy exemplifies this point and refers to the situation
in collective housing offered to applicants for asylum. A specific case, where
the required skills and demands have become ‘to “somehow deal” with the
contradictory demands and appear as “perfect problem-solving experts”
[… whereas] under the general conditions of deprivation of rights acting
“justly” has become impossible for employees […].’ (Muy 2018: 157; authors’
translation).
The shared institutional and the theoretical frame of reference together
determine capacities to practically engage with, negotiate and solve conflicts
of power. This double bind is typical of social work. Unlike former approxi-
mations to the global, this view emphasizes it as a resource for professional
empowerment. Social workers can play it off against institutional and gov-
ernmental demands and empower themselves in the reconfiguration of in-
justices. The distinguishing feature of the institutional frame rests in the ex-
pansion of the possibilities to experience the global space and the interplay
of power in the organizational field. Social workers collectively participate
actively and experience their role as world political actors who take part in
negotiations on social exclusion. The theoretical frame facilitates a political
act of empowerment, where social workers can individually instrumentalize
global principles of human rights or global social justice. In settings where
the question arises of how to deal with the mandates of clients that oppose
the missions of employers, social workers freely use and interpret their man-
date to justify resistance, strengthening themselves against external actors
who act (grossly) negligently.
Global arena: potential working fields
Social workers not only establish their own representative associations and
organizations, they form an integral part of the multi-professional teams of interna-
tional organizations. For example, they assist and support migrants worldwide,
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nowadays especially in the context of initiatives launched by countries of the
‘North’. These involvements cover operations in Lampedusa, Lesbos, Israel,
Lebanon, Suruc, Dar-es-Salaam, the US border zone, Chile and Peru, to name
only a few. In sum, social workers take jobs in the European Union or United
Nations and in the realm of transnationally operating welfare organizations
such as Caritas International or the Red Cross, but also in foundations and
consultancy services. Moreover, they are actively involved in transnational so-
cial movement associations. The organizational structure of helping institu-
tions differs. Services may be financed by public or private funds, supported
by governmental, non-governmental or private, ecclesiastical or human rights
organizations. Institutions of the same social agency operate in worldwide
networks, but communication between those agencies may often be compli-
cated. Regional and international conferences take place and fulfil the func-
tion of coordination platforms. Depending on the operational field of social
work in question, they also foster exchanges on concrete policies and differ-
ent options for handling border regimes and determining the needs of the
addressees and occupational groups involved.
Discussions centred on the participation of social workers in these or-
ganizations, or which explicitly examine their role in detail, are few and far
between.The involvement of social workers in suborganizations of the United
Nations, International Organization of Migration or International Criminal
Court is not always present and/or comprehensively reflected in scientific
work, despite (or explicitly because of) the long history of involvement by
social workers in international organizations (Groterath 2011; Wagner 2009).
There are several reasonable explanations for this dearth of information on the
role of social workers in international organizations. Firstly, social workers are
normally embedded in the organizational structures and operational fields of
nation-states even though the national and international departments of the
same organization may be involved (in the German case, this is true of most
of the large welfare organizations, i.e. Caritas and Caritas International). Sec-
ondly, writings on issues of social development and international cooperation
rarely address the intersection with social work explicitly. Instead, they de-
scribe or name it by using other terms and stick to a more predominant dis-
course.The same goes for international organizations that devote themselves
to humanitarian help or human rights approaches. They all too often do not
recognize the special competencies of social workers in these fields.
Social work in international organizations is driven by, or reduced to, two
predominant narratives: developmental aid-assistance-cooperation on the
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one hand and the field of migration and mobility on the other (Blank et al.
2018; Lutz 2018). Almost no other area in Social Work has received so much
attention in recent years. To subsume the work of international organizations
to the two paradigms of ‘development’ and ‘migration/mobility’ simplifies
the diversity of the landscape and, in particular, the skills and knowledge
necessary to provide high-quality social services. International adoption
processes, for example, are not the only field that receives little attention.
Here, social workers offer expert assessments of the
interdependencies of double parenthood, cultural affiliations of the
adopted child and adopting parents on the micro-level, which means
the individual or family level of identity and family construction, themacro-
level of institutional structures (verification, brokerage, follow-up support),
and the level of societal representation, which means stereotyping and
discrimination. (Sauer and Wießmeier 2016: 23; authors’ translation).
International adoptions are a controversial and highly political issue. A Social
Work approach evaluates social mobilities, opportunity structures, complex
identity formation under double parenthood as well as the dangers of dubious
private adoption organizations, child trafficking and abuse.
The global appears here as a border space in which social workers enact
their professional practice. A narrower understanding would refer to inter-
vention near the geographic border, for example in refugee camps, human
trafficking, and institutions of first admittance at national borders. A broader
conceptualization allows for the incorporation of a variety of institutions – a
pathway that leads to the inclusion of Aliens Departments, consultancy ser-
vices and residential groups for migrants, school social work (i.e. with inte-
grative classes) or street work in the context of sex work and human traf-
ficking. Border spaces cause tensions between transnationality and hetero-
geneous lifeworlds in a concentrated form, because in them transnational-
ity, transculturality, and transreligiosity are institutionally enforced. Border
spaces are different from the political and economic spaces of enterprises
or state summits, where the transnational encounters of politicians and en-
trepreneurs are more interest-driven. The emergence of border spaces like
refugee camps or favelas is less politically intended (and maybe not at all),
nor is it desired but it has to be managed anyway. These spaces are volatile
and persistent in their plurality at the same time, due to the fluctuation of
clients. This is how you come to appreciate the particular position of social
workers and their power to explain global political dynamics from the per-
102 Sandra Holtgreve and Cornelia Giebeler
spective of their discipline, which provides a perception of the global from
below, meaning from the precarious, exclusory, unintended side of globaliza-
tion.
Conclusions
The four areas presented in this contribution cover different perspectives of
Social Work on the global. They show the global as: (a) the overall context
of globalization dynamics, being the principal source of contemporary so-
cial inequalities. This understanding grants legitimacy to contemporary in-
tervention by social workers and deals with the core of analysis in social sci-
ence; (b) a complex space, which requires corresponding Social Work research
and practices to encompass the heterogeneity and multidimensionality of so-
cial reality from global to local; (c) a contested politicized space, where social
workers not only observe but also experience and actively relate to the global.
On the one hand, this space opens opportunities through umbrella organiza-
tions like IFSW, IASSW, and ICSW to intervene through international coop-
eration. However, professionals’ influence on the space of global social policy
is still only sparse. On the other hand, global theoretical concepts such as hu-
man rights, dignity and global social justice facilitate social workers’ agency to
decide more autonomously and self-responsibly how they enact professional
principles against diverging interests; and finally (d) a potential work field
for social workers, especially in the shape of international networks, insti-
tutions welfare organizations and NGOs. This work requires specific compe-
tences and skills such as personal, political and research training in analysing
foreign life worlds, developing personal competencies in working with the
poor of the Global South and political standing to challenge power structures
liable to marginalize subaltern people. The social work profession plays an
important role beyond national frameworks and in border spaces.
The perspectives reveal an inclination in Social Work towards the global.
Social workers possess broad means to observe, analyse and evaluate the
global. But they are confronted by limited organizational capacities and
structures that inhibit their capacity to intervene properly. The latter covers
the fact that social work has not only reacted, and still reacts, to the global so-
cial question but that it has further fomented the former by stabilizing global
political dynamics that uphold a centralization of power and global structures
of exclusion. In contemporary world society, such an externalization of social
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problems has become impossible. Thus, acknowledging the social question
as a global social question from the start brings great potential. Social work
may conduct explorations in the role of an observer of world politics from
the margins, but also as an actor who regulates and stabilizes the dynamics
of the global political stage outlined at the margins of exclusion. This text
argues for a deeper understanding of this role and recommends actions that
strengthen its capacity to act.
The present volume does not seek to describe structural world ordering
principles or dynamics. Instead it envisions views of globalization and a global
world phenomenologically. It interrogates what different groups perceive as
global, how and why they do it and how similar or different these perceptions
appear. We took this question literally for the field of Social Work. We have
found that, in the emergence of this globally connected world, Social Work
takes the position of a counterweight and a response with the aim of mitigat-
ing its disastrous effects. We have also elaborated on Social Work´s view of
the relationship between the global and the local, arguing that they are closely
intertwined through the chains of exclusion.
The four dimensions that compose a SocialWork perspective on the global
can never be uniform nor generalizable. Although we have provided a concep-
tual systematization of the nexus between social work and globalization, we
do not want this work to be understood as a simplification of the social com-
plexity that social workers confront. We conclude that the global appears as
an extremely exclusive space from the point of view of Social Work. Its task of
regulating the margins of societal exclusion makes a social work perspective
highly sensitive to the limits of the (supposedly) ‘global world’. The analysis of
global dynamics in social work is conditioned by the diversity of practical ex-
periences in direct contact with people, groups and communities, their daily
lives and localities. This position enables Social Work to critically question
global world ordering approaches such as the world system, world culture or
world society approaches by unravelling the arbitrariness of these approaches
when it comes to their empirical micro-foundations.
Notes
1 In the following text, the use of the term ‘Social Work’ as an academic
subject and discipline is marked by capitalization.
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2 Hans Thiersch and Klaus Grundwald did several efforts to conceptual-
ize lifeworlds (Lebenswelten) as a central element of Social Work. For an
introduction, see: Grunwald and Thiersch 2014.
3 At this point we want to refer to the numerous efforts of Cornelia
Giebeler to conceptualise experiencing strangeness and transcultural
contacts in establishing professional relationships. The cited works are
a selection of this work.
4 The first Global Definition of Social Work was established in 2000 by the
International Federation of Social Workers. Since then, the community
proves and (re-) ratifies it in regular intervals. Over time the definition
of Social Work enjoyed growing popularity. Especially since 2014 publi-
cations of Social Work have often cited it.
5 Although the idea of human rights is the most prevalent approach, other
concepts such as dignity, global social justice, socio-ecological sustain-
ability and development determine the horizon of the profession (Neuser
and Chacon 2003; Rolfes 2003; Giebeler 2003).
The Revolution in Rojava and the International
Yasin Sunca
Introduction
This chapter engages with the embeddedness of global politico-social and his-
torical processes in the emergence of revolutions from the perspective of in-
ternational historical sociology.1 There are three overall processes in the un-
folding of revolutions: revolutionary situations, trajectories and outcomes.
Parallel to this, the constitution of revolutionary agency is based on the local
conditions and constraints working against naturalized hegemonic structures
and semantics on a global level. Thus, a revolution does not take place only
against the power holders of a given state; more importantly, it challenges
the entirety of the political and social structures that, in one way or another,
made the contested regime possible. Following one of the primary premises
of this volume – that the actualization of the global takes place through partic-
ular local acts – I put forward the idea that a revolution is co-constituted by
global-level hegemonic structures and the organized resistance to them.This,
in other words, means that the global unfolds in the local through processes of
interaction. Ultimately, the ‘envisioned global’, in the case of revolutions, is
a combination of hegemonic structures and semantics that are co-constitu-
tive of revolutionary agency. The case of the Rojava revolution is particularly
instructive in understanding the unfolding of the global given the stateless-
ness of the Kurds in a world of nation-states and countless Kurdish attempts
at emancipatory political/military activities. The chapter draws theoretically
on the international historical sociology of hegemony and resistance; empir-
ically, it focuses on the case of Rojava (West Kurdistan, Syria) to illustrate the
argument.
On 19 July 2012 regime troops withdrew from the northern and north-
eastern regions of Syria and the control was taken over by the People’s Protec-
tion Units (YPG – Yekîniyên Parasitna Gel) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ
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– Yekîniyên Parasitna Jin), the Kurdish forces being led politically by the Demo-
cratic Union Party (PYD – Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat). A region-wide Kurdish
national question that had been in existence for at least a century and had
shaped, and been shaped by, the historico-social conditions of state formation
in the region, thus reached yet another turning point: for the first time, Kur-
dish forces with a left-leaning ideological position found a practical ground on
which to put a radical-democratic social transformation into action. Immedi-
ately after the take-over of power, however, the revolution came under attack
from the geopolitically backed and socially grounded genocidal masculinity
of jihadi Islam. In Kobanê in 2014, as a result of its globally televised resis-
tance to ISIS (also known as Daesh or ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham’), the
revolution was stabilized and legitimized internationally. Serious geopolitical
and geosocial problems, however, still lay ahead.
The Rojava revolution, not, admittedly, a power transition of the custom-
ary kind, became a topical issue as much within the study of revolutions and
international relations as in mainstream media. The global historical socio-
logical lineages of this revolution, however, were covered in a haphazard way,
if not totally ignored. The greater part of the literature focuses on the geopo-
litical conditions of the revolution (see, for example: Kaya and Whiting 2017;
Charountaki 2015; Gunes and Lowe 2015). A considerable proportion of it of-
fers nothing more than popular geopolitics, which is journalism rather than a
serious investigation into the causalities (Hevian 2013). There were, nonethe-
less, a number of authors who handled the Rojava case as a politico-social
phenomenon (see, for example: Küçük and Özselçuk 2016). But among them
two main currents seem to exist: one integrating the revolution into an in-
ternationalist revolutionary discourse to inspire and exemplify emancipatory
practices (see, for example: saed 2017; Stanchev 2015); the other, its antagonist,
mainly informed by a linear-modernist determinism and naturalized liberal-
representative democracy, trying to demonstrate how undemocratic the Ro-
java experience was by decontextualizing it spatiotemporally (see, for exam-
ple: Tejel 2014; Paasche 2015).These perspectives deploy either a revolutionary
romanticism or hegemonic Eurocentrism. In contrast to this scholarship on
Rojava, I shall attempt to give an ‘international historical sociological’ account
here, building on the co-constitutive role of global hegemonic structures and
the dynamics of resistance in the emergence of revolutions. In this sense,
the question guiding the present chapter is how the continuous interaction
between global structures and local reactions to them shapes revolutionary
agency.
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In the following, I illustrate the ways in which the actors – in this case
the revolutionaries of Rojava – reacted to their historically evolved global en-
vironment in materializing their political project. Instead of attributional –
and therefore fixed – categorizations of causality in understanding revolu-
tions, this work carries out processual analyses of the Rojava case since revo-
lutions are assemblages of historically specific processes (for a discussion on
attributional versus processual ontology, see Lawson 2016). Based on a the-
oretical reading of the international historical sociology of revolutions, my
analysis of the Rojava event explores three entangled processes in which the
revolutionaries engaged with the global: (a) the international historical soci-
ology of state formation in West Asia, which rendered stateless entities de-
fenceless; (b) the ideological and organizational upheaval of the anti-systemic
movements, particularly in the post-Soviet era, which conditioned a search
for other solutions; (c) the geopolitical constraints of the Syrian war as a result
of hegemony-seeking interventions, which victimized those with less geopo-
litical capacity for bargaining. Needless to say, while these processes can and
should be separated for analytical purposes, in practice they are intertwined
in many respects.
In each of these processes, I argue, the revolutionaries of Rojava mobi-
lized the dynamics of resistance to the perceived or actually existing hege-
monic structures. In other words, both the hegemonic structures and resis-
tance practices emerged through a historical interaction and were informed
by their global lineages. In this sense, I argue that the emergence of the revo-
lution in Rojava was international all the way down, through the interactions
that were constitutive of its agency. Again, this analysis can helpfully draw on
the distinction between the historical, ideological, and geopolitical dimen-
sions: the historical dimension pertains to the formulation of resistance dy-
namics based on a historical understanding of regional power relations; the
ideological dimension to a radical-democratic reassessment of the ideological
and organizational structures hegemonic in national-liberationist pathways;
and the geopolitical dimension to an instrumentalization of the geopolitical
vacuum emerging as a result of hegemonic confrontations.
Whereas international historical sociology serves as the theoretical frame-
work, I rely on interviews with and public statements from relevant actors to
illustrate the international lineages of the Rojava revolution.2 In what follows,
I first undertake a brief theoretical domiciliation of revolutions in the interna-
tional. In this, I attempt to include the dynamics of hegemony and resistance
in the nexus of revolutions and world politics. I then go into the details of the
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three analytical categories of the Rojava revolution’s international lineages in
order to illustrate the dynamics of hegemony and resistance in concrete his-
torical and contemporary processes.
Revolutions and the international
One structuralist definition of a revolution would be that it is a world histor-
ical event: Theda Skocpol (1979) argues that it is a power shift as a result of
social transformations that come after structurally entangled processes. Al-
ternatively, with Fred Halliday (1999: 21), revolutions could be seen as ‘major
political and social transformations in the context of a contradictory moder-
nity involving mass participation and aspiration to establish a radically dif-
ferent society’. In the former definition, the revolution comes, it is not made,
whereas in the latter agency is in play. A reconciliation between these two def-
initions can probably be achieved by referring to Marx, who features promi-
nently in both Skocpol’s and Halliday’s work: ‘Manmakes his own history, but
he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of condi-
tions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand’ (Marx 2008
[1852]: 1). Despite the structuralist determinism of broader Marxian scholar-
ship, this well-known quotation fromMarx clearly points to its constructivist
dimension involving the agential will or power of those who can work towards
making a revolution, whether successfully or not. This contention forms the
basis upon which revolutionary agency can be related to the international.
The meaning of the international can vary in different schools of Inter-
national Relations (IR). The present chapter, however, engages with historical
sociological premises beyond the narrow (neo-)realist and (neo-)liberal con-
ceptualizations.The question at hand is about politico-social phenomena that
can be understood only through their spatiotemporal embeddedness, with-
out caging them in states or dehistoricizing the unfolding of their constitu-
tive events. Accordingly, one can conceive of the international as hegemonic
power relations (Cox 1987), a systemic totality (Frank and Gills 1993; Waller-
stein 2004), a communication-based social whole (Albert 2016), a combined
totality of unevenness (Rosenberg 2006), or as one world constituted by many
worlds (Blaney and Tickner 2017; Law 2011). Regardless of their motivational
contention, in each of these explanations the external (of any political forma-
tion) is constitutive of, and constituted by, the internal. More precisely, the
international is integral to any social phenomenon. What is at stake here, ac-
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cordingly, is a particular presence of the international pertaining to agency
formation in political processes. If the desire behind a revolution is for a rad-
ically different life and hence a transformation, then the existing hegemonic
structures, against which a revolution is mobilized, are also constitutive of
agency. So, without any exclusion of different conceptions of the interna-
tional, one can contend that the spatiotemporally grown hegemonic struc-
tures and the interactive dynamics of resistance are constitutive of it.
The embeddedness of the international in the revolutionary processes has
long been amatter of debate. But the fourth-generation theory of the study of
revolution has taken a firm step in incorporating the international into rev-
olutionary situations, revolutionary trajectories and revolutionary outcomes
(Lawson 2016, 2019).The international matters as much when there is a social
or political upheaval as when it is relatively calmer (Halliday 1999: 7). However,
if the processual interaction between the agents of revolutionary change and
their global environment is constitutive of a revolutionary situation, then this
accumulation and gradual radicalization of revolutionary claims happens well
before the situation comes to be. In other words, hegemonic structures are re-
sisted both in an organized and unorganized fashion, until resistance melts
into a revolutionary moment.The terms and structures of this resistance also
emerge from within a global ideological context; it learns from, and speaks
back to, the global environment of anti-systemic movements. International
historical and sociological accumulation, in combination with the processual
transformation of ideology, then, determines the revolutionary agency within
the immediate geopolitics of revolutionary trajectories.These interactions ul-
timately shape the ways and processes whereby the global unfolds in the local.
The Kurdish experience of joining the world of nation-states as a stateless
nation conditioned the Kurdish interaction with global processes from below.
This experience of modernity was formed through an understanding of resis-
tance built on three dimensions of the interaction between the global and the
local: the historical-sociological, ideological-organizational and geopolitical.
The historical sociology of the revolution in Rojava
The Rojava revolution was the outcome of the face-off between a century-
long status quo and a great upheaval in the region. Inter-social turmoil forms
the ground for an international political upheaval which eventually renders
certain political formations (in our case, states) vulnerable to bottom-up pro-
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cesses (Lawson 2019: 74ff.). One century later we seem to be going through
such a period of destructive turmoil in the region (Bozarslan 2011). Global
historical processes and resultant power constellations reconfigured the re-
gion in such a way that doomed-to-fail nation-states were formed arbitrarily
in the 20th century.
The historical origins of the Rojava revolution nest in the resistance to the
hegemonic state system in the region that continuously conditioned Kurdish
deprivation. More precisely, Kurdish political agency in the 20th century was
transformed through interaction with the hegemonic nation-states system,
the intergroup dynamics in Syria, and the windows of opportunity resulting
from inter-state contradictions. The processual unfolding of these interac-
tions shaped the historicity of the Rojava revolution.
The late 19th and early 20th century was a historical moment of inter-
social reconfiguration for West Asia and North Africa: empires were either
replaced by nation-states as a result of successful nationalist mobilizations,
or weakened by eventually unsuccessful ones. The regional state system had
been consolidated by the first half of the 20th century. The Ottoman Empire,
which had once expanded territorially over three continents, faced national-
ist uprisings by different ethnic and religious groups in the territories under
its domination. A weakening economy and transforming power relations un-
der the impact of the French and English revolutions, combined with French
and English imperialism, forced the empire to take some pre-emptive mea-
sures which eventually embodied its centralization policies. Parallel to this,
two broadly defined power constellations were trying to control the Ottoman
state: Westernizers led by the Young Turks movement and the ancien régime
(Bozarslan 2013: 305ff.).
The regional state system and the characters of these states stabilized as
a result of the fatal damage inflicted on central mechanisms of the empire by
the FirstWorldWar.The intense conflict by quickly shifting geopolitics among
different ethnic groups, imperialist forces and the power constellations in the
empire forged the new power relations in the region. The centralized, hege-
monic and homogenizing nation-state model was alien to the historical con-
ditions of coexistence and inter-social relations in the region where it was
applied in the absence of a ‘nation’ (Bozarslan 1997: 61ff.; Halliday 2005: 88ff.).
This process is central to the historical domination over the Kurds in the form
of assimilation, the division of Kurdish-inhabited land, and conflicts lasting
decades.With such an understanding of the historical relations of hegemonic
structures and resistance dynamics, the PYD co-leader Saleh Muslim stated
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that ‘with the development of the nation-state in Europe the Arabs began to
see things differently’ adding, with the emphasis on the hegemonic nation-
states, ‘the land of the Kurds was divided into four parts and there was re-
pression and massacres took place’ (Ekurd Daily 2014).3
Like the other ethnic groups living under the Ottoman rule, the Kurds
were also seeking some kind of emancipation. Yet the Kurdish political forces
could not manage to unite and mobilize Kurdish nationalism, mainly due
to the interest-based divisions of the co-opted Kurdish elites. The divisions
were manifold, on a spectrum from the Kurdish notables who were aware of
the nationalist turn in the world history and pursued a Kurdish nationalist
agenda to the traditional elites who insisted on staying part of the unity of
the Ummah under the Ottoman roof. Exacerbated by the struggles for local
tribal interests, this incompatibility in imagining a future Kurdistan radically
shaped the mutually nullifying relations between, on the one hand, Kurdish
tribalism/Ottomanism, and, on the other, Kurdish nationalism/modernism
(cf. Hitchins 2000; Özoğlu 2001). Different forms of the same dynamic are in
place even today.
Kurdish political actors were either collaborating with or fighting three
forces: the Ottoman Empire (and later republican Turkey), the British Empire
and the French Empire. The confrontation within this triangle was caused
by the division of the Ottoman territory in Iraq, the Levant and South-East
Anatolia into zones of influence for France and Britain. With Turkey’s war
of independence, its borders were more or less drawn. The Kurds in Turkey,
for various reasons, largely supported the independence war. From the 1920s
onwards, the Kurds sought the help of Britain in Iraqi Kurdistan, but British
imperial rule did not recognize the Kurdish endeavour for independence
for strategic geopolitical reasons (McDowall 1996: 121ff.). The French, on the
other hand, signed the Ankara agreement defining the Turkey–Syria border,
to avoid further loss of territory in Anatolia (ibid.: 139f.). In this way the
Kurdish-inhabited land fell under the control of four different states. Al-
though the political and social dynamics of Kurdish resistance to oppression
differed in each country, the very presence of oppression originates from
the homogenizing enforcement of the nation-state model (Bozarslan 1997:
61ff.; Vali 1998). The resistance-to-oppression dynamics in Syria diverge from
other Kurdish experiences in some geopolitical details, although originating
from the same core.
The main determinants of Kurdish policy in Syria emerge from inter-
group dynamics and their interaction with the central state institutions. The
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representative of the PYD (Democratic Union Party) in France made their un-
derstanding of historical hegemonic structures clear:
the current organization and borders went back to the period of the French
mandate which, after having envisaged it, had finally given up granting au-
tonomy to minorities, like the Alawites or the Druze, to favour the construc-
tion of a centralized state, [an] over-centralized [state] which could only hold
by force. (Groupe France-Syrie 2016; author’s translation)
Within this context, there were probably two main determinants of Syrian
policy towards the Kurds, especially after full independence from France: (a)
the exclusion of the Kurds and deprivation of their fundamental rights; (b)
the implementation of an Arabization policy under the geopolitical premises
of pan-Arabism and hence the assimilation of the Kurds. The regime did not
accept one third of the Kurds as ‘true Syrians’ after the 1962 census (Tejel 2009:
51f.). The 1962 census laid the foundations for a more coercive policy by the
Syrian state against the Kurds as an alien group.This brought about the repres-
sion of Kurdish political mobilization by the regime to the extent that any po-
litical demand for greater Kurdish rights or demonstrations in any form faced
relentless punishment.
Kurdish political resistance in Syria has historically been dependent on
the Kurdish movements in neighbouring states. Kurdish parties with relative
social support among the Syrian Kurds have almost exclusively been offshoots
of the Kurdish parties in Turkey or Iraq. A central (geo-)political reason for
this is to be found in the dynamics of early nation-state formation: as part
of its regional policy for dealing with more powerful neighbours, the Syrian
regime provided sanctuary to Kurdish movements fighting against a neigh-
bouring country.This made the Syrian regime’s hand stronger in other issues
such as the dispute over water with Turkey.This was the case with the Xoybûn,
a region-wide Kurdish nationalist organization with its political base in Dam-
ascus in the late 1920s; the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, most notably Jalal Talabani,
in the 1970s; and the PKK from the 1980s onwards (Tejel 2009): ‘Whenever
the [Kurdish] parties had difficulties’ said a YPG commander ‘they ended up
in Rojava, and the Rojavans have always fought in other parts of Kurdistan.’
(YPG commander, interview, 22 September 2019; author’s translation).
Because of the convergence of interests between the PKK and the regime
of Hafez al-Assad – the PKK used Syrian soil and the Beqaa Valley from 1979 to
1998 as a space for political and military training while the regime benefitted
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from the regional impacts of the PKK’s presence in Syria – it did not target
the Syrian state.
Taner Akçam, (the leader of DEV-YOL [Revolutionary Path], the largest left-
ist political organization before the 1980 coup in Turkey) told Öcalan that
al-Mukhabarat (the Syrian secret service) will use you and throw you away.
In response Öcalan said “Yes, I know. But when they want to throw me away
it will be too late”. That was precisely how it was. (Former YPG fighter, inter-
view, 21 July 2019; author’s translation).
Besides making use of safe camps there for military and political training for
the fight in Turkey, the PKK always lived among the Rojava Kurds, recruited
cadres, trained and organized people, and eventually managed to strike root
in the region (Akkaya 2015). It was these recruits that would lead the politico-
social transformation in Rojava from 2012 on.
In the early 2000s, the regional impact of the developments in Iraqi
Kurdistan and Öcalan’s being handed over to Turkey by the US were the
main sources of increased involvement by the PKK-led Kurdish movement4
in anti-Ba’ath mobilization. The US intervention in 2003 in Iraq, which led
to the independence-like-autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan, pushed the other
Kurdish political actors to become more proactive. Under this regional im-
pact, the Kurdish organizations in Syria intensified their demonstrations
and protests. Encouraged by the US, Turkey forced the Syrian regime to expel
Öcalan and the US-administration eventually delivered him to Turkey (Yetkin
2004). This ended the PKK’s tacit deal with the Syrian regime. As a result, the
PKK-led movement reshaped its policies against the Syrian regime. In 2004,
an uprising erupted after a game of football in Qamishlo, which was followed
by a series of demonstrations throughout Rojava that were eventually vio-
lently extinguished by the regime, leaving 50 dead, many injured and around
2000 imprisoned. Liberated from its geopolitically constraining ties with
the regime, the PYD-led movement also mobilized the Kurdish population
in its strongholds. Despite its high cost, this revolt in Qamishlo and the
spreading of demonstrations across the northern regions further raised a
consciousness in Rojava of the area as a separate political entity (Gauthier
2005; Tejel 2017). Since then the Kurdish parties have been active to further
mobilize the people for their eventual emancipation.
The arbitrary formation of nation-states in the post-Ottoman era left the
Kurds to undergo assimilation policies in four states and a constant resis-
tance-to-oppression dynamic. This also locked the states in a constant strug-
114 Yasin Sunca
gle, firstly against some sections of their own population and secondly against
each other as a result of historical social, economic and (geo-)political dynam-
ics.While Kurdish resistance was generated by the former dynamic in the first
place, the later inter-state dynamic facilitated its continuity.The Rojava revo-
lution is primarily an outcome of, and a response to, a particular configuration
of the global transition from empires to nation-states. The historicity of the
revolutionary agency, in this respect, lies at the intersection of the histori-
cal and social dynamics of regional state formation and various engagements
between the Kurds and these hegemonic structures.
The ideological reconstitution of revolutionary agency in Rojava
One of the main insights resulting from the study of failed uprisings is that
while these uprisings are often successful in ousting a regime, this often hap-
pens at the expense of having a plan ready for what happens after (see Law-
son 2019: 222). How to reconstruct society after a revolution is a matter of
having a vision for the aftertime that is directly connected to the ideology
of the revolutionaries. The particular challenge to the Rojava revolutionar-
ies was not to take down the existing power holders, but to make good on
their claim to reconstruct and maintain social relations based on non-ex-
clusionary, non-hierarchical and gender-libertarian principles. The ideolog-
ical vision in question was present among the revolutionaries of Rojava, yet
had not come into existence out of a void. This vision can be detected in the
PKK’s problematization and gradual transformation of the hegemonic na-
tional liberation ideology and organizational structure throughout the 1990s
and 2000s. The processual-interactive relationship between the ideological-
organizational line hegemonic within global anti-systemic movements and
its problematization by the revolutionaries of Rojava shaped their revolution-
ary agency. In the analytical tradition of world-system theory, the term ‘anti-
systemic movements’ refers to globally interconnected mobilizations against
structural exploitation and domination by the capitalist world-system, as in
class- or national-liberation-based movements, feminist or ecologist move-
ments and so on (Wallerstein 2014). Anti-systemicmovements join global pro-
cesses from a standpoint of challenging them; yet, they also create the hege-
monic ideology and structures of this challenge. The ideological lineages of
the Rojava revolution are embedded in the locally based problematization of
the hegemonic national liberation ideology.
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What was strikingly different in the Rojava revolution compared to the
othermovements in 2011 inWest Asia andNorth Africa was its radical reimag-
ining of power relations. I do not intend to give a detailed account of this
radical process here, but rather want to focus on the international historical
and sociological process of its unfolding. It is important, however, to mention
that the transformation was made from an independence-seeking national
liberationmovement to a radical politico-social assemblage bymeans of three
interdependent struggles: (1) a struggle for direct and radical democracy, for-
mulated as democratic autonomy, serving as a way of solving the problems in
the locality concerned; (2) a struggle for the transformation of the state into a
democratic republic, in order to render it permissive to the rights and demands
of dissident political groups and different identities, including its Kurdish
population; (3) a struggle to connect different social and political formations
that were separated by nation-state borders by means of democratic confeder-
alism as opposed to the idea of forming an independent Kurdistan (Öcalan
2013a, 2013b). Playing a central role in the Rojava revolution, this re-imagina-
tion of revolutionary transformation was profoundly related to the confronta-
tion between the hegemonic ideological and organizational structures in anti-
systemic movements and the historical patterns of West Asian dynamics of
resistance.
The PKK was one of the leftist organizations in Turkey in the second half
of the 1970s that rapidly grew in the 1980s.The contemporaneous movements
in Turkey, in line with the global 68 movement and national liberation move-
ments (e.g. in Vietnam, Cuba and Angola), shared certain characteristics such
as, most notably, a Leninist party model, a national-liberation ideology and
(as an aim) a guerrilla campaign (Akkaya 2013). Two factors were determinant
throughout the emergence of the PKK.On the one hand, they established non-
hierarchical relations with the local Kurds.5 On the other, they made strategic
use of violence against the state, tribal structures, and other Kurdish orga-
nizations.6 The guerrilla warfare from 1984 onwards followed the example of
other guerrilla struggles for national liberation (Gunes 2013; Tezcür 2015) and
continued until the early 1990s.7 However, the collapse of the Soviet Union
would compel the PKK to engage with its organizational structure and ideo-
logical positioning.
In the early 1990s, the PKK was under heavy pressure to transform itself
ideologically and structurally for three central reasons: (a) the transforma-
tions in the anti-systemic movements, (b) the structural need to transcend
orthodox Marxism and the Leninist party model, and (c) the post-Cold-War
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social and (geo-)political conditions in West Asia. The world system theorists’
problematization of socialist states, social democracy and national liberation
movements is illustrative of the PKK’s understanding of the ideological crisis
that the left was going through:
Have social democrats achieved anything more than some redistribution to
middle strata? Have communist parties achieved anything more than some
economic development? And even so, has this not been primarily to ben-
efit the so-called new class of bureaucratic elite? Have nationalist move-
ments achieved anything more than allowing the so-called comprador class
a slightly larger slice of the world pie? (Arrighi et al. 1989: 34; author’s trans-
lation)
Although asynchronously, these questions underlay the ideological-political
determinants of a globally observable crisis.8 The PKK was engaging with
the orthodox national liberationist path and real socialism in order to trigger
a transformation. Two decades later, in his assessments of the early 1990s,
Öcalan (2013b: 287ff.) said that they were trying to build a Kurdistan with-
out knowing what socialism and nation-statism really were and how these
ideologies were impacting on personalities: ‘We managed to be in authority
[in the 1990s]. But we either did not know what to achieve with authority or
many of us started to think we were “special”’ (ibid.: 290).9 This diagnosis of
the degeneration of the PKK cadre conditioned an ideological intervention in
the party’s organizational structures by Öcalan. He aimed at addressing the
combined effect of nation-statism and real socialism on the one hand and the
historically developed tribal/religious and sexist personality/mentality struc-
tures on the other. A Kurdish activist remarked that the transformation of the
PKK
had been condensing from the 1990s onwards […] This transformation not
only meant a transformation [of the ideological goal] from an independent
Kurdistan to democratic confederalism but the transformation of mental-
ity structures. It was not simply a political transformation. (Kurdish Activist,
interview, 14 July 2019)
The transformation, which would be sealed as democratic confederalism in
the 2000s,was developing through the interaction of the organizational needs
and ideological interventions throughout the 1990s.
Combined with the lessons learned in the guerrilla war with the Turkish
army (Karayılan 2014), the pressure for change resulted in important transfor-
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mations in the party’s organizational structure. For instance, the creation of a
separate organization of women fighters and the first ceasefires in pursuit of
a negotiated settlement were remarkable developments that would shed light
on the processes to come.
One of the distinguishing properties of the PKK was the independent orga-
nization of the women from the men […] This was not only a theorization
but also the [practical] materialization of the women’s army and women’s
organization through the will of the women. (Veteran Kurdish politician, in-
terview, 17 May 2019)
The transformation of the PKK’s organizational structure and ideology was
happening through the feminization of the Kurdish politics around a well-
known motto: ‘becoming liberated by fighting, becoming beautiful by liber-
ating oneself, and being loved by becoming beautiful’ (Stêrk 2018). Yet, due
probably to the intensity of the conflict, the scope of transformation did not
reach to the degree of the current framework.10
As detailed so far, the transformation was already happening in practice
but its acceptance by the organization as a coherent political and ideolog-
ical project would wait until after Öcalan was delivered to Turkey in 1999.
Combined with the organizational turmoil after his imprisonment, the post-
Soviet development of radical political thought further pushed Öcalan to end
the hesitation between the hegemonic ideology of national liberation and a
strong need for a change to ensure the continuity of the PKK (Öcalan 2003:
30).11 Accordingly, he sought an ideologically acceptable and politically realis-
tic solution for historically deep-rooted problems emerging from the regional
experience of capitalist modernity.
This attempt at transforming the organization, in combination with
the growing splinter groups after Öcalan’s imprisonment, triggered a life-
or-death moment for the PKK. The period between 1999 and 2004 was ‘the
most difficult period [...], a period of painful transformation, and this period
[was] happening in the absence of the leader who formed the party, gave it
perspective and in practice led it’ (Veteran Kurdish politician, interview, 17
May 2019). But eventually from 2004 onwards, Öcalan’s leadership was rein-
stated at the expense of losing around one fifth of the party’s members. The
unburdened PKK started to experiment with a new organizational structure
beyond the Leninist party model in the light of prefigurative and proactive
radical-revolutionary politics (Akkaya and Jongerden 2010). Although the
problems associated with the Leninist party model persisted to some extent,
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the PKK-led Kurdish movement transformed into a web of social, political,
military/self-defence, and economic organizations, a number of which had
already been formed and were active in Rojava well before the civil war in
Syria.
The transformations of the global anti-systemic movements, national lib-
eration movements in particular, and the particular ways in which they inter-
acted with locally based party structures and resistance dynamics were con-
stitutive of the revolutionary agency in Rojava. When the geopolitics allowed
a power shift, the PYD as a political organization and the YPG-YPJ, the mili-
tary/self-defence units, were the most prepared and best structured organi-
zations to assume power not only because of the historical development of
the Kurdish movement in Syria (as explained above) but also through hav-
ing an ideological vision of what came next. Everything associated with the
Rojava revolution – for instance, the extra-systemic reconstruction of social
relations, peaceful co-existence between different ethnic, sectarian and reli-
gious groups, gender-libertarian social relations, structurally connected co-
operatives, communes, assemblies that organize self-rule – is the outcome of
the ways in which the PKK-led Kurdish movement addressed globally present
ideological and structural challenges within its ranks.
The geopolitics of the revolution in Rojava
Unsuccessful nation-formation practices, societies forcibly controlled by au-
thoritarian regimes or dictatorships, continuing imperialist interventions,
and the continuous deprivation of minority groups were forming the roots of
permanent conflicts, and hence social fatigue in the broader region (Bozarslan
2013). Combined with the immediate shock of the neoliberal dismantling of
state-led developmentalism, this social fatigue took the form of what was
called the Arab Spring. This upheaval unleashed a number of developments
which made the Rojava revolution possible. The complex international en-
gagement, however, was also forming the immediate geopolitical threats to, as
well as opportunities for, the survival of the revolution. The geopolitical threats
were coming from the politico-social hierarchies in the region while opportu-
nities were arising from the contradictions between different power constel-
lations. In combination with the historical-sociological and ideological lin-
eages explained above, revolutionary agency was constituted by a locally based
processual engagement with these geopolitical threats and opportunities. Ac-
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cordingly, a geopolitical strategy formulated as the Kurdish third way made
the revolution possible and continued to form its essence.
The violent intervention of the Assad regime in initially peaceful protests
and the involvement of regional and international forces both for and against
the regime set the initial configuration of the Syrian war. From the very first
days, Russia supported the Syrian regime.The US first supported the moder-
ate opposition, then turned to help Kurdish-led forces after the supplanting of
the opposition by jihadi forces. Regionally, Turkey was – increasingly – sup-
portive of the jihadi forces against the Kurds and the Syrian regime,while Iran
backed the regime in pursuit of creating a regional alliance stretching from
Iran, via Iraqi Shi’as to the Syrian Alawite regime. This background after the
start of Syrian war resulted in two interrelated constraints geopolitically sur-
rounding the Rojava revolution. The first (internal) one was formed through
the confrontation between the mainstream opposition and the regime. The
second (external) one developed alongside the confrontations between the US
and Russia in Syria.
First, internally, the regime wanted to instrumentalize the Kurds against
Turkey and the jihadists, while the opposition had no views on the Kurdish
question. The regime had had a very violent history with the Kurds through-
out the past decade and did not recognize their fundamental rights, despite
many promises after the Qamishlo revolt (Gauthier 2005). However, given the
country-wide uprising, the regime withdrew from Rojava for three reasons
largely informed by the experience of previous Syrian regimes in dealing with
popular unrest: (a) focusing on the fight in other regions, Aleppo and Dam-
ascus in particular, to contain the uprising first and then return to Kurdistan
once the fight with the Syrian Arab opposition had been won; (b) leaving the
Turkish AKP government to face the ‘PKK-linked Kurds’, thereby punishing
the AKP for its support of the – increasingly jihadi – opposition; and finally
(c) making two of its enemies, the Kurds and the jihadists, fight and weaken
each other (Gunes and Lowe 2015; ICG 2014; Spyer 2013). The PYD-led Kurds
assumed power after the withdrawal of the regime troops. Developments af-
terwards unfolded in the way the regime imagined that they would. However,
particularly their remarkable resistance to ISIS during the battle of Kobanê in
2014, and globally mobilized solidarity actions on their behalf with a massive
media coverage, pushed the Obama administration to support the Kurds.The
US backing of the Kurdish-led forces became a geopolitical game-changer.
The mainstream Sunni-Arab opposition in Syria, on the other hand, did
not have and did not propose any solution to the Kurdish question in Syria for
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a time after the regime had been ousted (Spyer 2013). Riad Assad, the nominal
head of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), rejected the possibility of federalism in
an interview in August 2012, saying ‘in Syria, there are no Kurdish or Sunni
regions. It is all Syrian land’ (Khoshnaw 2012). Riad al-Shaqfa, the leader of
the Syrian Muslim Brothers, one of the strongest groups, was blunter, stating
in September 2012: ‘We clearly oppose the ambitions of establishing a Kurdish
entity in Syria’ (quoted in Caves 2012: 3). It was clear that the mainstream Syr-
ian opposition had no plan for the Kurds, instead asking the Kurds to come
under the commandership of FSA without any preconditions which was im-
possible in view of Kurdish aspirations (Barfi 2013).The Rojava administration
did not have a capacity comparable to that of the regime and the state/sub-
state actors supportive of the regime (such as Iran, or the Iraqi Shia). Nor
did it have support comparable to that of Syrian opposition from regional
(e.g. Turkish) or international forces (such as the US during the early years
of uprising). On the contrary, this geopolitical setting was further driving the
Rojava revolution into a corner, for it was leaving the Kurds with no friends.
The second geopolitical constraint had to do with the attempts of in-
ternational forces, the US and Russia in particular, to reorder the region
through the global geopolitical contradictions centred on Syria (Unver 2016).
Even though the core states are central to these hegemonic relations, they are
dependent on converging interests with regional actors, which are conducted
by means of continuous negotiations. While all actors try to self-position
according to this hierarchical framework, Turkey and the Kurds in particular
have benefited from the room to manoeuvre left between Russia and the
US. Both of the former have some kind of relationship with both of the
latter, unlike, for instance, the Assad regime which has long been cut off
from the US. However, the Kurds did not have any leverage against Western
states apart from their ability to fight. The implications of Jihadi-Wahhabi
Islam and the Kurdish resistance to their attempts at genocide drew the
attention of international mass media, which then pushed Western support
for the Kurds in their fight against ISIS. Although this support prima facie
instrumentalized the Kurdish movement, it ultimately also added to its
international legitimacy.
The revolutionaries of Rojava engaged with these geopolitical constraints
by formulating a third-way policy. Asya Abdullah, co-leader of the PYD, stated
in the early days of the Rojava Revolution in 2013, that ‘despite the opposition
of the regional and international forces, we continued our struggle by opt-
ing for a third way and we took big steps towards the construction of demo-
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cratic autonomy’ (Yeni Özgür Politika 2013). Accordingly, the Kurdish third
way was conceptualized as an autonomous political strategy of the PKK-led
Kurdishmovement, beyond the historically confrontational hegemonic power
structures of secularist nationalism (i.e. the Assad regime) and Islamist na-
tionalism (i.e. the mainstream opposition) with their varying degrees of in-
ternational backing. It is asserted to be a political strategy on the path to
democratic confederalism, but not the ultimate goal in and of itself.
The geopolitical causality of the Rojava revolution lies in the processual
interaction between the contradictions of different political constellations and
the Kurdish engagement in this geopolitical setting with a third way policy.
Given these two geopolitical constraints, the revolution has been a case of
proving its social, economic andmost importantlymilitary capacity to sustain
and push the regional and international forces to accept the revolution, if
not officially recognize it. The unfolding of geopolitics, particularly after the
Turkish invasion of Afrin in 2016, further confined the revolution. However,
given the focus of this chapter on the constitutive elements of the revolution,
an elaboration on these developments is beyond its scope.
Conclusion
I have argued that the international was integral to the Rojava revolution all
the way down. Building on a historical sociological conception of the inter-
national based on the structures of hegemony and dynamics of resistance, I
have reflected on how the three particular processes involved in the interac-
tion between the global and the local shaped revolutionary agency in Rojava: the
historical sociology of regional state-formation; the ideological reconstitution
in reaction to the upheaval of anti-systemic movements; and the geopolitics
of the Syrian war. Accordingly, the historical sociology of state formation after
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which locked state and non-state polities
in a lasting impasse, is the causal precedent of Kurdish deprivation. The var-
ious experiences of the Kurds in endeavouring to escape from this impasse
against the homogenizing states’ repression form the historicity of the revo-
lutionary agency in Rojava.
Conceiving itself as part of anti-systemic movements, the PKK has inter-
actively engaged with the debate within these movements. This engagement
has changed along with the transformation in world politics. The strongest
impact was brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, after which the
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PKK-led movement reconsidered the ideological and organizational premises
of the hegemonic path to national liberation. This process is central to the
ideological reconstitution of revolutionary agency in Rojava.
Finally, obvious constraining conditions pertain to global geopolitics cen-
tred on the Syrian war. The constitution of world politics required renewed
intervention by the hegemony-seeking powers in the region when regional hi-
erarchies were renegotiated in the post-Arab Spring era. Given the historico-
social dynamics, this has reshaped the relations between the states, different
identity groups and non-state entities.The involvement of the revolutionaries
of Rojava in this constellation with their semantic/ideological and spatiotem-
poral arsenal is constitutive of the geopolitical constitution of the revolution-
ary agency.
Notes
1 I thank George Lawson for his detailed comments on the very first draft
of this chapter.
2 I do not namemy interviewees for obvious security concerns. I have used
7 of the interviews that I conducted as part of my doctoral research.
3 Sources including newspapers and interviews, on which this work is
based, are only available in Kurdish, Turkish and French. Thus, all fol-
lowing translations of these sources are provided by the author.
4 I use the term ‘PKK-led Kurdish movement’ for the network of au-
tonomous movements, parties, civil society organizations, armed
groups and so on in four countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) and
elsewhere. It refers to the Kurdish political bodies that are inspired
by the ideological line of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, but have
different organizational structures and, more importantly, carry on au-
tonomous politics according to the (geo)political context of the country
they operate in. This, however, should not be interpreted as if political
decisions were exclusively made by the PKK leadership and imposed in
a top-down fashion. The term covers this organizational complexity and
takes the separation between the shared ideology and the autonomous
decision-making processes fully into account.
5 On the PKK’s relations with local Kurds: ‘The family backgrounds of
members of other organizations are in the petty bourgeoisie or state
bureaucracy. They did not want to shake hands with the people for
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whom they were struggling, hesitated to sit in the same place with the
ordinary Kurds […] The PKK, on the other hand, was forcing them to
shake hands with the ordinary Kurds and in this way the PKK members
won the ordinary people’s hearts’ (journalist/former activist, interviews,
18 May 2019).
6 On the PKK’s use of violence: A number of interviewees mentioned that
the PKK’s strategically oriented use of violence mainly aimed at opening
a space for mobilization in the Kurdish cities and towns, against other
contemporary organizations and tribes which were already well-estab-
lished.
7 A founding member of the PKK defines the importance of the first guer-
rilla attack on Turkish military bases as ‘it was an important step to suc-
cessfully implementing guerrilla warfare theory in accordance with the
character of the period and met the needs of the time’ (Karayılan 2014:
62).
8 According to world system scholars, these questions were asked in the
West, from the late 60s on, which eventually led to the new social move-
ments against the hegemonic reductionist politics based on identity
or class (Wallerstein 2014: 164f.). A similar debate was to take place in
Turkey, but only after the second half of 1980s as a result of attempts
to understand the ideological roots of the leftist turmoil in the country.
For instance, a feminist activist of Turkish background stated that ‘we
managed to organize a women’s march for the first time in 1986. For me
this was the end of turmoil caused by the defeat in 1980.This march was
decisive.’ (Activist, interview, 15 May 2019)
9 In this context, by ‘authority’ he means senior ranks in the military chain
of command.
10 Particularly two books based on talks given by Öcalan (n.d., 1995) pub-
lished in the early 1990s show the ways in which the interventions in
party structure were carried out.
11 Öcalan’s analysis of nation-statism ‘pushed him [towards transforma-
tion]. […] He reaches radical democracy as a result of analysing power
structures and institutions. [Thus,] his main analyses are those of men-
tality and power. He builds his analysis through the observation of the
kind of structures that result from this mentality’ (Kurdish activist, in-
terview, 14 May 2019; author’s translation).

Resisting World Politics on ‘Migration
and Development’?
Tracing the Trajectory of Counter Discourses
and Movements in Latin America
Mustafa Aksakal
Introduction
This chapter traces the trajectory of Latin American counterdiscourses on the
relation between migration and development since the 1950s by juxtaposing
them with dominant globalized discourses. It not only provides a different
perspective on the discussions on the subject in a particular world region,
but also demonstrates how the dominant discourses have been observed, de-
scribed and countered in this region.
Public discussions on migration and development are nothing new; they
emerged inmany countries of the global South andNorth as early as the 1950s.
Various migration scholars have outlined these global discussions and identi-
fied three major waves of discourse (cf. Nyberg-Sørensen 2012; de Haas 2012;
Faist and Fauser 2011; Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002). The first, spanning the
1950s and 1960s, took place in a time of labour shortages in many Western
countries, and embraced international movements of labour as beneficial for
the development of countries of origin by way of their returning migrants. In
the 1970s and 1980s a second wave developed that emphasized (under)devel-
opment in countries of origin as a root cause of migration. The third wave of
discourse has been frequently identified as emerging after the 1990s. It was
particularly concerned withmigrant remittances and the activities of migrant
organizations as collective agents that could potentially promote (local) devel-
opment in their countries of origin.
While this kind of broad overview is useful for illustrating some general
trends over time in global policy discourses and public debates, it has its draw-
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backs too. It tends to assume a kind of global homogeneity where there is
none. As the introduction to the present volume underscores, an important
feature of globalization is that it proceeds through increasing economic, po-
litical and social ties between economic, political and social actors located
in diverse world regions. Furthermore, globalization is also characterized by
other dynamics, such as practices related to the different ways in which peo-
ple observe, describe and interpret the world. With respect to migration and
development debates, these practices might be differentiated between dom-
inant globalized understandings and discourses (Castles and Delgado 2008)
on the one hand, and counterperspectives that provide alternative, and some-
times fundamentally opposed, positions at the local, national and regional
levels on the other. The former are the particular viewpoints of powerful po-
litical actors that have been circulated globally.The latter are what the present
chapter seeks to address in a particular world region: the history of discus-
sions of migration and development in Latin America in terms of producing
counterdiscourses to the dominant globalized ones.
Drawing on a range of policy, civil society and academic documents, then,
this chapter addresses the discussions related to migration and development
that have emerged in Latin America from the 1950s onward. In doing so, the
objective is to highlight the contents and structures of alternative discussions
and their role in resisting dominant globalized discourses, raising the ques-
tion of how discussions in Latin America have positioned themselves in rela-
tion to those discourses.
Critical and alternative perspectives on migration and development have
been articulated by different actors situated in a variety of world regions.
Latin America, however, is particularly salient because it is a region with a
long historical tradition in the intellectual production of critical viewpoints
on development and migration. Since the 1950s, at least four cycles of debates
can be identified that have repeatedly served the purpose of providing coun-
terdiscourses to the dominant global ones. Understanding these perspectives
can not only help to obtain a more differentiated picture of migration and de-
velopment discourse in general, butmay also facilitate a better understanding
of the composition of current global policies and the power structures embed-
ded within them.
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section engages in a brief
literature review of the waves of migration and development discussions and
introduces the theoretical viewpoint of this chapter. The third addresses four
central public debates that were, implicitly and explicitly, involved in dis-
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cussing migration and development in Latin America. The fourth compares
the four discursive cycles and highlights their counterdiscursive features, ex-
emplifying the ways in which they previously resisted or still resist dominant
discourses. The conclusion returns to the initial guiding question and argues
that these viewpoints might be significant for better understanding the com-
position of current global policies that often comprise political paradoxes.
Dominant globalized discourses on migration and development
Public interest in, and discourses on, the link between migration and devel-
opment have now continued for seven decades. Various social scientists have
provided a historical overview of the changing nature of these discourses and
have identified three major waves (Nyberg-Sørensen 2012; de Haas 2012; Faist
and Fauser 2011; Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002). To some extent, this chapter
also provides an overview of migration and development discussions. Here,
however, particular attention is paid to Latin American discussions and the
ways in which they have opposed dominant discourses. To this end, this sec-
tion first focuses on the content, structure and the theoretical foundation of
twowaves of mainstream discourses that emerged during the 1950s and 1960s
and then reappeared in updated versions after the 1990s. These insights are
later employed as a background for the subsequent analysis of Latin America
discussions.
International labour migration and return during the 1950s and 1960s
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, international economic inequalities, and es-
pecially access to employment (Kindleberger 1967), were considered the main
causes of South–North migration. This view of labour market scarcities in
countries of the global South was also reflected in considerations of migra-
tion outcomes. It was expected that labour migration could help industrial-
ized countries solve the ‘excess of labour demand’ problem and marginalized
countries overcome the ‘excess of supply’ issue (OECD 1978: 19). For the indus-
trialized countries, it meant increasing the elasticity of their labour supply,
countering supply bottlenecks particularly in agriculture,mining and domes-
tic service (UNECE 1963). For the marginalized it implied exporting unem-
ployed people, thus limiting the costs resulting from unemployment (Kindle-
berger 1967: 199f.). Unemployed people would have the possibility of being
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employed and potentially earning higher incomes by moving to industrial-
ized countries. In the long run, they would gain human capital, namely new
skills, during their stays in destination countries (UNECE 1963). This meant
that migrants would accumulate financial and human capital that would be
imported to their countries of origin through financial remittances and, espe-
cially, through the investments and professional expertise they could offer on
their return, which would, supposedly, lead to economic development (Faist
and Fauser 2011).
This first discursive phase was significantly shaped by two different, yet in
some ways complementary, theoretical approaches, namely neoclassical the-
ory andmodernization theory. Common to both approaches is that they ‘eval-
uate the movement of people from labour-abundant to labour-scarce regions
and countries – along with a presumed transfer of capital in the opposite di-
rection’ (de Haas 2012: 13), increasing efficiency and productivity in all regions
and consequently providing benefits for all. From a neoclassical perspective,
it has been argued that economic differences between regions represent the
main drivers for cost-benefit calculations (e.g. expected wages) and subse-
quent outmigration. Human capital, therefore, represents a particularly im-
portant resource because mobile people aim to accumulate and make use of
their existing skills as profitably as possible during their stays abroad (Massey
et al. 1998). From a modernization theory viewpoint, it has been contended
that migrants are important forces of innovation and change. On the one
hand, they bringmoney back to their home countries. On the other, returnees
are also identified as transmitters of novel ideas, know-how and professional
attitudes. Both aspects were associated with the quick diffusion of wealth and
modernization in poor and traditional societies (de Haas 2010).
As King and Collyer (2016) observe, the dominant migration and develop-
ment discourses of the 1950 and 1960s continued until the 1990s to assume
that migration can generate economic and human capital benefits for coun-
tries of origin.However, some ‘demystification’ of the assumptions underlying
these discourses occurred through a range of empirical studies made during
the 1970 and 1980s. What became increasingly clear was that the benefits of
labour migration for the countries of destination outweighed those for the
countries of origin, in effect creating a kind of development aid from coun-
tries of the global South to wealthy countries of the global North (see Castles
and Kosack 1973).
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Temporary migration and remittances from the 1990s to the present
Migration and development scholars have identified the latest period of
broader discourses as emerging after the 1990s. This ongoing wave of discus-
sion has, on the one hand, adapted to the Age of Migration (Castles et al. 2014),
highlighting the diversification of source and origin countries and patterns
of migration. On the other hand, as Castles (2008) noted, the new phase
of discussions has also partly revisited older theoretical and political ideas
of the first wave. This becomes evident in the World Development Report
2008 in which international migration is discussed as a realistic pathway for
poverty reduction in marginalized regions (World Bank 2007). Formulated
differently, international migration was still considered an engine of progress
that might trickle down to the poorer segments of society. Despite some
similarities, the latest wave of discussions, however, covers additional topics
related to the circulation of migrants, money and ideas that were received
earlier with little or no attention, as well as dealing with the increasing
relevance of countries of origin as partners (Faist and Fauser 2011; King and
Collyer 2016). So, while in the initial period returning migrants’ investments
were emphasized, now financial remittances have moved to the foreground.
Temporary and circular migration are therefore considered the most efficient
ways to ensure the flow of remittances as it is expected that temporary or
circular movers not only have the strongest ties to families back home, but
also the highest commitment to supporting them and thereby contributing
to economic development (EC 2005). In addition, social remittances – un-
derstood as the transfer of ideas, knowledge and attitudes – are emphasized
as important for propelling development in countries of the global South
(OECD 2006). This is considered to have been achieved through temporary
returns, brain gain and brain circulation. Migrant organizations are cele-
brated as important players involved in philanthropic activities and collective
entrepreneurship, which is regarded as stimulating both economic and social
development (UN 2006). Finally, world political arenas have developed (e.g.
the High-Level UN Dialogues on Migration or the Global Forum onMigration
and Development), where dialogues between political actors from countries
of both origin and destination for migrants have been institutionalized,
indicating the acceptance of countries of origin as partners (Ban 2007).
Some core ideas from the previously noted neoclassical and moderniza-
tion approaches still receive some attention, such as the emphasis on eco-
nomic development or modernization through the transmission of ideas, at-
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titudes and knowledge from advanced to peripheral societies. However, po-
litical discourses have also become more diversified through the emergence
of different political logics (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002). In the 1950s and
1960s migration was meeting the complementary needs of countries of the
global North and South (i.e. the excess of labour demand and supply), but af-
ter the 1990s migration discussions were concerned with different issues. For
instance, as Guarnizo (2017: 457) observed, past South–North labour migra-
tion has significantly shaped public conversations, institutions and societies
in many destination countries. This has been expressed, for instance, in ten-
dencies to xenophobic reactions to migrants; the proliferation of right-wing
ideologies and political parties has also influenced the latest discourses on
migration and development. As Castles and Ozkul (2014) alleged, temporary
migration is discursively promoted in some discourses because temporary
permits convey the message to the local population that the settlement of im-
migrants and their access to social entitlement are restricted.
Differing political logics are often mirrored in discursive contradictions:
while in certain discussions some migrants (e.g. irregular migrants) are ad-
dressed as a threat to the security, identity or cohesion of immigration states
(Nyberg-Sørensen 2012), in others they are celebrated as development heroes
(Delgado 2018). This fact has been acknowledged through the denomination
of this link as a ‘nexus’ (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002), conveying the notion
that ‘a set of complex interdependencies and two-way causality that may have
contradictory effects’ co-exist (Carling cited in Bastia and Skeldon 2020: 4).
More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the previously noted
discourse highlights that political actors have indeed observed, described and
interpreted migration and development dynamics in immigration and emi-
gration countries. However, this has been done from a very particular view-
point, meaning that, rather than representing entirely global discourses, they
often express globalized viewpoints because they focus on processes from a
particular perspective, that of the global North. In addition, the latest glob-
alized discussions have been criticized by some scholars because prevailing
power asymmetries between immigration and emigration regions are repro-
duced in discourses. It has been alleged that representatives of powerful coun-
tries discursively promote an unequal division of roles, so that countries and
institutions of the global North are suspected of setting the political principles
and priorities, and actors of the global South of merely enforcing these agen-
das (Castles and Delgado 2008). This indicates that discourses are more than
verbal communications. From a Foucauldian perspective, not only is knowl-
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edge production in discourses related to power, so are the ways in which dis-
courses are linked to diverse practices (e.g. the practices of international orga-
nizations) (Foucault 1991). Against this backdrop, migration and development
discourses are not only globalized, but also often represent dominating view-
points, in which inequalities are reproduced.
Discussions in Latin American have historically been opposed to these
dominant globalized discourses in many ways that will be addressed in de-
tail in the remainder of this chapter. In many academic contexts these op-
posing discussions have been frequently reduced to certain neo-Marxist and
dependency perspectives. A closer look at these discourses reveals, however,
that debates on migration and development have had a long-standing trajec-
tory in the region and have even, in some cases, been linked to social move-
ments, which I address as counterdiscourses. The terminology draws on Karl
Polanyi’s (1973 [1944]) seminal studyTheGreat Transformation. He observed that
the political and economic transformations in 19th-century England involved
a double movement, referring to dialectical dynamics between liberal pub-
lic policies and opposing responses from society. Inspired by Polanyi‘s ideas,
this chapter follows the perspective of this book: on the one hand, it traces
the ways dominant globalized discourses on migration and development are
historically observed, described and opposed in a variety of Latin America de-
bates and, on the other hand, it shows that discourses in this region represent
a significant component of global discourse in light of broader globalization
processes.
Counterdiscourses on migration and development in Latin America
Discourses on the migration and development relationship had already be-
gun in Latin America in the 1950s. This section is concerned with answering
questions related to the content and structure of the discussions as well as
the ways in which migration and development were associated. In particu-
lar, it aims to uncover the ways in which these discourses instilled difference
and opposition to dominant globalized viewpoints. In general terms, it can
be argued that, from the very beginning of these discussions, the unequal de-
velopment of world regions within the global economy was a major concern.
As the following review of the most important cycles of discourse in the re-
gion shows, the specific link between migration and development has been
addressed more implicitly in some periods, and more explicitly in others.1
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Regional asymmetries, industrial development and migration concerns
(1950–1960)
The first wave of Latin American discussions was initiated in the 1950s by var-
ious intellectuals directly and indirectly linked to the Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), with the institution’s direc-
tor, Raul Prebisch, playing a major role in developing what came to be known
as the ‘Latin American structuralist approach’ (in short: ‘LA Structuralism’).
LA Structuralism represents a theoretical framework which explains, through
considering ‘structural differences’ between countries, a range of macro-eco-
nomic dynamics, such as the problems associated with the long-term deteri-
oration of the terms of trade in peripheral countries (Jenkins, 2013). Prebisch
and his colleagues observed that core countries are historically more indus-
trialized and hegemonic, which is manifested in the production and export of
manufactured goods. By contrast, peripheral Latin American economies have
an agro-mineral character that is expressed through the export of natural and
agricultural resources to core countries. In other words: ‘[W]hile the centres
kept the whole benefit of the technical development of their industries, the
peripheral countries transferred to them a share of the fruits of their own
technical progress.’ (Prebisch 1950: 10). From this point of view, the result is
an asymmetric economic relationship between the centre and the periphery
to which Latin American countries with structural and institutional differ-
ences, unequal exchange and a deterioration of terms of trade were exposed
(cf. Kay 2018). As the head of ECLAC, Prebisch was also interested in develop-
ing a strategy for the promotion of economic development in Latin America.
From a political standpoint, he conceived of economic progress as a way to
increase the standard of living for the population by systematically increasing
productivity in the region. This was not possible if Latin American countries
remained in their traditional roles as producers of primary goods because
it made them increasingly dependent, vulnerable and subordinate players in
the global economy. From his viewpoint, promoting development involved
industrialization which, in turn, required a strong state dedicated to actively
promoting progress in the country. The role of the state, then, was to imple-
ment political measures related to protectionism, subsidies and investments
in the infrastructure of the domestic industry to support the development
process, also known as, the ‘import substitution industrialization’ (ISI) (Kay
1989). Essentially, the underlying idea was to create developmentalist states
that protected and promoted domestic industry in Latin American countries,
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and to improve the life chances of the members of these societies.This means
that the fruits of these endeavours were envisaged as trickling down from the
companies to the industrial labourers through increasing wages and, conse-
quently, decreasing causes of labour migration. Regarding human mobility,
Prebisch was also aware that a constantly growing rural population entailed
not only rural–urban migration, but also industrial development as under-
lined in the following quotation:
agriculture absorbs a decreasing proportion of the increase in the popula-
tion of working age, with the result that industry and other activities have
been able to increase their employment more […]. There have, however,
been instances in which the rapid growth of industry during recent years
has brought about an actual transference of workers, with unfavourable
consequences for agriculture. (Prebisch 1950: 43)
While this reflects the outcomes of industrialization on agriculture, it is worth
noting that discourses within ECLAC in subsequent years were also directed
toward the demographic and social effects that rural–urban migration had
on peripheral countries and on urban societies (Ducoff et al. 1965). Moreover,
discussions on the role of the developmentalist state sought to find strate-
gies to attract highly skilled migrants. It has been emphasized that to attract
skilled foreignworkers,more than sporadic economic progress is required. To
achieve long-term socio-economic development in Latin American countries,
Bertola (2016: 246) noted, the implementation of effective developmentalist
policies was needed. This in turn required the building of ‘economic, social
and political structures’. From this point of view, development was perceived
as a useful means to attract more qualified immigrants. Furthermore, it was
argued that an additional role of the state is to create and implement coherent
recruitment strategies, namely, attractive migration policies for ‘encouraging
immigration of specialized labour’ (Perez 2016: 69).
This approachwas developed at around the same time that the firstmigra-
tion and development discourses emerged in the Global North. It is striking
that both discussions were similar in that the emphasis was on economic de-
velopment through industrialization but focused on this idea from different
angles, namely, from origin and destination region perspectives. As previ-
ously noted, an asymmetric relationship between core and periphery coun-
tries that led to unequal outcomes was the main focus. From this vantage
point, (internal) migration was not addressed as a natural consequence of
emerging regional disparities and rational choices, but rather as an issue sit-
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uated in the broader economic development processes of the global economy.
Industrial development was thought to have side effects related to urbaniza-
tion and the depopulation of rural areas that might have required state in-
tervention (ECLAC 1957). At the same time, highly qualified immigration was
perceived as relevant for accelerating industrial development.
The almost simultaneous emergence of this Latin American discussion
and the first wave of dominant globalized migration and development dis-
courses indicates that counterdiscourses do not always represent a concrete
response to dominant discourses. In fact, discourses may result from dif-
ferent types of observations and interpretations of development, which may
afterwards be instrumentalized as tools to counter dominant viewpoints.
Debates on dependency, underdevelopment and migration (1970–1980)
In the mid-1960s, dependency theories gradually gained traction in public
discourses in Latin America and evolved from regional discourses to inter-
nationally known and accepted critical migration and development debates
during the 1970s and 1980s. While the core ideas of the centre–periphery
paradigm of LA Structuralismwere kept alive in nascent dependency theories,
the approach roughly developed in two theoretical directions: the structural-
ist and the Marxist strands. Indeed, both strands provided analytical tools
for explaining the relevance of dependency in the development processes of
countries of the global South, but they focused on the underlying mecha-
nisms differently. For instance, from a structuralist viewpoint, Furtado (1973)
observed that both the technologies and the determination of consumption
patterns in peripheral countries were controlled by core countries. He con-
sidered these ‘dependent patterns of consumption’ as keys for explaining the
preservation of underdevelopment and dependence in peripheral countries.
From a more Marxist position, Marini (1973) observed that dependency in pe-
ripheral countries was accompanied by the ‘super-exploitation’ of the domes-
tic labourer. According to this viewpoint, the core–periphery division in the
global economy and the resulting unequal exchange would lead to decreas-
ing profit rates among domestic capitalists. To compensate for this economic
loss linked to unequal exchange, the capitalists would overexploit the local
labour force. In turn, this overuse of labourers would hinder the switch from
absolute to relative surplus values as the dominant productive relationship
in society, which would reinforce the dependency of these economies. Inde-
pendent from the particular strand of dependency theory in play, these ap-
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proaches often considered that earlier noted capitalist macro-dynamics had
fundamentally transformed the ways in which society was organized, such
as the forms of (re)production and relationships. Resulting structural imbal-
ances thus produced an industrial reserve army inclined to migrate either
internally or internationally (Portes 1978).
A further crucial issue related to the migration and development link that
dependency scholars emphasized was the phenomenon of brain drain. From
this point of view, conditions of underdevelopment were not solely connected
to the overexploitation of domestic labourers, but also represented a power-
ful factor pushing especially well-educated and qualified society members to
the more developed and industrialized regions (Frank 1967). In the case of Ar-
gentina, Oteíza (1971) revealed that the outflow of qualified persons could be
linked to differences in wages, infrastructure, social prestige, and political in-
stabilities and repression between countries of origin and destination. These
circumstances have been associated with barriers to development as reflected
in a policy document by ECLAC (1975: 10):
The emigration of scientists, professionals and skilled labour in general is
a common feature of all the countries of the region which has been accen-
tuated over the last few decades and is favoured by the emigration policies
of the developed countries. [… I]t is known that this emigration represents
a substantial economic loss in terms of training costs and of the productive
resources thus taken from the national economy.
The quote illustrates the ways ECLAC addressed intellectual and economic
losses related to training, human capital and taxes. In subsequent years, the
previous discussions were continued by updating the contents to fit the cur-
rent circumstances but also becamemore diversified through the inclusion of
alternative viewpoints.
The debate on development from within and unequal exchange
(1990–2000)
Discussions on neoliberal globalization have emphasized the politically pro-
moted trend toward an increasing circulation of capital and goods and a de-
centralization of production (Harvey 2007). This global development has also
shaped discussions onmigration and development in Latin America. As a con-
sequence, classical structuralist and dependency theories lost their analytical
power to explain development processes. Moreover, after the 1980s, migra-
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tion processes moved toward the more globalized, accelerated and diversified
dynamics identified by Castles and colleagues (2014) as the ‘Age of Migration’.
These conditions involved the need to adjust the analytical lens to changing
economic, political and social circumstances. These challenges were met by
the further development of perspectives toward neo-structuralist and neo-
dependency approaches, as noted earlier.
Neo-structuralist approaches emerged in Latin America as a response to
the proposed macroeconomic policies under the Washington Consensus and
its adjustment programmes. Like previously discussed LA Structuralism, the
neo-structuralist perspective in the 1980s also focused on ‘endogenous struc-
tural factors’ (Sunkel 1993: 7).2 A systematic, theoretical and practical revi-
sion was carried out in 1990 in the context of ECLAC and its policy document
Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity:
[T]he 1980s represented, in historical terms, a turning point between the
previous pattern of development of Latin America and the Caribbean and
a phase which is not yet fully defined but will undoubtedly be different and
which will mark the future development of the region […]. The challenge is
none other than to find the path that leads to development. (ECLAC 1990: 2)
Briefly summarized, the approach foresees a development process that is
‘from within’, or a change in the productive structure of the economy from
the export of raw materials to the export of industrial goods. As in the pre-
vious structural approach, several functions appertain to the state. Its role
changed from that of a developmentalist actor to one entrusted with the tasks
of seeking new opportunities in the global economy, observing and govern-
ing the market, promoting private–public partnerships and open regional-
ism as well as implementing social policies to increase equity in society (Kay
2018). As in LA Structuralism, migration was implicitly considered to be part
of the theoretical framework of the neo-structuralist perspective. This signi-
fies that themacroeconomic conditions were perceived as an important factor
that decreased the life chances of society members and could simultaneously
cause internal or international migration. By contrast, adapting to the con-
temporary economic rules of the game meant, by definition, reducing migra-
tion pressures and avoiding a brain drain. In short, the focus was solely on
the causes of outmigration, namely, development conditions, thus creating a
rather indirect link to migration.While neo-structural intellectuals have been
hesitant to directly address the link betweenmigration and development, this
does not hold true for representatives of the neo-dependency school.
Resisting World Politics on ‘Migration and Development’? 137
In globalized discourses, free trade is often associated with increasing
economic development in countries of the global South. In relation to mi-
gration, this means there is an expectation that, after high levels of short-
term outmigration, there will be reduced migration in the long run due to
the general improvement of the socio-economic situation of the origin-coun-
try population (Martin 2016). Moreover, and as discussed above, financial re-
mittances are seen in this perspective as also promoting development (World
Bank 2018).
These kinds of viewpoints are sharply challenged by several neo-depen-
dency scholars. They observe that transnational corporations represent in-
creasingly important global players forcing developing countries into a new
kind of dependency. As Delgado and Marquez (2007) suggest, this situation
becomes clear when one considers the maquiladora sector in Mexico, which
expanded in times of free trade under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). Maquiladoras are productive units that are largely discon-
nected from the Mexican economy and represent industrial extensions of
large transnational corporations originating mostly from the USA that carry
out labour-intensive assembly work. Because these companies enjoy an at-
tractive production environment via tax breaks and low wages, they indirectly
export labour. In addition to this ‘indirect export’ of labour, there is also a di-
rect exportation of labour expressed in migration flows toward the US, com-
posed of a kind of ‘reserve army of the unemployed’ (cf. Delgado andMarquez
2007).The underlying labour-export-led model clarifies why (against neoclas-
sical considerations) relatively high levels of inequality (underdevelopment)
persist in Mexico and why the country has, in recent history, risen to be the
largest migrant-exporting country in Latin America. From this viewpoint, the
role of financial transfers can be seen as placing the onus of development per-
formance on the shoulders ofmigrants, thereby, creating additional economic
dependencies.
The Buen Vivir discussion (2000–present)
Good Living or Buen Vivir3 represents another important wave in which mi-
gration and development have been intensively discussed. As an indigenous
philosophical perspective, Buen Vivir has a long trajectory in the Andean re-
gion. However, the viewpoint has resurged as a migration and development
discourse in recent years and became increasingly popular around the 2000s
in Latin America. This social philosophy represents a holistic perspective on
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human wellbeing which has important implications in the understanding of
the migration and development link. In general terms, Buen Vivir expresses
an indigenous worldview on the ways society is organized around the envi-
ronment, the community and a certain way of living that is based on socially
determined needs (Chuji et al. 2019). This perspective was taken up in aca-
demic, political and civil society discourses in the Andean region and led to
some social movements during the 1990s as well as later political changes in
Bolivia and Ecuador after the 2000s.
The philosophical starting point of Buen Vivir is similar to the previously
noted discourses, and is related to a fundamental critique of past and present
Western development thinking and globalized debates:
[The perspective represents] a substantial questioning of contemporary
ideas of development, and especially their attachment to economic growth
and their inability to solve the problems of poverty, without forgetting that
their practices lead to severe social and environmental impacts. (Gudynas
2011: 2; author’s translation)
While many of the previously discussed counterperspectives identify devel-
opment issues in relation to asymmetric dynamics, dependency and under-
development, Buen Vivir critically addresses the ways in which prosperity is
discussed and expressed in Western discourses, politics and economic prac-
tices. But what exactly are the main characteristics of this perspective and
how is development perceived by it? Before addressing this question, it might
be worth noting that BuenVivir represents a framework in whichmultiple aca-
demic approaches, civil society and policy discourses and practices co-exist
(Vanhulst and Beling 2014). This becomes especially evident in political de-
bates that have evolved in Bolivia and Ecuador where Buen Vivir has been,
although with slight differences, recognized as a set of guiding principles for
state action. Gudynas (2011) identifies these characteristics as follows: firstly,
the approach considers development as a non-linear process, recognizing the
plurality of development ideas and paths in human history. Secondly, the em-
phasis is on a new relationship between nature and human beings.Nature has
an intrinsic value and the excessive exploitation of it through certain means
of production and consumption is, therefore, condemned. Thirdly, the per-
spective rejects the reducing of social relations to marketable goods or ser-
vices and emphasizes rather the relevance of social relations and interactions
in communities that are based on reciprocity and solidarity. Finally, because
this perspective rejects the primacy of economic development and its mea-
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surement by property or income levels, it stresses non-material wellbeing,
such as happiness and good spiritual living. In short, inspired by non-capi-
talist indigenous visions of wellbeing, Buen Vivir underscores the importance
of ecologically, socially and socioeconomically sustainable community devel-
opments. Two concepts in BuenVivir, namely (in)equalities and inclusion seem
to be particularly interesting with regard to discussions on migration and de-
velopment.
As Villalba (2013: 1430) notes, ‘Sumak Kawsay [Buen Vivir] corresponds to
the Andean indigenous ontology’, leading to very different understandings of
advancement in society. This perspective foresees a decisive transformation
in the way human beings define, produce and consume their basic needs away
from ideas and practices related to development and thinking that are linked
to European modernity. This includes a shift in how relationships to others
and to the environment are formed and maintained through economic, po-
litical and social practices (Chuji et al. 2019), and embracing wellbeing (i.e.
happiness and a good spiritual life) (Villalba 2013). A rigorous implementa-
tion of the above-mentioned principles may resolve many of the currently
existing inequality-related dynamics because it includes a systematic shift in
the perception of outcomes as well as the means to achieve such outcomes.
Against this backdrop, it would also be unlikely that particular development
conditions, such as regional economic differences, would reproduce certain
drivers of migration. An example in favour of Buen Vivir is the idea of food
sovereignty reflected in the following statement by a Bolivian intellectual:
How do you achieve a good life? By satisfying the basic nutritional needs,
and this by controlling production. The Ayllu [author’s comment: a type of
extended family, working collectively in a commonly held terrain] community
strictly regulates the system of agricultural production and other resources,
the decisions made by the authorities after consultation with the people
are carried out with speed, opposition is punished. With the achievement
of good production at the same time, one of the fundamental objectives,
suma manq'aña, namely the principle of eating well, is achieved. (Choque
cited in Gudynas 2011: 6; author’s translation)
The quote shows how agriculture is approached as an integral part of commu-
nity development. Rural production is not only considered a means for satis-
fying basic needs, but is also linked to social relationships and decision-mak-
ing processes in the community.The academic and civil society discussions on
food sovereignty impacted political discourse andwere finally implemented in
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the Bolivian Constitution in 2009. Article 255 proclaimed food sovereignty for
all Bolivian citizens, including the prohibition of privatization of rural areas
as well as a ban on biotechnologies and toxic substances suspected of harm-
ing human health and the environment in agricultural production.This gives
farmers more power to decide what, how and where to produce, and it pro-
tects them politically, potentially eliminating a range of inequalities in rural
areas (e.g. exclusion or exploitation) and, therefore, some important drivers
of rural outmigration. It also invites us to embrace the role of social actors in
rural development differently: it does not suggest outmigration as a pathway
out of rural underdevelopment, as proposed by some international organiza-
tions, but rather aims to empower rural dwellers economically and politically.
In addition, the link betweenmigration and development was approached
in a different manner. Migrants were looked at from an equity and rights
perspective, rather than as the threats to, or heroes of, development that they
are frequently identified as in globalized debates:
[Buen Vivir] promotes the creation of Latin American and Caribbean citizen-
ship, the implementation of policies that guarantee the human rights of bor-
der populations and refugees, and the protection of human rights of Latin
Americans and the Caribbean in countries of transit and destination. (Acosta
2009: 25; author’s translation)
The citation shows that the migration and development link is considered an
integral process in which the inclusion of all human beings is a major priority.
From this viewpoint, citizenship is embraced as universal membership. This
includes solidarity with migrants, meaning a respectful and tolerant interac-
tion with foreigners. Some of these ideas were also considered in the Ecuado-
rian National Plans of Development.The significance of inclusion was under-
scored as a ‘harmonious integration’ (cf. SENPLADES 2010: 110) through pro-
moting the formal relations in the region. Moreover, the constitution claims
to integrate returning migrants to ‘protect migrant workers’ (ibid.: 80). From
this vantage point, migrants have not been solely viewed in terms of conse-
quences for countries of origin and destination, but rather as subjects that
may conceivably need support and safeguarding.
Buen Vivir has been critically addressed, and it has been pointed out
that the political implementation of this perspective by the governments of
Ecuador and Bolivia was certainly not free of ambiguity and various problems
(see, for example, the issues of food security addressed by McKay et al. 2014).
Nonetheless, Buen Vivir evolved into one of the most important alternative
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perspectives in Latin America and, in many ways, challenged dominant
globalized discourses on migration and development. Although there have
been political turnarounds recently towards more reactionary governments
in Bolivia and Ecuador, the Buen Vivir discourses in academia, policy-making
and civil society have opposed and still oppose the deep-seated mainstream
understanding that prioritizes (economic) development and material wellbe-
ing. The consideration of relational and emotional aspects in development
processes opened up a different vantage point on the causes of migration.
In embracing migrants and their needs in an inclusive and solidarity-based
perspective, this vantage point clearly counters (neo)liberal understandings
that perceive migrants as national security threats in destination regions or
as cash cows for remittance-based developments in origin countries.
Discussion: Countering dominant globalized discourses
The previously presented four periods of discussion not only show that public
discourse on migration and development has had a long historical trajectory
in Latin America, but also that a multitude of actors have approached the
nexus from different angles.
With regard to the former aspect, the first three approaches focus mainly
on economic (under)development as an important factor in migration. In the
early structuralist approach, migration was addressed as a consequence of
industrial development and then later in relation to the brain drain. It was
also acknowledged that the human capital represented by skilled migrants
was needed for industrial development. Therefore, the emphasis was placed
on promoting development both to avoid outmigration and to attract skilled
foreign labourers. LA Structuralism served as the central theoretical ground-
work for discourses related to dependency theories. In the second wave of
discussions, several social scientists explicitly considered internal and inter-
national migration as a consequence of dependency and underdevelopment.
The third wave of LA discourses largely represented theoretical revisions of
the earlier discussions. While neo-structuralist approaches concentrated on
development as an endogenous process in which migration was addressed in
a way similar to earlier discussions, the neo-dependency perspective concen-
trated on the relevance of global capital and on the activities of transnational
companies, particularly, in the framework of free trade. In contrast to these
largely macroeconomic perspectives, the discourse on Buen Vivir represents
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another vantage point on migration and development which can, therefore,
be identified as the fourth and exceptional wave of the debates. As a holistic
and humanistic as well as non-material perspective, it underscores the role of
overarching goals such as universal (human) rights, solidarity and inclusion
as central to society, and represents principles that are associated in many
ways with the migration and development nexus.
As for agents,multiple actors have been involved. In the earlier structural-
ist approach, the discussion was mainly concentrated around ECLAC mem-
bers and state representatives who observed and, in some cases, followed the
recommendations of the UN institution. In the following decades, ECLAC
remained an important player in public discussions. In the dependency dis-
courses, academic actors became increasingly involved in public discourses
(Kay and Gwynne, 2000). In the 1990s especially, civil society took a central
role in counterdiscourses, which was related to at least two dynamics: in the
post-Washington Consensus, non-governmental organizations were awarded
central roles as agencies in development practices, and were thus financially
and rhetorically promoted (Veltmeyer and Petras 2000); the 1990s likewise
witnessed the emergence of diverse ‘new social movements’ (Delgado and
Veltmeyer 2017) in Latin America that were initially organized by farmers,
rural workers and indigenous groups. Afterwards some of these movements
expanded globally because activists all over the world showed their solidarity
with them (Petras and Veltmeyer 2011). A case in point is the Zapatista Army
of National Liberation, which started its activities in Mexico, symbolically in
the same year that the North Amercian Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was
implemented, as a local indigenous social movement resisting global neolib-
eral discourses and policies. Finally, it is worth noting that after 2005 some
leftist governments evolved as new players reproducing counterdiscourses in
the context of the socialism of the 21st century (Delgado and Veltmeyer 2017).
Ecuador and Bolivia implemented central ideas of Buen Vivir in their political
constitutions around 2008 and 2009.
In sum, all these actors have observed the global economy, dominant glob-
alized discourses and related manifestations in the form of economic and
political practices, and have reacted, in one way or another, with counterdis-
courses and sometimes with political and social movements. Needless to say,
there have been variations in observing, describing and interpreting global-
ized discourses and economic and political dynamics in Latin America. The
previous analysis provided an overview of the most important cases in which
the global economy and migration processes as well as migration and devel-
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opment discourses have been interpreted from alternative and often oppos-
ing points of view. It underscores that dominant globalized discourses were
challenged in most of the critical discussions on migration and development
in Latin America. From a Foucauldian viewpoint, it might even be argued
that most Latin American discourses have identified globalized discourses as
symbols of imposition, reproducing power asymmetries. Consequently, the
previously addressed Latin American discussions mostly developed opposite
viewpoints, which this chapter terms counterdiscourses.
The Latin American structuralist and Buen Vivir approaches represent par-
ticular discussions. While the former viewpoint was initially developed to ex-
plain dynamics in the global economy and afterwards adapted to migration
and development discussions, the latter viewpoint represents an ancient in-
digenous philosophy, which has gained public acceptance over the past three
decades. Nonetheless, when considering the entire trajectory of discussions,
it can be argued that these discussions in Latin America represent an im-
pressive history of resistance to dominant globalized discourses, policies and
practices. The results also indicate that Latin American discussions represent
an important component of global discourses onmigration and development.
Conclusion
This chapter has been devoted to public discourses on the link between mi-
gration and development in Latin America, investigating the ways that pub-
lic discourses were positioned in relation to dominant globalized discourses
over the past decades. Considering the historical trajectory of Latin Amer-
ican debates, it has become clear that very diverse and rich reflections on
development and migration have evolved. It is striking that, with the excep-
tion of the Buen Vivir approach, the vast majority of the selected perspectives
concentrated on the link between asymmetries, dependency and economic
underdevelopment and migration. This means that many discourses have re-
flected onNorth–South relationships and perceived this link to be unequal, as
well as a process that most likely provokes outmigration. Put differently, they
producedmaterialistic perspectives on development andmigration.Nonethe-
less, the previous discussion shows that the debates on migration and devel-
opment symbolized discursive waves of political counter practices, including
discourses and, partly, political and social movements that were theoretically
and politically opposed to dominant discussions on migration and develop-
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ment. In this way, they represent an important component of global discus-
sions in the past and in the present, and are therefore more than just ‘pes-
simistic’ views of the link, as assumed by some social scientists (e.g. de Haas
2010).This is because of the long discursive tradition in which different view-
points have developed.
There are several benefits from understanding these dominant discourses
and their counterdiscourses. On the one hand, they can provide insights into
different modes of observation, description and interpretation, especially the
ways in which these practices are shaped by political interactions and mutual
references. On the other, they can facilitate a better understanding of cur-
rent dynamics in global migration policies. In addition, the juxtaposition of
the two viewpoints can, for instance, provide new insights for analysing the
paradoxes in recent global discourses, such as the Global Compact for Safe,
Orderly and Regular Migration launched in 2017.
Notes
1 The aim of this analysis is not to provide a comprehensive overview of al-
ternativemigration and development discourses in the region, but rather
to selectively focus on the most significant discussions. The underlying
selection criteria of these four periods of public discussions are related
to the variety of political actors involved, the political resonance on the
institutional, civil society and academic levels in the region, and the
concrete references to previously noted dominant globalized discourses.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the distinction between the four dis-
cursive waves follows analytical purposes. In fact, many of the presented
waves are related, meaning that rather than representing clearly sepa-
rated discursive phases, they have built on or even overlapped with each
other.
2 The Washington Consensus represents a range of economic policy rec-
ommendations related to the Structural Adjustment Programme, aim-
ing to promote liberalization, deregulation, privatization and free trade,
thereby resolving development issues in Latin American countries.
3 ‘Sumak Kawsay’ in Kichwa or ‘Suma Qamaña’ in the Aymara language.
‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Intervention’
Metaphors of Russia’s Loneliness in a Global World
Sergei Akopov
Introduction
This chapter engages in debates about mapping the global from the perspec-
tive of contemporary Russian politics. It particularly focuses on the question
of how the nexus between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘intervention’ has been articulated
by Russian state and bureaucratic elites in their discourse on contemporary
domestic and foreign affairs. Its main research question is: What do political
metaphors of Russia’s ‘sovereignty’ and ‘intervention’ tell us about the mech-
anisms of the ‘organized politics of loneliness’, as a specific way of relating to
(and imagining) the world, in contemporary Russia?
In relation to the subject of this volume I would, firstly, like to contribute
to research on how (as indicated in the introduction) transnational connec-
tivity is limited and even actively resisted by actors that foster the isolation
of nation-states by appealing to border protection, anti-globalization resent-
ment, and concepts of global enemies. Today this often occurs as part of the
general claim for national sovereignty or what Seyla Benhabib (2016: 109) has
criticized as ‘the new sovereigntism’. I argue that the Russian case adds to
this general debate.
Secondly, I would also like to open up a discussion with several other con-
tributors to this volume. For example, in his chapter Aziz Elmuradov asserts
that Moscow’s recent conception of the global has largely been defined by
an idea that the Western-led liberal world order is in decline and that, in-
stead, Russia should call for a multipolar, pluralistic world with a ‘multiplic-
ity of politico-cultural forms and multiple centers of international influence’
(Chebamkova 2017: 1). In this chapter I explore what the price paid by Rus-
sia for advancing such an ethical and ideological position in the international
arena might be. For example, does Moscow’s rejection of universalism in-
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evitably push Russian elites to ontologize the global ‘loneliness’ of Russia and
other ‘great civilizations’ in the world arena? Should Russia practise self-help
in order to protect its ‘lonely sovereignty’ in a hostile world? In the latter case,
can Russia’s declared ‘geopolitical loneliness’ (Surkov 2018) serve as a justifi-
cation for interventionism and revisionist world politics, while civilizational
dialogue de facto turns into a ‘dialogue on our terms’?
My argument will proceed as follows. In the next section, I will explain
the theoretical framework of my research, which is based on the idea of
sovereignty as a symbolic structure (Jens Bartelson), and the link between
‘sovereignty’ and ‘intervention’ (Cynthia Weber). I will then explain the
methodology of discourse analysis of political metaphors and how it can
illuminate the ‘politics of loneliness’. In the empirical part I will proceed
to investigate the principal 2014 ‘Crimean speech’ that sheds light on the
discursive articulation of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘intervention’ within Russian
politics.
Of course, before the 2014 Ukrainian crisis there was the 1990s crisis in
Yugoslavia, the 2008 war in Georgia, the 2008–2009 campaign for the inde-
pendence of Kosovo, and so on. However, before 2014 Russia usually managed
to find ‘global alliances’ with several Western states. This was most evidently
the case in Russia’s joint opposition with France and Germany to the US-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003. It was only after the conflict over Crimea that
the West was unified in its decision to impose sanctions on Russia, prompt-
ing Russia to reply with countersanctions. The case of Crimea opened the
floodgates to mutual accusations of interventionism. The disputes over the
suspension of several Russian athletes from the Winter Olympic Games in
PyeongChang, Russia’s alleged intervention in the US elections, and the 2018
chemical weapons scandal in Salisbury constitute just a small number of cases
out of many in this respect. Those countries who either abstained or stayed
neutral with regard to Russia soon became key partners of Russian foreign
policy within the BRICS alliance between Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and
the RIC Forum linking Russia, India and China.The empirical analysis in this
chapter will take the ‘Crimean speech’ as its starting point.
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‘Sovereignty’ and ‘intervention’ as performative
and discursive practices of the local and the global
In the literature it is quite common to problematize ‘Westphalian’ accounts of
the nature of sovereignty as amyth of International Relations (IR) (Albert 2016:
118) and sovereignty itself as an ‘essentially contested and essentially uncon-
tested’ (see Bartelson 1995) concept. Jens Bartelson (2014: 39) sees sovereignty
as a symbolic form by which Westerners have perceived and organized their
political world during the modern period. According to him, this ‘fetishism of
sovereignty’ implies that today everything that can be constructed as a threat
to domestic political order ‘can be twisted into an argument for further inter-
ference and intervention in the name of the overarching objectives of inter-
national peace and order’ (ibid.: 99). Consequently, the governmentalization
of sovereignty has amounted to ‘a stealthy rewriting of the nomos of Earth
that has turned the modern international system into an empire in its own
right’ (ibid.). In other words, sovereignty reveals itself ‘through the effects that
it generates’ (Epstein et al. 2018: 804), for which reason we need to theorize
further on the performative nature of sovereignty.
As noted by Tanja Aalberts (2016), like any other concept the concept of
‘sovereignty’ is meant to structure the reality around us. However, behind this
lies the more complex question of how ‘sovereignty’ actually corresponds to
that empirical reality. Referring to the analytical philosophy of Wittgenstein,
Aalberts points towards a performative nature of sovereignty. In her view,
‘sovereignty’ not only describes, but also constitutes a certain reality (ibid.: 184).
Moreover, although sovereignty tends to be seen as the founding principle of
the modern state, there is no comprehensive account of sovereignty that is
universally applicable to all cases of statehood. In this chapter, I agree that the
use of the concept of ‘sovereignty’ can act as a powerful figurative expression
(ibid.: 195), performed within a practice of exercising political power, and also
that ‘sovereignty’ can be interpreted and studied as a discursive practice (ibid.:
192).
The performative nature of sovereignty resides in the fact that it does not
so much describe a reality, but rather is itself (political) action towards the
construction of a reality. Performativity can also be manifested in an attempt
to represent something that is conditional and conventional (like, for instance,
modern Russian collective identity) as unconditional, natural, universal, or
even as the only ‘normal’ political order. Cynthia Weber described this as the
phenomenon of ‘simulating sovereignty’ and of ‘performative states’, where
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ideas of sovereignty and legitimized interventions are mutually constituent.
As Weber emphasized in relation to US invasions in the Caribbean, ‘in the
sovereignty/intervention pairing, it is sovereignty which serves as the foun-
dational concept and intervention which is meaningful only in relation to
sovereignty.The construction of sovereignty as both a guarantee of the mean-
ing of intervention and as a term that is meaningful in and of itself is done
by theorists’ (Weber 1992: 201f.).
Drawing on works by Jean Baudrillard, Weber points out that the lat-
ter’s notion of ‘simulation’ can also be applied to discourses of sovereignty
and intervention, because ‘just as in simulation no ultimate foundation ex-
ists to ground indicators, so too with discourses of sovereignty, no “domestic
community” can be distinguished and made to serve as the foundation of
sovereign authority within a state’ (ibid.: 215). According to Weber, the only
way for sovereignty not to be seen as referring only to itself is the existence of
another category – the category of ‘intervention’. Weber calls intervention ‘an
alibi’ of sovereignty, because intervention always implies a violation of some
sovereignty (ibid.: 215). She outlines two alternatives for states to speak on
behalf of the source of sovereign authority. Both of them reflect attempts by
states to exert effective control over political representations.The first alterna-
tive is a ‘political’ representation that involves a presumed exchange between
the state and its citizenry. In this case, a citizenry ‘authorizes the state to serve
as its agent so long as the state honours its obligation to stand for and further
the interests of that citizenry both domestically and internationally’ (ibid.:
216). However, according to Weber, what makes this relationship between the
state and its citizenry possible is a second type of representation, ‘symbolic
representation’ understood as ‘the act of portraying officialized myth […]. In
this case, what is portrayed is the mystical source of sovereign authority, “the
people”. Symbolic representation is a strategy whereby the sovereign author-
ity of the state is “written” or invented in a specific form which serves as the
grounding principle of the state’ (ibid.).
At the time (the early 1990s), Weber’s ideas on the simulation of sovereignty
were new in IR, but not in the social sciences more generally. From Judith
Butler had already come the ideas that the power of language can performa-
tively constitute identities in fantasy, and that, for example, ‘genders can be
neither true nor false, but are only produced as the truth effects of a discourse
of primary and stable identity’ (Butler 1990: 136).When we look at sovereignty
as a set of discursive practices and symbolic representations, I suggest that
political metaphors can become useful tools to unveil particular frames that
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a speaker is enacting in order to gain the support of the social groups that he
or she is addressing.
Metaphors of security as tools for framing
the ‘politics of loneliness’
In political philosophy the concept of ‘loneliness’ is often defined through its
juxtaposition with ‘solitude’. The former is considered to be a negative state,
because it has to do with painful rejection of the individual. By contrast, the
latter – solitude – is not driven by estrangement, but rather a positive no-
tion, as through solitude we can attain more self-awareness or greater cre-
ativity (see also Akopov 2020). Hannah Arendt has explicitly drawn attention
to this difference: ‘the lonely man finds himself surrounded by others with
whomhe cannot establish contact or to whose hostility he is exposed.The soli-
tary man, on the contrary, is alone and therefore ‘can be together with him-
self ’ (Arendt 1994: 476). Some scholars replace the dichotomy between solitude
and loneliness with a similar opposition between ‘loneliness’ and ‘aloneness’,
agreeing that a person who is alone does not feel abandoned but rather is
full of enthusiasm (Singh 1991: 111). In psychology, similarly, Clark Moustakas
distinguished between productive ‘true loneliness’ and ‘negative loneliness’.
While the former is equivalent to our earlier definition of solitude, the lat-
ter is characterized as ‘loneliness anxiety’ and is accompanied by a system of
defence mechanisms that distract people from dealing with their crucial life
questions. Instead, loneliness anxiety motivates people to constantly seek ac-
tivity with others (Moustakas andMoustakas 2004). Counterintuitively, public
gatherings in large crowds may not be the most effective ways of coping with
loneliness. Crowds can become lonely as well, and ‘lonely crowd’ societies are
usually characterized by a high level of conformity and ‘other-directed people’
(Riesman et al. 2001).
The ultimate idea of this theoretical endeavour is ‘to insert [loneliness]
into the reading of international relations, a conception which has so far re-
mained outside the analytical focus of IR theorists’ in a very similar way to the
one in which Felix Berenskoetter (2007: 647) described his aim to insert the
concept of ‘friendship’ into IR theory. That appears logical not only because
‘loneliness’ is an emotion that ontologically grounds the need for friendship
(both individually and collectively), but also because loneliness satisfies both
criteria offered by Berenskoetter for concepts of international political the-
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ory: presence within academic circles and public discourse, on the one hand,
and the ability to grasp key features of social relations tied to their ‘experien-
tial content’, on the other (ibid.). An example of the latter is the article ‘The
loneliness of the half-breed’ published in 2018 by Vladislav Surkov, a former
First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration, in which he
affirms the slogan of Russian Tsar Alexander III: ‘Russia has only two allies:
its army and navy’, something he considers ‘the best-worded description of
the geopolitical loneliness which should have long been accepted as our fate’
(Surkov 2018).
However, a detailed introduction to the concept of loneliness and what it
means for IR discourse is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, I want to
focus on a more recent case of the ‘politics of loneliness’, and specifically on
how sovereignty and intervention have been vocalized by Russian state elites
in their discourse on Russia’s identity since the so-called ‘Crimean spring’
(2014). Put briefly, the ‘politics of loneliness’ can be linked to the idea, ex-
plained in the previous section, of the performative nature of sovereignty. In
my understanding, the political discourse on sovereignty can play a perfor-
mative function by absorbing the collective loneliness of the local community
and redirecting it towards an ‘external enemy’ (or threat) in the global com-
munity. Most often it is done to strengthen vertical state control and to cen-
tralize power ‘in the name of the nation’ (Laruelle 2009) or ‘state-civilization’
(Tsygankov 2016). This securitization occurs through the means of language
– specifically by means of metaphors that allow us to bridge claims for the
defence of national sovereignty and justifications of interventionism in world
politics.
These so-called ‘metaphors of security’ became an effective unit of analysis
to study Russia’s ‘puzzling’ collective political subconscious (see Chilton 1996:
47). Here I am interested not in randommetaphors, but rather those that can
be observed within well-established frames of political communication and
channels of political mobilization. For example, those that unpackwidespread
anxieties, traumas or nostalgia for Russia’s lost greatness (see Samokhvalov
2017). By exploring metaphors, we literally let the language of Russian offi-
cial discourse speak for itself, allowing tropes to take us beneath the surface
of rational ad hoc argumentation, towards the unknown mechanisms of the
emotional construction of social solidarity (Bleiker and Hutchison 2014), the
organization of hate (Ahmed 2004), or the hidden depths of affective political
communities (Hutchison 2016), which help to reveal how the Russian political
community envisages the link between national and global politics.
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Certainly, the language of official discourse cannot speak on behalf of all
Russians. It cannot reflect perspectives and positions regarding the ‘world
making’ of the entire Russian community. However, it can at least mirror cer-
tain trends in public opinion and help to reproduce key frames and perspec-
tives. This is not a new idea, particularly if we relate such an investigation
of political metaphors to classical frame analysis, which explains conceptual
frames as ways of organizing experience and structuring an individual’s per-
ception of society and identity. According to Erving Goffman, the manner in
which the role is performed ‘will allow for some ‘“expression” of personal iden-
tity’ (Goffman 1986: 573). Therefore, for Goffman, there is a relation between
persons and roles that ‘answers to the interactive system – to the frame – in
which the role is performed and the self of the performer is glimpsed’ (ibid.).
Originally the idea of frames came to Gregory Bateson,whowas observing
fighting games between monkeys in the San Francisco Zoo. He believed that
the monkeys exchanged metacommunicative signals, letting other members
of the group know whether a particular fight was a ‘fight for real’ or rather
a ‘game-fight’ for fun. We can, probably, find similarities between how mon-
keys exchange their metacommunicative signals and how politicians frame
their rhetoric towards potential voters by using metaphors as signals to in-
dicate how much their fight for national sovereignty is a ‘fight for real’. In
other words, a widely accepted politicalmetaphor can become a ‘metacommu-
nicative frame’ outside of which a speaker’s messages may be simply ignored
(Bateson 1987: 193).
Like Goffman and Bateson, George Lakoff (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980)
also explored framing as a strategy in political communication promoting
specific interpretations of political reality. According to Lakoff, frames deter-
mine our opinions and values as mental structures that influence our think-
ing, often unconsciously. That is because communication itself comes with
a frame. There is an important connection between frames and metaphors.
Authors suggest that metaphors are very important cognitively because they
are widely used to convey personal meaning and worldmaking. For example,
what Lakoff and Johnson described as a ‘conduit metaphor’: a speaker can put
ideas or objects into words or containers and then send them along a channel,
or ‘conduit’, to a listener who takes that idea or object out of the container and
makes her own meaning of it (see ibid.).
Why do some ‘conduit metaphors’ connected with security generate real
emotional resonance among their recipients while others entirely misfire?
Based on Lakoff and Johnson, we could suggest that this happens when pow-
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erful metaphors become assets that allow a variety of ways to make meaning
for a significant portion of the politically mobilized population. The sense of
loneliness, anxiety, trauma and nostalgia for the great past becomes a perfect
reservoir that can be drawn on to constructmetaphors of securitization,while
the latter can cumulatively shore up new social alignments that create new
political realities. In this chapter I suggest that political metaphors should be
considered as metacommunicative signals targeted towards the (direct/indi-
rect) reactivation of different frames of ‘loneliness anxiety’ in the social imag-
inary of Russian citizens. Or, as Russian scholar Olga Malinova (2012: 4) puts
it, political leaders expect that their arguments will fit particular frames to
provoke a desirable reaction from the audience, which is limited by the estab-
lished semantic repertoires. For Lakoff (2006) the elements of the communi-
cation frame include the following: a message, an audience, a messenger, a
medium, images and a context. In our case, such a ‘message’ will be a Rus-
sian official discourse of sovereignty; the audience – government servants
and those members of the Russian population who consume this discourse;
the medium – the Russian president, who articulates images and metaphors
that will become the subject of our discourse analysis in the next section.
Discourse analysis of metaphors of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘intervention’
in the ‘Crimean speech’
As discussed in the section above, we are looking at political metaphors of se-
curity that frame sovereignty in away that helps to absorb, deploy and redirect
the collective emotion of ‘loneliness anxiety’, which can also be used for the
justification of interventionism. If, following Weber, we consider justified in-
tervention as ‘an alibi’ of sovereignty, then, in the case of modern Russia, it
is logical to pick as a starting point for discourse analysis the 2014 ‘Crimean
speech’. The first step is to look at the speech and distinguish metaphors of
sovereignty and intervention that reveal how Russian elites envisaged both
the global and the national (local). To synthesize these metaphors, I will use
a technique of initial active coding derived from the methods of grounded
theory. In grounded theory it is recommended to test whether the developed
codes are representative.Thus, in a second step (next section) I test this speech
against other speeches, undertaking a systematic analysis among the pool of
all the Official Addresses of the Russian president to the Federal Assembly
(1994–2020).1 I will suggest that the identified metaphors offer an indication
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of the particular ways in which Russian elites construct ‘symbolic representa-
tions’ of sovereignty in order to make an authoritative claim to represent the
Russian people in local and global affairs. A final graph will help to discuss
the results in a comparative perspective in the conclusion.
The ‘Crimean speech’ was made on March 18, 2014 in the Kremlin, where
the Russian President addressed the Russian parliament. I have used that
speech to create twenty ‘open’ codes of ‘sovereignty’:
a) Integration, gathering together (sobiranie); Reunification of Russia regard-
less of the opposition of the West; Primordial unity of Slavic countries
(panslavism); Ancient Rus as a common heritage; Inseparability of Crimea
from Russia.
b) Glorification of Russian military (for example, historical victories in
Crimea).
c) Soviet ‘sovereignty parade’ as a negative phenomenon.
d) Victimization of Russian nation as being forcefully divided and histori-
cally split apart.Metaphor of ‘the sack of potatoes’ as symbol of lack of recog-
nition of Russian-speaking diaspora.
e) Speculating on Russia’s trauma of the 1990s.
f) (Relative) deprivation of Russia’s population.
g) Opposition between the suffering ordinary people and irresponsible elites
and highly paid ‘global nomads’.
h) Unmasking and unveiling of nationalism (case of conflict in Ukraine); Ref-
erences to fascism and WWII.
i) President as a protector of ordinary people, who ‘does not abandon his
men’ (paternalism).
j) ‘The elastic spring’ metaphor – Russian resilience and need to be assertive;
Sovereignty and self-determination; Sovereignty as immunity from the
West.
k) Importance of maintaining political stability and seeking world order
within the system of the UN.
l) Soft power and foreign intervention via ‘colour revolutions’.
m) Sarcasm and hypocrisy of the West; Condemning exceptionalism of the
USA.
n) Gratefulness to the countries of the East / BRICS for support for Crimea
becoming Russian.
o) ‘Keeping our house in order’ metaphor (political and legal order in Russia).
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p) Collectivism and collective will; Solidarity and ‘spiritual bracing’ (‘duhovnie
skrepi’).
q) Russia facing a threat from the ‘fifth column’ (‘this disparate bunch of “na-
tional traitors”’).
r) Legal aspects of sovereignty (Case of Kosovo, Ukraine’s illegal revolt,
Crimean Referendum etc.).
s) Ungratefulness of the West.
t) People as the ultimate source of every authority and sovereignty.
Following the logic of building grounded theory I synthesized and reorga-
nized these twenty initial codes into six groups (constellations): the three
first groups (1–3) represent metaphors of ‘sovereignty’, while the second three
(4–6) represent ‘justified interventions’. I illustrate them below:
The first group I brought together under the metaphor the defender of ordi-
nary people. This trope accentuates the ‘loneliness anxiety’ of citizens seeking
the paternalistic protection of a strong leader: ‘We could not abandon Crimea
and its residents in distress.This would have been a betrayal on our part’ (Putin
2014). After that accumulated collective emotion can be redirected to con-
struct perceptions about the outside world: ‘However, what do we hear from
our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are vio-
lating norms of international law. Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least
remember that there exists such a thing as international law – better late than
never’ (ibid.). Defending the common people and, in their name, defending
political stability against the hypocrisy of political elites (i) can be expressed in
the Russian catch phrase ‘we do not abandon our men’ (‘mi svoih ne brosaem’).
The second group of symbolic representations falls under the metaphor
of spiritual ties for national unification (p). Here the primordial unity of Slavic
countries and panslavism (a) in general play a key role in promoting the his-
torical civilizational unity of three Slavic countries ‘where Prince Vladimir was
baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the over-
all basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples
of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus’ (ibid.). Russia is being threatened by a ‘fifth
column’ (q) that may put its unity under threat – a valuable language tool to
justify the need for sacral sacrifice in the best traditions of the scapegoat-
ing mechanism when violence can be diverted onto another (external) object,
‘something it can sink its teeth into’ (Girard 1979: 4). The (re)unification of
Russia, along with the recovery of its national sovereignty (a) (regardless of
how this might complicate its international relations) and the glorification of
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its military, plays a key role here (b). It appropriates nostalgia for lost self-
esteem and national pride: ‘This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with
an outstanding history [...] Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan
and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolizing
Russian military glory and outstanding valor’ (Putin 2014).
Thirdly, the house in order metaphor unites under a single frame codes like
the importance of domestic stability (o) and how the world’s stability is being
challenged by the decline of theUN (k). Stability should be achieved, according
to Putin, via the collective will of the people as the ultimate source of legiti-
macy (s): ‘We see that the overwhelming majority of people in Crimea and the
absolute majority of the Russian Federation’s people support the reunification
of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol with Russia … because
the people are the ultimate source of all authority (ibid.). The expression ‘we
see’ plays a performative role here, symbolically uniting into a single political
body the president and ‘his men’, so that neither of them feel themselves to
be ‘lonely’ anymore.
The fourth group redirects claims to sovereignty towards justified inter-
ventionism, employing an allegory of the elastic spring. That includes codes for
Russian resilience, the need to be assertive against the West/NATO, or im-
munity from the West (j) coupled with sarcasm over Western exceptionalism
(m). An image that threatensWestern partners with a Russian ‘spring’ that will
strike back at them is emblematic in that sense: ‘They are constantly trying to
sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position [...]. But there
is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed
the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally’ (ibid.).
The metaphor of ‘playing the bear’ gives away another psychological mecha-
nism – comparative victimization: ‘After all, they were fully aware that there
are millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea […] Russia found it-
self in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way
to its limit, it will snap back hard’ (ibid.).
The fifth group I marked under Putin’s metaphor of the sack of potatoes (d),
which speaks directly to Russia’s ‘geopolitical loneliness’ described earlier. Re-
gretting themarginalization and division of the Russian nation, the president
noted: ‘Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different
ones, becoming ethnic minorities overnight […] while the Russian nation be-
came one of the biggest, if not the biggest, ethnic group in the world to be
divided by borders’ (ibid.). Criticizing Russia for its lack of assertiveness in
world politics, he added: ‘I heard residents of Crimea say that back in 1991
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they were handed over like a sack of potatoes. This is hard to disagree with. And
what about the Russian state? [...] It humbly accepted the situation’ (ibid.). In
this group I also placed codes like speculating on Russia’s trauma of the 1990s
(e) and the further victimization of the Russian nation as being forcefully split
apart (d).They seem to be based on an idea of Russia’s relative deprivation (f).
Finally, the sixth group – the idea of ‘moral debt (duty)’ – is based on the
ungratefulness of the West to Russia (t). It addresses Russia’s sense of alien-
ation and isolationism from the negative ‘Other’, but perhaps also what Aziz
Elmuradov in his chapter to this book describes as a deep, historically rooted
sense of insecurity, which results in Moscow’s permanent demand for a great
leader (‘vozhd’) and ‘great power politics’. According to Putin, the actions of
the West were aimed against Ukrainian, Russian and Eurasian integration,
despite Russia’s attempts to engage in dialogue with the West. Instead of re-
ciprocal steps ‘they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our
backs […]. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the
deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the
same thing: “Well, this does not concern you”. That’s easy to say …’ (ibid.). Be-
low we can compare how the ‘ungratefulness of the West to Russia’ contrasts
with Russia’s ‘gratefulness to the East’ (n): ‘We are grateful to the people of
China, whose leaders have always considered the situation in Ukraine and
Crimea by taking into account the full historical and political context, and
greatly appreciate India’s reserve and objectivity’ (ibid.).
The six key metaphors of Russian sovereignty and justified intervention
identified above remain instrumental for our further investigation. As we can
see, the first three groups aremeant to accumulate and absorb domestic ‘lone-
liness anxiety’, and the last three aim to redirect it towards envisioning the
global (West and East). A further round of saturations is needed to see whether
the initial coding of these six metaphors and, most importantly, the mecha-
nisms of the ‘politics of loneliness’ that they contain, has any relevance to a
wider cache of speeches to the parliament.
Metaphors of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘justified intervention’
in the annual addresses of Russian presidents (1994–2020)
Since 1994 the Russian president has delivered an address to the Russian par-
liament almost every year, outlining major plans for the county’s develop-
ment in the upcoming year. His listeners usually number around 1300 people:
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members of the Federation Council and Russian government, deputies of the
State Duma, heads of the constitutional and supreme courts, the governors
of Russian regions, heads of the Russian Orthodox Church and major me-
dia outlets, and so on. The 1994–2020 collection of speeches to the Russian
parliament looks like a valid pool against which we can test the symbolic rep-
resentations of Russian sovereignty that we identified earlier in order to build
more grounded conclusions about the ‘politics of loneliness’.
In Table 8.1 I have systemized every mention of ‘sovereignty’ or ‘sovereign’
in the annual addresses of three Russian presidents. After each year I have
provided in brackets abbreviations of the names of the Russian presidents;
for example, ‘1994 (BY)’ for speeches of Boris Yeltsin, ‘2000 (VP)’ for Vladimir
Putin and ‘2008 (DM)’ for Dmitry Medvedev.
Table 8.1 Employment of ‘sovereignty’ in 1994–2018 addresses of Russian presidents
Year № Representation of sovereignty inside and outsideRussia
1994
(BY)
6 Inside: Sovereignty of themultinational people of Russia grantedby its con-
stitution that should protect their equality (1) and guaranteed by Russian
armed forces that protect territorial integrity (2)
Outside: Problem of building united monetary system with Belarus (3); if
necessary defending Russia’s legitimate interests ‘firmly and harshly’ (4);
Russia is not required to request permission from theworld community for
its UN peacekeeping operations within the CIS (5); in relation to European
security – against the expansion of NATOwithout Russia (6)
1995
(BY)
15 Inside: Ensure sovereignty, independence and unity of Russia (1);
sovereignty and need to overcome crisis improving the quality of life
(2); sovereignty and building proper federalism and municipal manage-
ment (3–4), sovereignty against separatism (5); sovereignty vs. ‘banditism’
in Chechnya as loss of territorial integrity and power fragmentation (6–13);
defending sovereignty (14) and the stability of state borders (15)
1996
(BY)
6 Inside: Sovereignty of nationalist movements led to the fall of the USSR (1)
while ‘paralysed’ Russia could not become a ‘foothold’ against nationalism
of former USSR republics (2); President Boris Yeltsin protects Russian peo-
ple as source of real sovereignty in 1993 conflict with the Supreme Council
(3); satisfaction that finally in 1991–1993 the Soviet ‘parade of sovereignties’
was channelled into the Federal Treaty of Russia (4)
Outside:Alma-Ata agreements on the creation of CIS from sovereign states
(5); tendency for integration prevails now over the former ‘run-away’ of









2 Inside: Russian sovereignty declaration underpins new Russian parliamen-
tary tradition (1)
Outside:Protecting sovereignty vs solving problems by force, withmethods
‘from the Stone Age’ (2)
2000
(VP)
2 Inside: ‘Challenge for Russian state sovereignty’ vs global terrorism getting
insidethecountry,butalsoaspiringgeopolitical recompositionof theworld
(in case of Chechnya) (1)
Outside:Attempts to infringeuponthesovereign rightsofpost-Soviet states







4 Inside:Ourvaluesdetermineoursovereigntyandwewill staystrong (1);Rus-
sia chose democracy itself and decides how/when to build it itself (2); grat-
itude to soldiers defending sovereignty duringWWII (3)







3 Inside: National spiritual unity as grounds for sovereignty (1); ‘State
sovereignty is also determined by cultural criteria’, wrote D. Likhachev (2)
Outside: We will only be able to preserve our statehood and sovereignty
if our citizens see, feel, and are confident that all the state’s efforts of are
aimed at protecting their vital interests – improving their lives, improving
their welfare and safety (3)
2008
(DM)
1 Inside:Any ‘reformatory itching’ is inappropriate, Sovereignty of people and






1 Outside: the size of sovereign debt isminimal. The level of Russia’s interna-








5 Inside:Not disruption of sovereignty but continuity in Russia’s political de-
velopment, promotion of direct democracy, including people’s initiatives
via the Internet online (1)
Outside: Russia should remain sovereign and influential in C21st world,
keeping its national and spiritual identity (2); Sovereignty as strong diplo-
macy and military might (3); To be sovereign we should multiply and be
younger,more creative andmorally better (4);Unity, integrity andS. ofRus-
sia vs separatism, nationalism, Russian sovereignty vs outside intervention
including through foreign agents (5)
2013
(VP)
1 Outside:Russiawill aim for leadership in defending international law, seek-
ing respect for national sovereignty, independence and theunique identity
(samobitnost’) of its peoples
2014
(VP)
7 Inside:This yearwe overcamehardships together proving thatwe are ama-
ture nation, a really sovereign and strong state, that can defend its compa-
triots (1) and respect the sovereignty of Ukraine (2-3)
Outside: Russian sovereignty vs. sovereignty loss by states in Europe (4–5);
Sovereignty vs dissolving, getting lost in theworld (6)
Outside: Eurasian Union as integration, based on keeping national identity










1 Outside: Technological delay as loss of sovereignty that is equivalent to the
loss of economic energy
2019
(VP)
3 Outside: Russia has been and always will be a sovereign and independent
state (1). Itwill eitherbethat,orwill simplyceasetoexist.Unlikesomecoun-
tries, without sovereignty Russia cannot be a state (2). For the first time our




5 Inside: The opinion of our citizens, as the main source and bearers of
sovereignty (5)must be decisive.
Outside: Russia can be and can remain Russia only as a sovereign state (1).
Our nation’s sovereigntymust be unconditional (2); National citizenship to
beanobligatory requirement for thosewhoholdpositions of critical signif-
icance for national security and sovereignty (3); The 2020 amendments to
the Russian constitution will help to create a solid system that will be ab-
solutely stable in terms of its external contours andwill securely guarantee
Russia’s independence and sovereignty (4).
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I then attributed each mention of sovereignty to one of six above-men-
tioned metaphors and calculated their total number. Cases that I could not
ascribe to any of these groups I assigned the label ‘other frames’. Following the
logic of R.B.J. Walker, I have split these metaphors into ‘internal’ and ‘external’
ones, applyingWalker’s (1993: 159) famous ‘inside/outside’ dualism of ‘order’ vs
‘anarchy’. As we remember from Weber (1992: 201), discourses of sovereignty
imply discourses of (legitimate/justified) interventions. Looking at the three
‘internal’ metaphors in the left column, we can see that they can be coupled
with justifications of ‘external’ interventions in the right column (Table 8.2).
Table 8.2 Numbers of symbolic representations of Russian sovereignty 1994–2020
projected onto ‘internal’ and ‘external’ political communities
Sovereignty projected onto the national
sphere (Inside)
Sovereignty projected onto the global
(Outside)
‘The defender of (thewill and voices of) the
common people’ being victimized – 7
Russian diaspora treated as a ‘sack of pota-
toes’ – 5
‘The spiritual ties’ of Russia – 5 ‘Theelastic spring’ ofRussian resistance– 16
The need to ‘keep our house in order’ – 21 ‘Moral debt’ of the ‘ungratefulWest’ – 2
Other – 3 Other – 4
This coupling seems logical: the metaphor of the defender of common people
can be redirected towards the need to protect the mistreated Russian diaspora
abroad. Once unified by its spiritual ties, Russia can be mobilized (like an elastic
spring) into resistance to the Western liberal world order. Finally, the commit-
ment to keep our own house in order is mutually supportive of the obligation not
to trust the hypocrisy of the ungrateful West. The results of Table 8.2 are again
graphically displayed in Figure 8.1.
Generally, the six metaphors mentioned above relate to the utilization of
sovereignty in the texts of the 1994–2020 addresses of Russian presidents,
though to different degrees. Figure 8.1 shows that 21 mentions of the term
‘sovereignty’ fall within the symbolic frame ‘keep our house in order’. This is a
rather wide symbolic pool in which we can emphasize the representation of
sovereignty as building strong centralized federalism and opposition to sep-
aratism, ‘banditism’ and the loss of territorial integrity (alluding to the two
Russian wars in Chechnya). Another noteworthy aspect is the close link be-
tween claims for sovereignty and the idea of a strong Russian state (derzhava),
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Figure 8.1 Metaphors of ‘sovereignty’ in addresses of Russian presidents 1994–2020
as well as its financial independence from foreign creditors (see, for instance,
Medvedev’s declaration in 2010 that Russia’s ‘sovereign debt is minimal’).
The secondmost numerous group is the elastic spring of Russian resistance,
with 16 examples. While the previous group largely related to justifications of
‘internal’ interventions (like wars in Chechnya), the elastic spring expresses how
Russia envisages ‘justified interventions’ in its ‘external’ relations, in particu-
lar, concerns about ‘humanitarian interventions’ and accusations that NATO
controls European countries for whom ‘possessing sovereignty is too much of
a luxury’ (see Table 8.2).
According to Figure 8.1, the metaphors ‘defender of common people’ (seven
mentions) and ‘spiritual ties’ (five mentions) were almost equally influential.
The latter relates to the sovereignty of the Russian state and its leadership
of the spiritual unity of the Russian nation, based on the preservation of its
unique civilizational identity. The former is more concerned with the repre-
sentation of the president as a main defender of the interests of ‘common
folk’. For example, in 1993 Boris Yeltsin (1993) ‘protected the interests of the
Russian people’ in his conflict withThe Supreme Council, which ‘acted against
the will of the people’. In a comparable way, in 2014 Vladimir Putin (also in
patriotic unity with the people) defended Russian interests in conflict with
NATO and against the sanctions imposed by the West.
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Metaphors representing the Russian diaspora abroad, treated as a ‘sack
of potatoes’ (five examples), usually refer to them as compatriots (sootechestven-
niki), whether they live in Latvia, Estonia or Ukraine. References to the ‘moral
debt of the ungrateful West’ (two mentions) emphasize the notion of the West’s
long-expected attempt to break down Russian statehood and sovereignty.
Both narratives started to evolve in Russian discourse during the first term of
Putin’s presidency. For instance, back in 2005 he said, in relation to the task
of ‘keeping state sovereignty’: ‘It seemed to many that our young democracy
was not a continuation of Russian statehood, but its final collapse. That it
was just a prolonged agony of the Soviet system.Those who thought this way
made a mistake’ (Poslanie Prezidenta 2005).
In 2007, in Munich, Putin developed this idea, claiming that the Organi-
zation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had degenerated into
‘a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests’ ofWest-
ern states alone (Putin 2007). According to the Russian president, ‘it is obvi-
ous that such interference does not promote the development of democratic
states at all […]. We expect that the OSCE be guided by its primary tasks and
build relations with sovereign states based on respect, trust and transparency’
(ibid.). In 2014 Putin was already pursuing a similar line of argumentation by
condemning the 2008–2009 interventions in Kosovo and US exceptionalism,
which ‘prefers not to be guided by international law’ but rather ‘by the rule of
the gun’ (Putin 2014). ‘Here and there, they use force against sovereign states
[…]. To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolu-
tions from international organizations, and if for some reason this does not
work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall’ – a
narrative later used by Putin to deflect US criticism of Russia’s intervention
in Crimea.
Eventually this logic grew into the full-scale opposition of Russia to the
‘global West’: despite many efforts of ‘those who in the past 15 years have tried
to accelerate an arms race and seek unilateral advantage against Russia’ they
still have not ‘managed to restrain Russia’ (Poslanie Prezidenta 2018).The pas-
sage above demonstrates that symbolic representations of themoral debt of the
ungrateful West and the elastic spring are interconnected. Pointing to this inter-
connectedness is valuable for explaining the ‘politics of loneliness’.
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Russia’s ‘lonely’ sovereignty: conclusion and discussion
The word ‘sovereignty’ or ‘sovereign’ was used 63 times in the addresses of
Russian presidents to the Russian parliament between 1994 and 2020. In his
Official Address to the Federal Assembly on 15 January 2020, the Russian pres-
ident used the word sovereignty six times (more than in any of the speeches
in the previous years). ‘Sovereignty’ in that speech was related to different
subjects: the sovereignty of the ‘Russian state’, the ‘unconditional’ sovereignty
of the Russian nation, sovereignty as a ‘guarantee of national security and
independence’, sovereignty and social opinion as a ‘source of power’ (Presi-
dential Address to the Federal Assembly 2020). Given the manifold ways in
which sovereignty has established itself in the world of Russian political dis-
course we can pose the question: What is the reason for the constant return
to sovereignty by different Russian presidents?
One of the approaches to answer this question is to treat ‘sovereignty’ as
a ‘floating signifier’, ‘an object presupposed by hegemonic articulatory logics’
(Laclau 2000: 75); but what makes one ‘floating signifier’ more powerful
than another? A second approach looks at ‘sovereignty’ as a symbolic form
(Bartelson 2014), but a symbolic form of what? Or, perhaps, sovereignty can
be approached as a tool for mediation between an authoritarian political
regime and the perceptions of a given populace, where ‘going outside the
regime is not an option’ (Gill 2015: 28, 50). But what makes the populace
trust the narrative of the regime? Without disregarding the three approaches
mentioned above, in this research I was testing Weber’s (1998: 92) idea that
political speeches ‘may be analysed as performative enactments of a state’s
sovereignty’. My discourse analysis aimed not just to show how metaphors
of security become political representations of Russia’s sovereignty, but also
how they reflect the perceptions of Russian elites on the nexus between the
national (local) and the global – the subject of investigation in this volume.
The findings of this research seem to indicate multiple interconnections
between a group of metaphors that play the role of containers for the ac-
cumulation of political support inside the local community and a (second)
group that redirects and diverts the ‘fear and anxieties’ of the national pop-
ulace towards construction of the image of a hostile global environment (in
particular, towards the anti-Russian conspiracy of the hostile West). There is
something very existential that plays the role of a ‘floating signifier’ of Russian
sovereignty and stands behind its symbolic form, functioning as a mediation
tool between Russia’s authoritarian politics and its populace. It is hard to say
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for sure what that is, but, as I have tried to explore in the discussion above,
it seems credible to suppose that Surkov’s narrative of ‘Russia’s geopolitical
loneliness’ is not as innocent and accidental as it may sound.
Once we insert loneliness into Russia’s puzzling equation between claims
for its national sovereignty and justification of its outside interventionism,
it looks as if our circle can be squared. Surkov compares Russia’s cultural
and geopolitical identity with that of someone born into a mixed-race fam-
ily: ‘Russia is a Western–Eastern half-breed nation. With its double-headed
statehood, hybrid mentality, intercontinental territory and bipolar history, it
is charismatic, talented, beautiful and lonely. Just as a half-breed should be’
(Surkov 2018). The image of ‘lonely Russia’ created by Surkov mirrors all six
metaphors of Russian sovereignty identified in this research. Russia is inde-
pendent and assertive (the elastic spring metaphor), Russian-speaking people
are divided and victimized (the sack of potatoes). That explains the demand for
Russia’s unity through shared spiritual ties as well as the idea of stability and
order in our house. Last but not least is the symbolic representation of the Rus-
sian president who defends and does not abandon hismen against the hypocrisy of
the ungrateful West. The latter perfectly fits into the conclusion reached by the
former main ideologist of the Kremlin: ‘What will the forthcoming loneliness
look like? Will it be the loneliness of a middle-aged bachelor at the edge of
the dance floor? Or the happy loneliness of the front-runner, an alpha nation
that has made rapid headway to leave all other peoples and states far behind?’
(Surkov 2018).
How can ‘lonely sovereignty’ justify intervention? In my view, it makes
sense even on the level of our daily life. When we feel anxiety about being
lonely, we can justify to ourselves things that others would find hard to accept.
Notably, the same can happen with collective ‘loneliness anxiety’: loneliness
can be fantasized as a sacral sacrifice for staying true to our home community
and national identity, even if it is the price to be paid for alienation from the
global world.
Notes
1 All the texts of the Official Addresses of the Russian president to the
Federal Assembly (1994–2020) were retrieved from the Russian Legal
database ‘Consultant Plus’ (http://www.consultant.ru).
Russia and the EU in a Multipolar World:
Invoking the Global in Russian Terms
Aziz Elmuradov
Introduction
Over the past decade, Russia’s relations with the European Union have evolved
from competition to conflict. With the Ukraine crisis as a culmination point,
many scholars explain the conflictual stand-off as a result of a long-term cri-
sis rooted in the internal structure of EU–Russia interaction (Casier 2016;
Chaban et al. 2017; Haukkala 2015). While such a perspective contributes to
a better understanding of the conflict, there is more to the confrontational
dynamics between the two sides. World politics can be traced back not only
to the pursuit of national interests, but also to differing ways of envision-
ing the world. To a considerable extent, the current conflict with Russia is a
conflict of worldviews. In line with the theme of this volume, the following
chapter takes this epistemic dimension of world politics seriously. The world
and the global are not fixed realms but are constituted in the practices of con-
crete actors who create their discursive horizons of the world and the global
through symbolic representations, narratives andmodels.This chapter, there-
fore, focuses on practices of worldmaking inherent in Russian foreign policy
discourse. Retracing popular modes of mapping the world from the Russian
perspective, I will show how a multipolar worldview informs the relationship
between Russia and the Western world.
Russian foreign policy discourse is greatly affected by major trends and
trajectories under way in world politics. Russia finds itself in an increasingly
dynamic global environment. The world is more volatile and uncertain to-
day than at any time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In a broad sense, ‘dis-
order’, ‘breakdown’, ‘the rise of the rest’, ‘post-West’, ‘post-liberal’ and even
‘post-truth’ (D’Ancona 2017) have become widespread mantras of the day ram-
pantly used by global elites to define the magnitude and potential trajectories
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of the shifting global context. In addition, Russia’s immediate international
environment is also dynamic – sometimes more so than Russia itself – po-
litically, economically and demographically. With the EU in flux, China on
the rise, and the US-led liberal world shaken, what challenges does such a
world subject to fluid change present to Russia? How does Moscow’s percep-
tion of global change shape its approach to interaction with the EU? To deal
with these questions, this chapter argues that it is crucial to exploreMoscow’s
long-standing normative thinking: a doctrine of a ‘multipolar world’, centred
on the principle of balance of power. This multiplex edifice of views under-
pins Russia’s contemporary understandings of the global political space and
is thus relevant to its perceptions of the EU.
Moscow’s conservative turn
Moscow’s current mode of envisioning of the world and the global must be
put into the context of a broader policy shift.This new policy course is marked
by the so-called ‘conservative turn’, also called a ‘Eurasianist’ or ‘civilizational-
ist’ turn, an important dimension of which is re-envisioning the world order.
On the one hand, there is a sense of uncertainty accompanied by a mixture of
concern and excitement about what Russian politicians describe as a global
shift of power. The rhetoric in Moscow remains mired in the spirit of the ‘de-
cline of the West’. Some Russian leaders run to overgeneralizations that ‘the
rise of the rest’ and the ‘shift of global power to the East’ is an inevitable course
of history. Looking forward to these global transformations, Russia’s Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov says that ‘after five or so centuries of domination of
the collective West, as it were, it is not very easy to adjust to new realities that
there are other powerhouses. It is not Russia that is shaping this world order,
it is history. It is the [global] development itself ’ (Lavrov 2018b). According to
policy experts Sergey Karaganov and Dmitry Suslov (2018), there is ‘no way
Russia can avoid or sit out this process’, or else whatever new world is cre-
ated, ‘it will be created without Russia, or even against it’. Russian president
Vladimir Putin claims that ‘it is now being decided how the world will look in
the future, in the coming decades. Will this be a world of monologue and the
rule of force, or a world of dialogue and mutual respect?’ (Kremlin 2018).
In this narrative, the EU ‘has failed to create a politically unified space ca-
pable of acting in concert on the international stage and is unlikely to achieve
this in the future’ (Bordachev 2019). It is ‘certainly fighting to make sure that
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it is not lost in this new world order’ (Lavrov 2018b), but ‘the ability of Brus-
sels to influence this world is waning’ (Kortunov 2019a). In Russian political
circles, there is a proverbial saying: ‘Europe is an economic giant, but a polit-
ical dwarf.’ This attitude lingers in the air. If previously the EU was portrayed
as a difficult but still indispensable partner for a host of reasons including
Russia’s own ‘modernization’, over the past decade the paradigm has shifted
from inferiority to superiority, to estrangement and even to a certain sense of
indifference. Russia and the European Union are ‘certainly not in confronta-
tion—unlike Russia and the United States. They are, however, experiencing
estrangement and, in some cases, alienation’ (Trenin 2019).
In matters of world politics, the EU is perceived as impotent due to its
technocratic inertia and resultant inability to respond effectively to the chal-
lenges of the dynamic world and, worse still, to its increasing dependence
on ‘Atlanticist moods’ in matters of strategic importance, to its own disad-
vantage. In effect, what is questioned is not the role that the EU could play
globally as ‘one of the independent poles’, but its very ability to recompose
itself in a timely manner in order to play that role. Adding to these, there is a
sense that the European project is in deep crisis – a perception buttressed by
the rise of anti-Brussels sentiment in a number of European countries. The
EU was ‘struggling internally even as international relations … entered a pe-
riod of unusually high turbulence.The sharp turn in U.S. policy has made the
breakdown of the international order… an irreversible process.That order was
most suited to European interests and its collapse poses a serious challenge
not only to the philosophy of European foreign policy, but also to Europe’s
worldview’ (Trenin 2019). But there is ‘not much that Russians can realistically
expect from Europeans. Despite their valiant efforts, they [European leaders]
will not turn the EU into a geopolitical and strategic counterweight to the
United States. They will probably not produce leaders of the stature of not
only de Gaulle, Brandt, and Churchill, but even of Chirac, Kohl, andThatcher’
(ibid.).
By contrast, Moscow is and must be ready for ‘creative participation’ in
the global transformation. Imbued with a powerful sense of righteousness,
Russia ‘will remain a country that is able to ensure its survival’ either with
support from allies or, if necessary, all on its own (Bordachev 2019) or even as
a ‘lonely power’ (Shevtsova 2010; see also the chapter by Sergei Akopov in this
volume). The major challenge Russia faces today is to reinvent itself as an in-
dispensable global player. This is obviously a long-term vision that surpasses
the time frame of the current presidential term. However, in Moscow’s eyes
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the process has already started.TheWestern liberal order is waning as it is los-
ing its monopoly over ‘universal’ norms and values, and the centre of gravity
in world affairs is shifting to the non-West. According to a widespread view,
the emerging world order should ‘fully reflect the changing balance of powers
and the existing West-centred institutions should either undergo a profound
transformation or be replaced by more universal, more inclusive and more
representative organizations’ (Ivanov 2019). The world should ‘fully reject the
concept of Western (i.e. liberal) universalism in favor of developmental plu-
ralism’, and the emerging concept of modernity should ‘imply opportunities
for preserving national traditions, culture, specific economic, social and cul-
tural models distinctly different from the Western examples’ (ibid.). At times
Hobbesian and at other times Lockean, Moscow’s worldview is crucial, and it
is to its ideological roots that I now turn.
Multipolar world
From the Russian perspective, two paradigms can be distinguished that op-
pose each other in contemporary world politics. One is believed to advocate
cultural, economic and political globalization conducted under the guidance
of the Western world, including the EU. The other, which Russia itself advo-
cates, is a more particularistic approach that calls for ‘a balance of interests,
multiplicity of politico-cultural forms and multiple centers of international
influence’ (Chebankova 2017: 1). The latter worldview – multipolarity – has
been reinforced as Russia’s main world political view advanced in the inter-
national arena. Its proponents claim that such a conception of world politics
can only have ‘a dialogical character, in contrast to the unipolar world order
that is mostly based on the normative monolog of liberal democratic states’
(ibid.). According to this view, the European Union, by proclaiming the ideas
of democracy, individual freedoms and human rights as the main principles
of its foreign policy, ‘imposes these on everyone else, not caring much about
how thismay affect people of other cultures. European pretensions of “univer-
sality” do not allow for a dialogue with “others”’. In these conditions, ‘normal
diplomacy as an art of compromises is impossible’ (Tsygankov 2018).
In what follows, I will explore the geopolitical, historical and civilizational
dimensions of this worldview while contextualizing their implications within
Russia’s self–other-definitional discourse towards the EU. In doing so, I fol-
low the line of argumentation that the underlying justifications of sovereignty
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and the balance of power retain their centrality to an understanding of Rus-
sia’s EU discourse – also in its global context. As genealogical repertoires of
foreign policy thinking, the concepts of sovereignty and the balance of power
largely informRussia’s relationship with the EU. As wewill see, these concepts
also underlie a set of deep-seated convictions and beliefs about the nature of
Russia’s role and its relationship to the wider world.
Geopolitical mappings
Multipolarity is a geopolitical concept centred in the idea of the balance of
power essential to Russia’s self-identification as a sovereign power in world
politics. In grossly oversimplified terms, this implies that if there is no bal-
ance of power, there is no full sovereignty. It is by virtue of history and ge-
ography that it is an imperative for a country such as Russia to maintain full
sovereignty over its domestic as well as foreign policy. The concept is most
often associated with the figure of Yevgeny Primakov (1929–2015), a veteran
Russian politician, diplomat, architect and arch-representative of this world-
view. According to this concept, Russia should be an independent centre of
power and a crucial global player with its own understanding of the world
order and should build a foreign policy based on its own strategy, and not
just in conformity with or opposition to someone else’s worldview (Primakov
1996). From this perspective, major powers see the world through their own
lenses and cognitive maps: America’s neoliberalism, Europe’s normative power
and China’s tianxia. Russia is no exception. The main factor influencing Rus-
sia’s world political attitude is a desire to feel less like the periphery of Eu-
rope and more like the independent centre of Eurasia. Primakov’s legacy was
to strengthen the multi-vector nature of Russian foreign policy, essentially
abandoning the unilateral orientation to the West that prevailed in the first
half of the 1990s. Primakov put forward a plan for the development of a strate-
gic triangle taking in Russia, China and India as a practical mechanism for
promoting global multipolarity, a concept that later led to the establishment
of BRICS. He argued against the expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern
Europe and in favour of creating a new European security architecture for a
reunited continent without dividing lines. All these ideas laid the foundation
for Russia’s foreign policy formulation for the subsequent period.1The princi-
ples he formulated alongside the notion of multipolarity have since then con-
stituted the basis of Russia’s foreign policy concept, including its 2016 version
(ERFUKNI 2013; MFARF 2016). These principles entail the pursuit of national
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interests, pragmatism and a multidirectional policy that suggests a readiness
to cooperate with any country around the world where there is a reciprocal
willingness based on mutual respect, equality and a balance of interests.
Although framed in these terms, the world according to Moscow is char-
acterized at the same time by great power politics in which it is predomi-
nantly these ‘major powers’ that lay down the rules of the international or-
der, ‘acknowledge’ and ‘respect’ each other’s ‘national interests’ as a ‘sphere
of privileged interests’ and, while they may compete with one another, also
cooperate to uphold the global order. It is a world where smaller actors need
to know their place for their own good and tolerate a tacit restriction on their
sovereignty. According to proponents ofmultipolarity, a vastmajority of exist-
ing nation-states are simply not able to independently ensure even their own
security and economic growth, not to mention any significant contribution
to the formation of a new world order. Thus, in both the present and future
multipolar world, only a handful of countries – the major powers – have ‘real
sovereignty’. President Vladimir Putin stated this view of the world in his
speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on 2 June 2017:
‘There are not so many countries that have sovereignty. Russia treasures its
sovereignty, but not as a toy.We need sovereignty to protect our interests and
to ensure our own development. India has sovereignty; China is such a coun-
try; but not many’ (Kremlin 2017). As for the European Union, Russia would
like to see ‘a responsible international player capable of pursuing an indepen-
dent foreign policy in the interests of European nations’ (Lavrov 2018a). For
Russia, the European Union ‘as a political actor has a positive meaning when
a united Europe appears as a subject sovereign with respect to the United
States, an independent center of power. […] in the foreseeable future this con-
dition is not feasible in practice’ (Trenin 2018).
It seems the Russian officials do not so much lament the EU’s acting on
geopolitical motives, rather they deplore exactly the opposite – the EU’s not
being sufficiently geopolitically mindful. The Russian elites do not hide their
surprise at how little autonomy and decisive leadership Europe really exer-
cises when it comes to the big decisions in world politics. Lavrov recalled
that ‘we for some previous years overestimated the independence of the Eu-
ropean Union and even big European countries’ (Lavrov 2014). Some critics
argue that, contained in their ‘post-modern ecosystem, Europeans lost their
curiosity about how Russia sees the world and its place in it, […] failing to
grasp that what they saw as a benevolent power could be viewed by others as
a threat’ (Krastev and Leonard 2014: 3). What happened to Europeans? They
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are ‘largely absent on issues of military security in Europe: their silence in
response to Trump’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty was deafening
and very telling’ (Trenin 2019). ‘TheWest today is more afraid of plastic bottles
than Russian missiles’ (Kortunov 2019b).
The Russian discourse on the multipolar world order also reveals its view
of the broader structure of European security architecture. Like its envision-
ing of the global order, Moscow’s concept of Europe is multipolar and plural-
istic. According to Richard Sakwa, there are two opposing paradigms of Euro-
pean political space envisioned by Brussels and Moscow respectively.The first
is a wider Europe, ‘the idea of the continent centred on the EU and European
space is represented as Brussels-focused, with concentric rings emanating
from the west European heartlands of European integration’ (Sakwa 2015). In
Moscow’s view, the paradigm of a wider Europe is not, in reality, truly Euro-
pean. It is Atlanticist, that is, deeply embedded in the Atlantic community.
The EU-centred wider Europe is becoming absorbed into the Atlantic system,
jeopardizing its own normative foundations and lending its policies a geopo-
litical dynamic that the EU was established precisely in order to transcend
(ibid). More than a cosmetic update, European leaders face the historic task
of rethinking the entire ‘European project’ because it is becoming less and less
European (Kortunov 2018a).
The second paradigm, according to Sakwa, is based on the idea of a greater
Europe.Thiswould be a continent united in its systemic diversity. Instead of an
EU-centred Europe, the idea supposes amultipolar continent, withmore than
one centre and without a single ideological flavour. This is a more pluralistic
representation of European space, and draws on a long tradition,2 including
Gorbachev’s ‘common European home’. The idea of a new European Security
Treaty, announced by Dmitry Medvedev in 2008, called for the realization
of such a vision – a genuinely inclusive new security order – arguing that
new ideas were required to ensure that dividing lines were not once again
drawn across the continent. In 2010 in Berlin Putin made a similar plea for a
geopolitical unification of all of ‘Greater Europe’ from Lisbon to Vladivostok,
to create a genuine ‘strategic partnership’ (Putin 2010).
In contrast to the unipolar and exclusive nature of European geopolitical
space, the Russian leaders take the multipolar and inclusive nature of Asia
as a positive example. ‘As for the multipolar or unipolar nature of Asia, it is
not unipolar; we see and understand this very well. The leaders of the Asian
countries today have enough common sense to enter precisely this mode of
working with each other. And we are ready to work in the same mode with
Russia and the EU in a Multipolar World
172 Aziz Elmuradov
everyone’ (Kremlin 2016). Unlike relations between Russia and the EU, ‘Rus-
sian–Chinese relations are a very flexible form of interaction, which the two
sides can calibrate and customize depending on the particular area of co-
operation. The sides are not constrained by any highly detailed bureaucratic
procedures, protracted decision-making mechanisms, limitations of national
sovereignty and so on’ (Ivanov 2019). The Chinese–Russian partnership is ‘not
directed against any third countries … has nothing to do with “dividing Eura-
sia” [and] does not imply relations between a “senior partner” and a “junior
partner”’ (ibid.).Theremay be asymmetries in their relations, but ‘these asym-
metries do not make the relations hierarchical with the leading power impos-
ing its will on the satellite power’ (ibid.).
For Russia, China’s rise is an illustrative example justifying its view of the
emerging multipolar world. Firstly, Chinese experience shows no linear de-
pendence between the effectiveness of economic modernization and political
liberalization. China is ‘at the vanguard of a global normative revolution, as
Western-led conceptions of universal values give ground to competing mod-
els of development’ (Salin 2011). Secondly, the Kremlin sees China’s rise as
instrumental in shifting the global centre of gravity from the Euro-Atlantic to
the Asia-Pacific region. According to Fyodor Lukyanov, Research Director of
the Valdai Discussion Club, justification for Moscow’s ‘shift to the East’ has
nothing to do with Russia’s attitude towards Europe but with
the objective fact that only a country with solid and acknowledged positions
on the Pacific may seek to become a great power in the XXI century. Russia
needs to hurl all effort to implement a complex strategy of re-orientation to-
wards Asia Pacific […] as it does not any longermake sense for Russia to keep
regarding all its actions through the prism of its relationship with Europe.
(Lukyanov 2014a)
Historical imageries
Multipolarity also has a historical dimension. This is particularly relevant in
the case of Russia, since Russian elites draw on historical imageries in order
to justify the need to shape the present-day international order. Historically,
Russia has been both a maker and a taker of the rules upon which the inter-
national order is based. Adherents of multipolarity in Russia like to refer to
the experience of the ‘Concert of Europe’, but this time not on a European but
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a global scale; the actors are different, but the basic tenets are conceived as
similar. Russian foreign policy expert Bobo Lo summarizes the view aptly:
The great powers determine the arrangements and rules of international
politics, and, crucially, abide by them. No single power may be allowed to
threaten the status quo or assume disproportionate power – Napoleonic
France in the nineteenth century, the United States today, and China in the
future. Smaller states know their place, and frame national policies with
due regard for the interests of the major powers. The latter do not interfere
in one another’s domestic affairs. And security – or at least their security –
is collective and indivisible. (Lo 2015)
Indeed, the Russian elites use the past to argue how Russia as a great power
has contributed to European stability. For example, in Putin’s rendering, un-
like [the Treaty of] Versailles, concludedwithout Russia and ultimately leading
to the SecondWorldWar,Russia’s very active participation in ViennaCongress
‘secured a lasting peace’ and manifested ‘generosity and justice’ (cf. Kremlin
2013).The Russian view suggests that useful lessons should be learnt from the
Concert of Europe, that is, the defeated should not be treated too harshly, and
that Russia should not be excluded from the negotiating table.
Given Russia’s own active participation and resultant sense of historical
pride, it is little wonder that Russian leaders boast of the Congress of Vi-
enna and the concert of European great powers as the standard example of
an effective security system. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov refers to
it, asserting that ‘Russia became a saviour of the international system’ at the
Congress of Vienna, the formation of which ‘led to development of the con-
tinent without serious military conflicts for 40 years’ (Lavrov 2018c). Sergey
Karaganov, one of the leading foreign-policy experts in Russia, has elevated
the Vienna system to the status of something worth emulating. ‘[U]shering in
the most glorious era in the history of the European continent’, the main rea-
son why the Congress of Vienna worked was that ‘the postwar arrangement
was relatively fair and did not humiliate France in defeat’. And then he goes
to lament that ‘there was nothing like the Congress of Vienna following the
Cold War, although the solemn language and commitments of the 1990 Paris
Charter had the makings of a historic accord for “eternal peace”. Now Russia
with its globally minded elite, topnotch diplomacy and geographical position
can do a lot to help build this world, a new Concert of Nations, for the benefit
of itself and its partners’ (Karaganov 2015). Another prominent expert, Fyo-
dor Lukyanov, recalls that ‘what is needed is precisely a genuine professional
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diplomacy in the spirit of the 19th century, a diplomacy that is familiar from
textbooks but whose actual practice has been virtually forgotten’ (Lukyanov
2014b).
Some critics contend that the design of the ‘European Concert’ cannot be
replicated under modern global conditions. According to Andrey Kortunov,
Director of the Russian International Affairs Council, although the ‘European
Concert’ was fully multipolar and really helped to preserve peace in Europe
for a long time, it is impossible today to repeat the experience. Today the sit-
uation is completely different. ‘In the 21stcentury, the differences between the
great powers affect the foundations of the world order, the basic concepts
of international law, and even more general questions – the ideas of justice,
legitimacy, the ‘big meanings’ of history’ (Kortunov 2018b). In the author’s
opinion, there is a simple reason why the ‘European Concert’ is a naïve exam-
ple for how the balance of power might be maintained in the contemporary
world. And this reason is the flexibility characteristic to the great powers of
the past: Great European powers could afford the luxury of promptly changing
the configuration of unions, coalitions, and alliances to maintain the overall
balance of the system.
Could we imagine such flexibility today? Could we suppose that over the
course of two or three years, Russia would be capable of swapping its cur-
rent partnership with China for an alliance with the United States? Or that
the European Union, as it faces increasing pressure from the United States,
would re-orient itself towards strategic cooperation with Moscow? Such sce-
narios look improbable at best and absurd at worst. (ibid.)
Kortunov argues that ‘the magnificent multipolar façade often disguises the
same steel-and-concrete bipolar structure of global politics, reflecting the
Soviet mentality that has not been entirely overcome’ (ibid.). For instance,
Moscow’s contemporary view of the ‘East–West’ dichotomy reflects the rudi-
ments of the Soviet mindset. Such a mindset does not fit into the declared
multipolar picture of the world, but it is a very convenient way for Moscow
to construct opposing imageries of ‘West’ and ‘non-West’. Nevertheless, some
parallels the expert draws do resonate with the mainstream perceptions and
beliefs of Russian political elites.The question is posed: ‘Why did the 1814–1815
Congress of Vienna result in a stable European order, while the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles becamemeaningless 15 years after it was signed?’ (ibid.). In answer-
ing this question, Kortunov finds fault with the nature of democratic politi-
cal leadership. In contrast to the Concert devised by absolute monarchs, Ver-
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sailles was crafted by the leaders of the Western democracies who depended
on national public sentiment, which in turn demanded that they ‘punish the
Germans’. In this reading, Kortunov laments that today’s politicians are even
more dependent on public sentiment and that ‘the chances of seeing new ex-
amples of Alexander’s magnanimity and Metternich’s insight today are slim’
(ibid.).
Civilizationalist vocabulary
Multipolarity under Putin has acquired a new civilizational dimension. Rus-
sian political elites refer approvingly to Samuel Huntington’s theory of the
‘clash of civilizations’. Just as there are several centres of global power, so there
are various civilizational ‘poles’.The 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept talks
of ‘global competition [...] on a civilizational level,’ with ‘an increased empha-
sis on civilizational identity’ (ERFUKNI 2013). In proposing a ‘dialogue be-
tween civilizations,’ Moscow is declaring to the West that ‘our values are just
as good as yours’—different, but in no way inferior. The 2016 Foreign Policy
Concept also unambiguously commits to this aspect: ‘competition has been …
gaining a civilizational dimension’ with ‘attempts to impose values on others’;
‘promoting partnerships across … civilizations’ is regarded as a priority; the
‘civilizational diversity of the world and the existence ofmultiple development
models have been clearer than ever’ (MFARF 2016).
Emphasizing the civilizational dimension of world politics in this way
raises the possibility of further cultivating the notion of civilization as a sub-
ject of international politics. Multipolar world ideologists consider civiliza-
tions as a new subject of international politics (Chebankova 2017). In this
reading, ‘civilizational development’ is seen, as Putin said in a speech to the
World Russians People’s Council in 2018, as ‘the foundation for the multipolar
world’while Russia is as ‘an authentic civilization, a unique one, but onewhich
does not aggressively claim its exceptionalism’ (Kremlin 2018). Referring to
a prominent Russian thinker of the 19th century, Nikolai Danilevsky, Putin
stated that ‘no civilization can call itself supreme, the most developed one’
(ibid.). Some Russian intellectuals (Mezhuev 2012; Tretyakov 2012) claim that
Danilevsky’s ideas could be invoked in defence of the equality of the world’s
political cultures, their peaceful co-existence and recognition.
Moreover, Russia’s elite considers this civilizational ideology to be a dis-
tinct intellectual product that it can offer to the world (Tsygankov 2016). The
idea is to reconstruct the discourse on international affairs in such a way that
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the ideas of particularity, cultural-historic context and the multiplicity of po-
litical forms can be incorporated.Whether such a worldview could contribute
to global stability remains an open question. Some argue that the theory of
the multipolar world could be developed into a stronger and more coher-
ent political ideology, given its substantial metaphysical and political basis
(Chebankova 2017).
The Russian political elites continue to speak of the multipolar world both
as a desirable goal and as a modern-day reality. It is one thing for Moscow
to embark on a quest to shape the world on the basis of preconceived ideas
of multipolarity and another thing to effectively handle the real world con-
stituted by instantaneous and unpredictable processes rather than order or
linearity. In a way, the changing global context has been a dream come true
moment for Russia. But even when dreams come true, one has to live up to
them. The tension between the normative – a genuine change to a multipolar
world – and the instinctive – inherent belief in the Hobbesian nature of world
politics – continues to influence Russia’s world political attitudes. On the one
hand, Moscow speaks of a need to adapt to a world in transition, one that
is increasingly globalized and interdependent. On the other, the instinctive
element in Moscow’s reaction to the pressures of a dynamic world is to draw
back to what it knows – classical interpretations of great power politics. As-
sertive in the pursuit of its goals, the course of Moscow’s foreign policy has
been condemned in the West. While the Russian elites denounce the ‘demo-
nization’ of Russia, the general feeling is that they take a certain psychological
satisfaction from the fact that Russia is back on the world stage, perhaps ‘dis-
liked by some but ignored by none’ (Lo 2018). The major legitimating reason
for retaining the present course and taking it further is the conviction that
it has been widely successful. This is not just the view of the Kremlin and
the Russian political elite. It is also shared by some Russian liberal critics,
the public and even some experts in the West. ‘Russia may be on “the right
side of history” in opposing moral interventionism – a position in which it
is supported by China and India’ (Lo 2018). In Russia, recent foreign policy
successes in the Middle East and the partnership with China are stressed in
contrast to the failures of Western policymaking.
All this being said though, it is important to note that such preconceived
ideas about the inherent and normative nature of world politics do not hang
in thin air. Immersed in them, Russia’s discourse on the multipolar world is
simultaneously flavoured by human personality to an uncommon degree. It
is common to speak not just of Putin but also of ‘Putin’s Russia’. Russia’s story
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has become the story of the President himself, a story of which he is a diligent
student and that he preaches at every opportunity.This tonality cannot go un-
mentioned as it intimately pertains to a deeper understanding of the political
philosophy within which Putin’s worldview is rooted. His perception of Rus-
sia’s place in the world is certainly not a modest one, neither is his emotional
appeal to it: ‘As a citizen of Russia and the head of the Russian state I must
ask myself: Why would we want a world without Russia?’ (Solovyov 2018). He
took Yeltsin entirely seriously, in his own way, when the latter, on leaving of-
fice because of ill health, told him to ‘take care of Russia’. It is no lie that the
‘Putin consensus’ has gained wide support, implicitly or explicitly, across the
broader Russian political spectrum and, perhaps more importantly, that that
support is based on the ‘gut instinct’ of many in Russia, who have come to be-
lieve that if there is anyone who should represent modern Russia, it can be no
one else but Putin. ‘Divorced to marry Russia’, that is the kind of admiration
he enjoys among many of his compatriots, with some even calling him vozhd,
meaning a leader of exceptional power and authority. The philosophy behind
his foreign policymaking reflects the characteristics of Putin, not only the
views and ideas that he cherishes but also the methods he favours of putting
them into action. Like Yevgeny Primakov, his political godfather, his political
philosophy is not only to defend national interests as such, but also tomanage
to do so under the most unfavourable conditions, even when the country’s ca-
pabilities are at a low ebb. As Putin himself observed, speaking at Primakov’s
funeral, it is important ‘to keep listening to Yevgeny Primakov’s voice’ and ‘to
remember his lessons’ (Kremlin 2019a). Furthermore, Putin’s world politics is
one which seeks to remain vigilant and alert to developments in larger forces
and moods, global and local. Wisdom then consists in finding the balance be-
tween the need to ‘swim with the currents’ or ‘appear to be swimming with
them’, and ‘to steer’ them in a needed direction, if necessary, to intervene in
order to make the difference. ‘Blackbelt’ in his martial art,3 practitioners of
politics close to Putin do not deny his claim to an equal ranking in matters of
foreign policy. It is these qualities, too, namely a conservative and survivalist
persona aligned with Russian strategic culture and historical experiences that
reaffirm traditional principles of world politics.
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Conclusion
Summing up, Moscow’s conception of the global context over the past decade
has largely been defined by the idea that the Western-led liberal world order
is in decline.This decline is constructed as a result of a historical process that,
in Moscow’s eyes, has already started.The liberal order is losing its monopoly
over ‘universal’ norms and values, and the centre of gravity in world affairs is
shifting to the ‘non-West’. Instead, a particularistic approach is proposed that
claims to call for a balance of power,multiplicity of politico-cultural forms and
multiple centres of international influence. This worldview – of a multipolar
world – has been reinforced as Russia’s world political doctrine and advanced
in the international arena: ‘The world should fully reject the concept of West-
ern (i.e. liberal) universalism in favour of developmental pluralism’ (Ivanov
2018). Proponents of this view claim that such a conception of world politics
can only have a dialogical character. Framed in these terms, the world accord-
ing to Moscow in significant ways remains rooted in great power politics.
Notes
1 All Foreign Policy Concepts since 2000 derive from global security and
geopolitical considerations developed by Yevgeny Primakov. The termi-
nology of multipolarity has shifted lately toward an emphasis on ‘poly-
centrism’. The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept speaks of the transition to a
‘polycentric system of international relations.’ Practically speaking, there
is no substantial difference between the two concepts.
2 Giuseppe Mazzini’s idea of a ‘United States of Europe’; Gaullist ideas of
a broader common European space from the Atlantic to the Pacific; Gor-
bachev’s idea of a ‘common European home’; Nicolas Sarkozy’s return to
the idea of pan-Europa; the Valdai Club’s idea of a ‘Union of Europe’.
3 In Putin’s own analogy, ‘Judo teaches self-control, the ability to feel the
moment, to see the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses, to strive for
the best results. I am sure you will agree that these are essential abilities
and skills for any politician’ (Kremlin 2019b).
Back from the USSR
Envisioning the Global Through Journey Narratives
Lucy Gasser
Making worlds and their horizons
This chapter traces the worldmaking practices of four journey narratives by
travellers from the global South in the Soviet Union. Animated by postcolo-
nial theory and decolonial aims, it contributes to envisioning the global by
understanding literature as practising a ‘species of world making’ (Bell 2013:
257) and seeks to identify the narratives of the global that latently structure
the normative horizons of these writings. It articulates the worldmaking
practices of British imperialism’s ‘civilizing mission’, and looks at writers
from Britain’s former colonial dominions who displace and contest them.
Rabindranath Tagore and Bisham Sahni from the Indian subcontinent and
Pauline Podbrey and Alex La Guma from South Africa each had the oppor-
tunity to travel in Soviet Russia and its socialist satellites and penned non-
fictional accounts of their experiences.The chapter argues that these formerly
marginalized texts furnish resources for productively contesting colonially
determined narratives of the global and hone a capacity for pluralizing aspi-
rational horizons. This serves the decolonial aim of dismantling the legacies
of imperial ways of producing (knowledge of) the world.1
British imperialism’s so-called civilizing mission entailed a narrative that
did a great deal of work for the colonial project. It told a story in which the
Western European colonial metropolis was located as the centre of both the
imperium and the world: this was the node whence all that was laudable in
European civilization and needed to be exported to the colonies originated.
It served as the moral pretext that sought to disguise and legitimate the ex-
ploitation that was in fact constitutive of the empire: it was the ethical imper-
ative that bade the more ‘advanced’ European civilization to come to the aid
of its junior siblings in the colonies, to be caretaker of their resources.
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Dismantling this faulty structure and its various articulations has been the
work of much postcolonial scholarship, not least Edward Said’s enormously
influential Orientalism (1978). Yet I want to propose the value of considering
the ramifications of the civilizing mission anew by turning a critical eye on
the spatio-temporal mappings underwriting its discursive production of the
world.Moving from a clearer delineation of these, I trace how thewritings of a
number of travellers to the Soviet Union from the global South not only multi-
ply thwarted the colonial arch-narrative’s violently ascribed cartographies and
temporalities, but furnished the resources and honed the capacity to envision
a plurality of alternative aspirational worlds.
My intervention here takes the form of a number of juxtaposed and inter-
related readings of accounts of journeys in the Soviet Union and its satellites.
These journeys were broadly situated within the geopolitical time of the Cold
War, though one account – Rabindranath Tagore’s Letters from Russia (1930) –
significantly predated it. Tagore’s epistles are read alongside Bhisham Sahni’s
Today’s Pasts (2004) in order to demonstrate how their worldmaking practices
constructively repudiate the civilizingmission. Pauline Podbrey’sWhite Girl in
Search of the Party (1993), in turn, complicates their ‘corrective’. Finally, reading
Alex La Guma’s A Soviet Journey (1978) against the grain, I argue for the value of
insisting on plurality when envisioning narratives of world.The writer-trav-
ellers should not be taken as representative or as giving exhaustive accounts,
but as instantiations of viewpoints that produce alternative spatio-temporal
mappings of both colonial narratives and much-studied postcolonial trajecto-
ries of ‘writing back’ to the imperial centre (Ashcroft et al. 1989).
The civilizing mission’s projection of the global constitutively informed
and shaped its discourses and narratives. Its particular practices of world-
making entailed positioning the European capital as the centre whence the
kind of civilization deemed desirable was to radiate outward to the colonial
peripheries. Spatial marginality was thus ascribed to the colonial ‘outposts’.
A neat expression of this is offered by the cartographic forays that culminated
in the Mercator projection that in many (Western) contexts became the most
frequently occurringworldmap, and thusmost commonly held envisioning of
the world.This projection placesWestern Europe top and centre, dramatically
understates the size of the African continent, and glibly divides the Pacific.
The interplay between what is construed as literal andmetaphorical centrality
is evident, as is the marginalization – again, both literal and figurative – that
comes with being located on the periphery.
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Germane to the approach of drawing out these alternative mappings is
Pheng Cheah’s proposal, inWhat is a World? Postcolonial Literature as World Lit-
erature, that world literature be thought of as ‘literature that is an active power
in themaking of worlds, that is, both a site … and an agent that participates and
intervenes in these processes’ (Cheah 2016: 2; emphasis added). The making
of worlds and the discourses that sustain them are determined by the power
structures that produce them. As Duncan Bell (2013: 261) observed, worlds
can ‘be taken by force, made and remade in the image and at the behest of
others. Imperialism, according to this account, is a technology for the tak-
ing and (re)making of worlds’. Each of the texts discussed here entails prac-
tices of worldmaking, and my readings work to configure the horizons that
determine these worlds, as well as their normative content: specifically, the
contours of their normative horizons. Imperial legacies leave not merely car-
tographic traces, but also temporal ones, as succinctly communicated by the
Greenwich Meridian’s positioning in London. Cheah points to how centrality
works not only in the ways space is charted, but in the ways time is measured:
The subordination of all regions of the globe to Greenwich Mean Time as the
point zero for the synchronization of clocks is a synecdoche for European
colonial domination of the rest of the world because it enables a mapping
that places Europe at the world’s centre (Cheah 2016: 1).
This maps time as literally emanating outwards from a temporal centre –
a node that determines global punctuality – in the capital city of the British
empire. Grafting this on to the civilizing mission elucidates how the mapping
of time works in that narrative. In colonial stories, London was to be under-
stood as the determining co-ordinate of temporality: belatedness and back-
wardness – those oft-reiterated accusations levelled at the colonies – were
to be determined in relation to this centre. This fitted the narrative of the
civilizing mission, since it was necessary to establish the colonizers’ putative
superiority over the colonized in order to justify their ruling over the latter.
This superiority was, and indeed often still is in a variety of different contexts
today, articulated in temporal terms, as an expression of the advanced nature
of European civilization and culture.
Both these temporal and spatial dimensions work to determine deriva-
tiveness. The peripherality of the colonies is derived from the assigned cen-
trality of the imperial capital; the belatedness of the colonies is derived from
the more admirable advancedness of European civilization; the colonized are
taught to consider themselves always in a species of alterity derived from Eu-
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rope. In addition, the colonized are cast in these arrangements as passive: as
the object of the civilizing mission, that which needs to be civilized.
The designation of being before, ahead of, or more advanced than is implic-
itly premised in the civilizing mission on an understanding of progress, and
it is on this that my first readings will pivot. It is important to interrogate
these ascriptions of progress and progressiveness, as they are reborn in sub-
sequent narratives.The colonial narrative would have it that the imperial cen-
tre is the home and origin of progress, and that colonialism brings progress
to the colonies to help them along. This co-optation of ‘progress’ insinuates
itself into other narratives as well, particularly those of Europe’s global po-
sitioning. The European centre was able to model itself as ‘owning’ progress.
This formed an integral component of the ‘structure of legitimation around
colonialism: Indigenous societies could not have survived without the advent
of white education, infrastructure, etc’ (Lentin 2019).The seeds sown here ger-
minate in later notions that there is something inherently progressive about
Europe, ‘underpinned by a wider conception of Europe and the West as the
general birthplace of the so-called “rights of man”’ (Lentin 2004: 14).
In Provincializing Europe: PostcolonialThought andHistorical Difference, Dipesh
Chakrabarty (2000: 20) enunciates the need to ‘release into the space occupied
by particular European histories… other normative and theoretical thought
enshrined in other existing life practices and their archives. For it is only
in this way that we can create plural normative horizons’ (emphasis added). The
articulation of ‘plural normative horizons’ is useful to the task in hand. The
‘normative’ grasps the directionality, the implied forward thrust of progress
at stake. The image of the horizon is apposite for the spatio-cartographic
metaphorics at work inmy argument,which understands the idea of the hori-
zon in the spirit suggested by Vijay Prashad’s (2007: xvii) view of what the
Bandung conference of 1955 did for its Afro-Asian participants: ‘The horizon
produced by the Third World enthused them’. The conference’s imaginative
power was that it created an alternative framework of the possible, enabled a
different configuration of what might be striven towards – and this was full
of animating energy.
The horizon then delimits the world that can be imagined, the fringes
of the imaginable, and thus marks also the figuration of the aspirational.
One might hope to progress towards one’s aspirations.The horizon of a world,
moreover, may be determined by its centre. As such, efforts to destabilize and
disarticulate Eurocentric narratives like the colonial civilizing mission can be
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well-served by locating not only alternative centres, but by also calibrating the
alternative horizons they might bring into existence.
Chakrabarty’s injunction to create a plurality of such normative horizons
is implicitly a denial of the will to exclusivity embodied in the civilizing mis-
sion’s agenda: only the European colonial power could represent the ‘right’ way
to progress; and there was only one kind of desirable progress. Temporality,
construed in the linear terms of these narratives, allows only one route to
the future: the one charted by the European frontrunner. Chakrabarty’s call
is for a multiplicity of horizons to be opened out in the space long occupied
exclusively by European historiographies and epistemologies.
Tracing the articulations of imagined worlds as configured by the trav-
eller accounts I come to below, facilitates a mapping of alternative horizons
and, concomitantly, alternative understandings of progress and progressive-
ness than those derived from (Western) Europe. Narratives of progress entail
that there is something to be progressed towards.The civilizingmission had a
clear sense of what that should be – at least a clear agenda on what it wanted
to market it as being: if the colonies tried very hard, they might one day ar-
rive where the colonial centre was already. But progress was also actively en-
visioned by agents in the global South, in ways that neither took their home
countries as intrinsically peripheral, nor unquestioningly accepted the hori-
zons ordained by coloniality. Specifically, global South travellers in the Soviet
Union offer a rich resource for alternative imaginings of the horizons of de-
sirable progress. Significantly, they orientate these in relation to co-ordinates
that do not deem the imperial capital to be central at all, rather bypassing it
altogether and triangulating their positions according to alternative compass
points. It is these alternative mappings that I seek to excavate in the following
readings.
Rabindranath Tagore, Bhisham Sahni, Alex La Guma and Pauline Pod-
brey all had the opportunity to garner first-hand experience of the Soviet
Union. Each provides traces of these experiences in their written accounts: for
Tagore, this took the form of the letters he sent home during his travels; for La
Guma, it was a travelogue written for and published by the Soviet publishing
house aptly dubbed Progress Publishers; Sahni and Podbrey articulated their
impressions in autobiographies. Their sojourns in the USSR and surround-
ing countries span a large temporal framework, and they embarked on their
journeys with different agendas and priorities, which inflect their narratives
of this space accordingly. I sketch their delineation of alternative normative
horizons through readings that juxtapose first Tagore and Sahni to illustrate
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how they thwart received colonial narratives and open up an alternative as-
pirational space in the Soviet Union. I then turn to Podbrey in a reading that
highlights a possibly necessary critique of some of the more wilfully utopian
impressions generated by the first two. Finally, I integrate some observations
of what can be gleaned from the contestation of a will to exclusivity through
a reading of La Guma’s account.2
Against colonial worldmaking: Rabindranath Tagore
and Bhisham Sahni
Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) was, at the time of writing his corre-
spondence from Russia in 1930, already an established and internationally
respected man of letters. He has been dubbed, by Indian literary historian
Sisir Kumar Das, ‘the most towering Indian of the century next only to
Gandhi’ (2015: 8). Tagore was born into a relatively privileged household in
Calcutta in 1861 and, as a result of inheriting significant property, he did not
have to work for a living. To many, he is best known as the winner of the
1913 Nobel Prize for Literature for the English translation (some might say
adaptation) of Gitanjali. Tagore was deeply critical of the British Raj in India,
in 1919 renouncing his knighthood in response to the massacre at Jallianwala
Bagh, where the British Indian Army opened fire at peaceful protestors.
He was a strong advocate for Indian independence from British colonial
rule, though, unlike many who supported this, he was not a proponent of
nationalism as its antidote.
Both a passionate poet and teacher, in Letters from Russia Tagore positions
education as the most central of his concerns. He had been invited a number
of times since 1925, and ‘in spite of ill health he was fairly determined to make
the visit when the VOKS (All Union Society for Cultural Relations with For-
eign Countries) again invited him in 1930’ (Bhattacharya 2017: 249). Despite
plans to travel further afield, his journey lasted only about two weeks, and was
limited to Moscow and its surroundings due to his poor health. His experi-
ences were determined by the fact that he was on an official tour, and all his
communications were mediated by interpreters. His letters were published
more or less as they arrived, in Prabasi, a well-regarded centrist Bengali liter-
ary journal, and shortly afterwards in 1931 in a collection as Russiar Chithi, in
the original Bengali. The letters were sent home to an India-in-the-making;
the correspondence is personal but intended for a wider audience, as Tagore
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expresses a wish for his native land to learn from his observations. Excerpts
appeared in English translation, but a full-text English version only became
available in 1960 – partially due to the efforts of the British colonial govern-
ment (see Bhattacharya 2017: 238). I work from the English translation made
by Sasadhar Sinha.
Bhisham Sahni was born in 1915 in Rawalpindi, in today’s Pakistan, and
moved to India after Partition in 1947. Most of his written work, which in-
cludes short stories, novels and several plays, is in Hindi, though his mother
tonguewas Punjabi and hewas taught inUrdu.Hewas awell-respectedwriter
and political activist, as well as being younger brother to Indian film and
stage actor Balraj Sahni. Bhisham Sahni was politically engaged for most of
his writing career, participating in the Quit India Movement in 1942, serving
time in jail, campaigning against communal violence, and working variously
with the Indian National Congress Party, the Indian Peoples’ Theatre Associ-
ation (1946–50), the Progressive Writers’ Association (1976–86), and serving
as head of the partly Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian Writers’ Association. He
spent seven years inMoscow,working as a translator at the Foreign Languages
Publishing House from 1956 to 1963. Though sympathetic to socialism, Sahni
never joined the Communist Party of India, partially due to his perceiving in
the party a lack of a coherent agenda against communalism.
Sahni’s autobiography Today’s Pasts: A Memoir, originally written in Hindi
and published in 2004, was published in English in 2015 in a translation by
Snehal Shingavi. This is the translation from which I work. Though not ar-
dently pro-Soviet, in his text, he presents himself as evidently and lingeringly
sympathetic to communism. He writes with the benefit of hindsight and de-
lineates a tale of at least some disillusionment, while nonetheless locating in
the Soviet Union of his memory lingering potential.
Some 74 years separate the original publication dates of these two texts.
Such a lengthy interval serves to make the overlap of some particularly re-
silient narratives all the more remarkable, though, of course, they neither
experienced the same USSR, nor presented a homogenous imagining of it
in their writings. Both set out with positive expectations, which surely influ-
enced what they chose to register. Key amongst their agreements are a shared
attitude to the question of education and an indictment of Western European
greed, both of which run directly counter to the narrative of the colonial civ-
ilizing mission.
Both Tagore and Sahni find cause to laud the Soviet Union for its ac-
complishments in the field of education. Though the civilizing mission de-
186 Lucy Gasser
pended on a purported ethical imperative to bring education (and religion) to
the colonies for its legitimating structure, both of these Indian travellers rep-
resent the USSR, rather than the colonizers, as being at the forefront of edu-
cational ‘progress’. Tagore, especially, wished to learn from the achievements
made in the sphere of education, and expressed his intention to take the prac-
tices he witnessed on his journey back to his school at Santiniketan in Bengal
(Tagore 1960: 49, 52). The Soviet world he produced could serve as a model to
emulate for Indians due, in his construction, to the two regions’ many simi-
larities: ‘Only a decade ago they [the Russians] were as illiterate, helpless and
hungry as our own masses: equally blindly superstitious, equally stupidly re-
ligious’ (ibid.: 27). Sahni, too, was profoundly impressed by the USSR’s ac-
complishments in literacy and education; indeed, both his children went on
to attend university there.
The understanding of progress presented by the texts also has a cultural
dimension; as indeed did the civilizingmission. Rather than locating themost
advanced, desirable, and aspirational version of culture, or stage of ‘civiliza-
tion’, in the colonial metropolitan ‘centre’, Tagore and Sahni find evidence not
only of the equal standing of the Soviets, but of their being ahead on this spec-
trum. Certainly, one could take issue with their implicit or explicit definitions
of ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’, but it is worth noting that, however their texts
choose to define the markers, the Soviets are more advanced in the implied
developmental trajectory.
Tagore observes that those who participate in cultural events are ‘wage-
earners, such as masons, blacksmiths, grocers and tailors. And there also
come Soviet soldiers, army officers, students and peasants’ (ibid.: 56).The So-
viet Union, for him, is to be lauded not only for making this possible for its
citizens, but for possessing and producing citizens who are able to find such
high culture desirable – which again speaks to the question of education. He
notes: ‘One cannot imagine Anglo-Saxon peasants and workers enjoying it so
calmly and peacefully until the small hours of the morning, let alone our peo-
ple’ (ibid. 51). The Soviet Union emerges, in this sense, as culturally superior
to the ‘Anglo-Saxons’.
The attribution of cultural advancedness is a subset of the attribution of
civilizational development, which speaks to the envisioning of the kind of civ-
ilization thatmore closely approximates the one that the authors deemworth-
while. A second major accord, then, between Tagore and Sahni’s accounts is
in their locating in the Soviet Union an important rebuttal of the greed and
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decadence of the colonizers. The colonial centre is indicted for a ‘glut’, born
of its Western European civilization and violently exported to the colonies.
Tagore sees the global problems of capitalism and colonialism – and they
are not to be divorced from each other. He notes: ‘Not much statistical in-
tricacy is involved to see that during the last hundred and sixty years the
all round poverty of India and England’s all round prosperity lie parallel to
each other’ (ibid.: 103) – and finds a ‘radical solution’ (ibid.: 3) being sought in
Russia. Europe and its ‘Western civilization’, by contrast, are rendered con-
temptible for belying their barbarism: ‘behind the scenes everything is topsy-
turvy, filthy and unhealthy, dense with the darkness of sorrow,misery and evil
deeds. But to us outsiders, looking through the window of the shelter we ob-
tain, everything appears proper, elegant and everybody well-fed’ (ibid.: 7).This
Europe wilfully forgets its own history where ‘they burnt innocent women as
witches, killed scientists as sinners and remorselessly crushed freedom of re-
ligious belief and denied political rights to religious communities other than
their own’ (ibid.: 62), and hypocritically points the finger elsewhere:
It is proclaimed to the people of the world that Hindus and Mussulmans cut
one another’s throats … but once upon a time even Europe’s different com-
munitieswere engaged inmurderous strifeswhich have now turned to deso-
lating wars between different European countries… displaying the primitive
mind of suicidal stupidity, before which our petty barbarism must bow its
head in awe. (ibid.: 16)
In the contrast, this Europe emerges as the home of greed and decadence,
which it exports to its colonies: ‘The pride arising from the difference inwealth
has come to our country from the West’ (ibid.: 8). As a welcome antidote to
this, the Soviet Union has created an environment for ‘the complete disap-
pearance of the vulgar conceit of wealth’ (ibid.: 9), where there ‘is no barrier of
greed’ (ibid.: 108). Sahni, too, indicts Europe and theWest for the ‘glut of con-
sumer goods in the capitalist world’ (Sahni 2015). Together, Tagore and Sahni
participate in producing a narrative of the decadent wicked West, as well as
a faith in the lack of greed and corruption associated with communism. The
dissatisfaction of some Soviet citizens with the scarcity of goods available
to them is, indeed, for Sahni observing the Union in the 1960s, rather to be
blamed on the increasing openness to the outside world under Khrushchev
which allowed them access to capitalist frames of comparison.
Implicitly, this indictment on the part of Tagore and Sahni entails an un-
derstanding of civilizational progress as moving towards a more equitable
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distribution of resources. This too runs overtly counter to colonial narratives
of the colonial centre as a beacon guiding less developed peoples to the de-
sired destination, or as a role model for the colonized to emulate. The civi-
lizing mission was premised on its artificial manufacturing of a moral high
ground for the colonizers. Tagore and Sahni’s accounts completely dispel this
myth, locating their guiding lights rather in the Soviet Union, which in their
iteration serves in many ways as the antithesis of the colonial power.
The European colonizer’s greed is furthermore accompanied by negli-
gence and cowardice, as articulated by Sahni through his development of a
historical narrative in which the West comes off poorly. Despite his expe-
rience of some disillusionment with its original promise, Sahni (2015) still
concludes that the world ‘will have much to learn from the Soviet Union’. This
conclusion is at least partially accounted for by his narrative of the geopo-
litical terrain of the Cold War – which, in turn, is knitted to a particularly
inflected narrative of the Second World War:
The British government had turned its entire attention to the war, and was
becoming increasingly cruel and cold towards India. So much so that when
Bengal was overwhelmed by the famine and more than three million peo-
ple died, suffering, the British government remained unmoved even as the
world watched. (ibid.)
The Bengal famine in 1943 reveals, for Sahni, Britain’s indifference to its
colony. Let down by the British who are understood as having at least some
responsibility to what is at this point still part of the empire, in Sahni’s
envisioning Indians begin to find a favourable alternative in the Soviet
Union:
During the course of the war, the popularity and the influence of the Soviet
Union had grown worldwide. It was the Soviet Union that suffered the worst
effects of the SecondWorldWar. England and America delayed opening up a
second frontwhileHitler’s forces invadeddeep inside the Soviet Union. Then
the war took a turn, and the Red Army routed Hitler’s forces all the way back
to Berlin. Such a total reversal had never been seen before. It changed ev-
erything. Young people were drawn to left-wing thinking in large numbers.
(ibid.)
The British, already condemned for their failure to intervene during the
famine in Bengal, are implicitly cast as cowardly for their reluctance to open
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a second front, while the Soviet Union ‘suffers the worst effects’ only to
heroically save the day by beating Hitler all the way back to Berlin.
If this is not sufficient reason for the colonial oppressor to cede the moral
high ground, the final blow is dealt in the portrayal of the Soviet Union as
representing a more advanced position in relation to questions of social jus-
tice: specifically, in combatting sexism and racism.The Soviet Union emerges
in Tagore’s letters as a space that has improved the lot of both women, and
racialized peoples: a reputation it held in many parts of the world and for a
notably long time (see, for instance, Sandwith 2013).
In Tagore’s letters, Soviet Russia has solved, so it is suggested, the prob-
lems of multiple co-habiting nations and of racism. He notes, ‘that in their
State there is no difference whatsoever of race and colour’ (Tagore 1960: 39);
the Soviet project is one that creates and fosters ‘community which includes
also the swarthy skinned peoples of Central Asia. There is no fear, no concern
that they too should become strong’ (ibid.: 48).This is a sentiment that will be
echoed by first prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru some 16 years later
in The Discovery of India (1946): ‘Russians are almost totally devoid of racial-
ism’ (Nehru 1994: 549). In these articulations, it is in the Soviet Union that the
‘progressive’ politics of anti-racism and anti-sexism are understood as taking
place.
The Soviet Union thus emerges as a space that has achieved solutions to
problems which Tagore’s and Sahni’s homeland is still grappling with, and
consequently as a site of aspiration and even envy. It is to the Soviet Union
that Sahni and Tagorewould have their countrywomen andmen look for guid-
ing principles and concrete strategies on the road to an aspirational future.
Tagore’s discursive construction proffers the advancedness of the Union, in
terms of education, culture and social justice, linking it and what it repre-
sents to the future.The Soviets, for him, are ‘determined to raise a new world’
(ibid.: 10); ‘Russia is engaged in the task of making the road to a new age;
of tearing up the roots of ancient beliefs and customs from its ancient soil’
(ibid.: 115). Sahni, too, is moved by its bearing a torch to the future: ‘When-
ever attentionwas cursorily paid to the Soviet Union’s problems, themindwas
also drawn to their accomplishments.When Sputnik – the first satellite –was
launched by the Soviet Union andmankind was brought closer to the heavens,
the entire world rejoiced’ (Sahni 2015). Technological progress crystallizes the
Soviet Union’s general ‘aheadness’. Sahni associates the USSR’s advances into
space with its position at the vanguard of progress and its connection to the
future. It is its affiliation with the future that offers the final, and perhaps
190 Lucy Gasser
most obvious, instantiation of the Soviet Union’s representing a vision of de-
sirable ‘progress’ for these two travellers. It opens up an alternative normative
horizon in the worlds cumulatively produced by these two travellers’ accounts
and the readings offered here. They not only resist and contest the civilizing
mission’s demarcations of global centrality and civilizational aheadness, but
situate an alternative horizon for their aspirational future.
After displacement of the civilizing mission: Pauline Podbrey
Pauline Podbrey was born into a Jewish family in Lithuania in 1922, and em-
igrated with her family to Durban in South Africa in 1933. Her father was a
committed communist and from a young age she moved into leftist political
activism, joining the South African Communist Party and doing a great deal
of work with various trade unions.The latter caused her to meet H.A. Naidoo,
a well-known South African-Indian trade unionist whom she later married.
Due to apartheid legislation thatmade it technically illegal for Naidoo tomove
from Durban to Cape Town, where the family settled in 1943, as well as diffi-
culties relating to their interracial marriage, Podbrey and her family escaped
to London in 1951, and on to Hungary in 1952, where she and Naidoo worked
for Radio Budapest until their return to England in 1955. Consequently, she
experienced the Soviet republic in the context of the discontent that led to the
uprising of 1956, but left prior to the actual revolt and occupation.
In her memoirWhite Girl in Search of the Party, written in English and pub-
lished in 1993, Podbrey recounts her experiences of the Soviet Union as viewed
with the benefit of hindsight, after the dissolution of the USSR. Her imagina-
tive production of Soviet space is profoundly influenced by her relationship
to communism. As a young activist in South Africa, her image of the So-
viet Union is an idealized one: she imagines this space as the fulfilment of a
grand aspirational dream, at the forefront of progress: ‘I was convinced that
the Soviet Union was leading the world in all spheres, art, science, industry,
the emancipation of nationalities, women, agriculture’ (Podbrey 1993: 27). In
terms of progress in the various spheres of culture, technology and, impor-
tantly, social justice, the Soviet Union is leading the way: it is here that she
locates her normative horizon.
When offered the opportunity of working at Radio Budapest, Podbrey ex-
presses her enthusiasm for the opportunity to participate directly in the ac-
tualization of such a noble ideal:
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The thought of living and working in a socialist country excited and thrilled
us! In our dreamswe’d never hoped for such a privilege. To experience at first
hand the struggles and achievements of building socialism, to share in the
life of a people engaged in this historic task, to be part of their movement to
create a workers’ paradise; it all seemed to us too good to be true. (ibid.: 157)
From a vantage point shaped by her white South African upbringing, then, the
Soviet Union looks like a dream of a better future. This is where the commu-
nism that inspired and drove Podbrey and her fellow activists in South Africa
is actually being put into practice. Later she opines, ‘[t]he Soviet Union was a
dream of Utopia common to the right-thinking persons all round the world,
the Fatherland to which we all owed allegiance for moral, ethical and ideolog-
ical reasons’ (ibid.: 186). Her language – ‘paradise’, ‘Utopia’ – articulates this
space as an idealization and aspiration.
South Africa, by contrast, is not quite so far ahead in Podbrey’s portrayal.
Indeed, it is also ‘behind’ its former colonizer Britain.When Podbrey struggles
to find a hospital that will deliver her mixed-race baby, she is pleased to find
a British matron at a nursing house willing to take her on: ‘Here, we told our-
selves, is a woman of principle. It just goes to show, we said, how much more
civilized the British are, how much more advanced than we South Africans’
(ibid.: 129). It transpires that the matron is primarily financially motivated,
and backtracks when the other patients express displeasure. But Podbrey’s
imagined South Africans, due to their racism, are less ‘civilized’ and, implic-
itly, more backward, than the British – though of course the ‘civilizedness’ of
the British matron is directly undercut by her prioritizing money. Podbrey’s
attributed backwardness is understood in relation to an imagined progres-
sive, socially just society. This envisioning of South Africa as behind both the
Soviet Union and the West represented by Britain, undergoes a sharp change
as Podbrey comes to experience first-hand the ‘paradise-in-the-making’ con-
stituted by socialist Hungary.
Her disillusionment becomes inevitable as she describes the dismantling
of the precious image of the ‘glorious future’ that the Soviet Union had repre-
sented for her. The utopian vision she had looked to for inspiration in South
Africa is shattered by the lived reality of Budapest. At the radio station, she
experiences, and indeed participates in, the construction of a false image of
the USSR. She witnesses the fabrication of desirable news: ‘In the absence of
any real news two Yugoslav comrades were set to work next door to us man-
ufacturing items of “news”’ (ibid.: 168); and the dogmatic strictures imposed
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when it comes to party propaganda: ‘a report of a speech by Comrade Stalin,
no matter how indigestible the English translation … had to be broadcast ver-
batim’ (ibid.: 168).
With regard to the Soviet Union’s advancedness in terms of social justice,
Podbrey is forced to question her until then strong belief in the USSR’s over-
coming of the problem of anti-Semitism. In this regard, her voice serves as a
necessary corrective to the utopian envisioning of Tagore and Sahni’s attribu-
tion of progressiveness in this sense. At first reacting indignantly to claims of
anti-Jewish feeling in response to the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia, she is
subject to censoring by her supervisors in a manner that suggests a less than
clean slate. Her colleague Istvan, who is also Jewish, disappears mysteriously
from the station and though no clear reason ever emerges, it is speculated
that ‘he had failed to confess to a bourgeois Jewish merchant father’ (ibid.:
182).
The vision of the Soviet Union as a space that has overcome the problems
of racial discrimination is also belied by her experience. She relates an inci-
dent that happens to her husband, H.A., when he encounters some Romani
people on the street:
‘Oh sir,’ he [the spokesman of a group of Romani] begged, ‘takeme back with
you to your land. I want to bewithmy ownpeople, with black people, like you
and me’. ‘But in South Africa,’ H.A. tried to explain, ‘the black people have a
bad life, they don’t have equal rights with the whites, they suffer from dis-
crimination and prejudice’. ‘Same as here, same as here…’ Our only previous
contact with gypsies had been in restaurants, listening to their seductive,
soulful melodies or foot-tapping to their wild, abandoned, exciting strings.
Were they really an oppressed minority? (ibid.: 189)
While the ‘wild, abandoned, exciting strings’ strike a rather exoticizing note,
Podbrey’s appreciation of their position is an important step in her disillu-
sionment with Soviet communism as she recognizes discriminatory treat-
ment and signals the racialization and racism present within Europe and the
Soviet Union, revealing that this is in fact not the dream of a race-free soci-
ety it was purported to be. This serves as a significant contestation of what
– in Tagore’s and Sahni’s cumulatively produced worlds – might have been
represented as the Soviet Union’s paving of a smooth road to an aspirational
future of social justice. Racism, counter to that narrative, is alive and well in
the Soviet space of Podbrey’s account.
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The narrative of the USSR’s having overcome sexism is also shown up as
false. It is, arguably, Podbrey’s experience of communist control over women’s
reproductive rights that pushes her disillusionment to its culmination. Un-
intentionally falling pregnant during her time in Budapest, she expresses her
expectations as a woman and a communist: ‘I’d have thought that in a Social-
ist country women had the right to decide what to do with their own bodies’
(ibid.: 171). This, she learns, is lamentably not the case. Indeed, it is her ex-
periences in insisting on her right to an abortion and her final but difficult
success in this endeavour, that signals for her the disintegration of everything
she had believed communism to mean: ‘I felt ashamed to be benefiting from
such a hypocritical system, one in which abortions, like other prizes, were at
the disposal of the privileged, like me.The class differences of other countries
seemed trivial by comparison’ (ibid.: 172). Podbrey is disillusioned not merely
by the system’s failing her as woman, but by its betrayal of the principles of
equal treatment. This is chillingly revealed by the juxtaposition of the story
of the typist Lydia, who is forced to seek out an illegal abortion and ends in
prison. Interestingly, this becomes a turning point in the text’s evaluation of
South Africa. Podbrey says, ‘I’d had two abortions [in South Africa] but noth-
ing prepared me for the indignity to which I was now subjected by this doctor
and his nurse’ (ibid.: 171). In apartheid South Africa, it seems, she was able to
access abortions, and was treated with less indignity.
She also signals the exceptionalism of the South African Communist Party
amongst the communist parties of the world, noting ‘just how special they
[the communist party leaders] were in the international Communist arena
we were not to discover until later’ (ibid.: 142).The South African communists
were warm and welcoming of all fellow travellers; British communists, for
instance, were less congenial. Finally, after the colossal disappointment and
disillusionment Podbrey experiences as a result of her time in the Soviet bloc,
she concludes very much in favour of the South African brand of communism
she had initially fallen in love with: ‘That was a part of my life I could be proud
of – the South African Communist Party was the only organization which
stood for total equality… But life under a Communist regime had opened my
eyes to the evils inherent in such a system’ (Podbrey 1993: 201). Consequently,
in the world of Podbrey’s text, socialist Europe emerges as the home of a
failed dream: a false vision of desirable progress. This causes her to shift her
normative horizon away from that once-utopian image back to South Africa,
which – however diseased on a governmental level – emerges as having more
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closely approximated that horizon and thus as the locus of a true, or ideal,
vision of communism yet to be achieved.
In conclusion: Beyond a will to exclusivity with Alex La Guma
Tagore and Sahni’s repudiation and displacement of the civilizing mission,
and Podbrey’s contestation of its ColdWar inverse are valuable in dismantling
the legacies of colonial worldmaking. It does not, however, enact structural
change when different placeholders merely rehearse the same trajectories:
as when the Soviet road to socialism replaces the colonial road to capital-
ism. And while Podbrey’s locating an aspirational ideal in South Africa is pro-
ductively resistant to dominant norms, the structure underlying this serves
to replace one horizon with another. In conclusion, then, I offer a reading
against the grain of what is at face value a profoundly clear-cut ideological
text: Alex La Guma’s vehemently pro-Soviet A Soviet Journey (1978). In its par-
ticularly stringent reproduction of binary politics and prescriptive socialist
trajectories, this travelogue is explicitly mapping a single alternative norma-
tive horizon. Nonetheless, contrary to the travelogue’s more obvious agenda,
I want to end by arguing that this text signals the possibilities inherent in re-
sisting a will to exclusivity, and thus latently reveals a capacity for configuring
horizons in the plural.
Alex La Guma (1925–1985), born in District Six in Cape Town, was a South
African writer and anti-apartheid activist. He was a defendant in the noto-
rious Treason Trials, and was forced into exile in London in 1966. A life-long
communist, he was also an activemember of the Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian
Writers’ Association, publishing in their quarterly journal Lotus, and winning
the Lotus Prize in 1969. La Guma was chief representative of the African Na-
tional Congress in the Caribbean when he died in Havana in 1985. He went
to the Soviet Union in 1975 as a guest of the Union of Soviet Writers, and this
journey, along with experiences gathered on trips in 1970 and 1973, furnished
the material that would result in his travelogue (see Field 2010: 210), a text
whose aim is overtly to present a positive image of the communist project
being pursued there. Originally published by Progress Publishers in Moscow,
the book belongs to the ‘Impressions of the USSR’ series and forms a part of
the image of itself the Soviet Union was interested in presenting abroad.
LaGumapositions himself as a staunch communist, enamoured of the So-
viet project and convinced that his home country has much to learn from it.
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Not only does he wish to disseminate knowledge about the USSR in a positive
light, but he explicitly presents it as practising a viable alternative to the global
capitalism of the West, which is yoked to the ongoing colonial oppression he
sees his and other countries suffering under. In a typically pro-Soviet sketch-
ing of ‘progress’, the USSR facilitates the ‘catching up’ of its ‘non-European’
(La Guma 1978: 34f.) brethren, allowing them to bypass capitalism and enjoy,
by association with the rest of the Union and as also suggested by Tagore and
Sahni, closer proximity to the future.
While overtly promoting this trajectory, the text nonetheless dissolves the
exclusivity on which it is theoretically premised. Throughout his journeys in
the Soviet Union, La Guma makes and fosters connections with Soviet citi-
zens, enlivened by the mutual sympathies that he presents in the text as ex-
isting in simple interactions and conversations and in the interest and empa-
thy displayed by those he encounters. This produces an imagined something
shared that binds them, cultivating connections, affinities, sympathies and
grounds for alliances. These are fed by a capacity to allow different stories
to co-exist without cancelling each other out, allowing them, rather, to sup-
plement each other. Significant in this world’s imagining of pasts and origin
stories, then, is its lack of a will to exclusivity. While Europe’s imperial civi-
lizing mission required the quashing of other stories than those of Western
European reason and religion, and Soviet propaganda foresaw only the Soviet
route to a desirable future to the exclusion of other ways, La Guma’s meetings
with the peoples of Soviet Eurasia suggested varied stories that were happy
to live alongside one another. In Kazakhstan, his guide Amangeldeh relates
how the local mountains came to be: ‘There is a legend which says that when
the world was born, God looked down on Kazakhstan and saw the flat empty
steppes. He felt sorry for those living in such desolate emptiness, so he took a
handful of rocks and tossed it down as a sort of compensation and so we got
the Blue Mountains.’ (ibid.: 114f.).
In response, La Guma offers a different narrative of the origin of moun-
tains:
There is an African folk-tale, from Tanzania, I think, which gives another ex-
planation for howmountains came to be. It says that long ago the earth was
smooth and flat and even all over, but one day she arose to talk to the sky.
When the two of them had finished their chat the earth took leave of the sky
and started to return. But she did not reach home all over. Some parts of her
became tired on the way and stopped where they were. (ibid.: 115)
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La Guma’s ‘another explanation’ claims no exclusive universality and no
supremacy for itself. On another occasion, he relates the story of how stars
came to be:
‘Starswerefirstmade in SouthAfrica, you know’. I toldhim that SouthAfrican
tale of the young African girl who sat warming herself by a wood fire one
night and playedwith the ashes, taking them in her hands and flinging them
up to see how pretty they were when they floated in the air. As they floated
away she put more wood on the fire and stirred it with a stick and the bright
sparks flew everywhere and wafted high into the night. They hung in the air
and made a bright road across the sky, a road of silver and diamonds.
‘It’s still there,’ I said. ‘They call it the Stars Road or theMilkyWay.’ (ibid.: 131f.)
La Guma ends his anecdote: ‘if we invented the stars, it must have been your
people who invented the sun’ (ibid.: 132). The account of his journey imagines
and produces a world that is shared and inclusive, in which different (hi)sto-
ries can accommodate each other and need not strive to win out over each
other. By allowing these different stories to co-exist, La Guma’s travelogue
works to contest a will to exclusivity and so unleash the potential of a plural-
ity of normative horizons. This is, finally, structurally different in a way that
mere displacement cannot be.
In conclusion, the juxtaposition of these readings serves to unfold how
these travel accounts can serve as resources not only for contesting violently
ascribed colonial narratives, but as sites of productively imagined alterna-
tives.The centres of their worldmaking practices are not located in the former
colonial centre, which itself is moved to the periphery of their envisioning of
the global. As such, the aspirational horizons animated by the worldmaking
activities of these travel writings lie, for Tagore and Sahni, not in Britain’s
imperial capital, but in the potentialities opened up by the Soviet Union. The
alternative horizons opened up by them are complicated and undercut by Pod-
brey’s account.Her contestation of too utopian a representation of theUnion’s
achievements in social justice is valuable to guard against one exclusive route
to prescriptive progress merely being replaced by another. La Guma, finally,
signals the capacity of his worldmaking not only to forego the will to exclusiv-
ity on which colonial narratives such as the civilizing mission are premised,
but to display its utter expendability in the world he chooses to imagine. Im-
plicit in this is also the value of plurality indicated by Chakrabarty’s call to
create plural normative horizons in place of Eurocentric prescriptions whose
structuring principle is exclusivity. An insistence on plurality and structural
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change in thinking about exclusive narratives of the global works in the ser-
vice of dismantling the legacies of colonial epistemologies.
Notes
1 I am grateful to themembers of the RTG ‘World Politics’ for their insights
and comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
2 I build here on previous work, parts of which have appeared elsewhere,
though in pursuit of different arguments to the one I make here (see
Gasser 2019a, 2019b).
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Today the planetary is on everyone’s lips, and yet they don’t know what they
are talking about. They think the planetary is the global: what concerns
Chicago and Singapore at the same time, or whatnot and whatnot. … By
planetary I mean errant thinking, an errant world’. (Axelos in Gauvin 2009:
min. 43, author’s translation)
With these words taken from a 2009 France Culture interview, Kostas Axe-
los cautions against confounding what he calls the planetary with global-
ization. Now, it is certainly questionable whether planetarity is indeed the
talk of the town. However, in her 2005 book Death of a Discipline, Gayatri Spi-
vak also urged the errant thinking this paradigm stands for (the word planet
comes from the Greek ‘planâsthai’: ‘to err, to wander’) and thus revived a dis-
course that goes back to Weimar Germany and the likes of Ernst Jünger, Carl
Schmitt and Martin Heidegger (cf. Apter 2006: 60). Likewise Achille Mbembe
announced he would offer ‘Reflections on Planetary Living’ in his opening
speech at the 2020 Ruhrtriennale that was cancelled due to COVID-19. The
critique of a ‘technological escalation’ and ‘unshackled markets’ he wanted to
articulate there (Mbembe 2020a) brings to mind the early developments of
planetary thinking provoked by Ernst Jünger’s (1930) essay on ‘The Total Mo-
bilization’ of all resources, economic and technological as well.1
In this chapter, I would like to sketch the alternative way in which plan-
etarity addresses the developments that are today commonly referred to as
globalization. It gives voice to a fundamental critique of the presuppositions
implicitly guiding discourses of globalization and to the global horizon that
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allows for such presuppositions, without falling into a merely negative cri-
tique of globalization. Instead, planetarity needs to be understood as a dis-
tinct practice of worldmaking, one that grants a novel kind of perspective
and agency. This is why its analysis proves an important contribution to this
volume, a contribution I am tempted to characterize as a supplement to the
phenomenological and epistemological paradigms that are key to the project.
As a particularly economic approach to the complex discursive field of plane-
tary thought and action, I will focus on the book Vers la pensée planétaire (Toward
Planetary Thinking) that Kostas Axelos published in 1964.2
Axelos, a Greek communist revolutionary and exile who lived in Paris
since 1945, provides somewhat of a ‘missing link’ between the conservative
revolutionaries of Weimar and today’s postcolonialism. He was influenced by
Heidegger’s phenomenology and the so-called ‘Kehre’ (turn) away from it and
he was implicated in the shift to post-structuralism that French thought un-
derwent since the 1960s. Axelos contributed to this shift by questioning the
Freudo-Marxist presuppositions upon which many French (and also quite a
few German) left-wing intellectuals had relied since the end of the Second
World War. That Vers la pensée planétaire is supposed to play an active role in
this intellectual and political shift is already clear from its title vector ‘to-
ward planetary thinking’. Indeed, bymeans of a rereading of Freud andMarx,
the book seeks to inspire the ‘step and leap’ (Axelos 1964: 27) from a ‘Western
and European modernity’ to what it envisions as a new ‘planetary era’ (Axelos
1964: 307), one that moves beyond the global horizon which gave rise to this
modernity. That is to say that Axelos’s project engages in a specific practice
of worldmaking, a practice that leaves behind not only the grand narratives
of modernity, but also the horizon of the globe in and from which they gain
their ‘sense’ and ‘self-evidence’. Thus, one might characterize the contribu-
tion the discourse of planetary provides to this volume as a distinctly post-
phenomenological and post-structuralist attempt at world-making.
In what follows, I will show that planetarity moves beyond the global hori-
zon thanks to a non-dialectical notion of becoming (‘devenir’) aporetically ori-
ented toward a decentralized universe. In order to think such a becoming,
Axelos playfully engages central political, philosophical and psychoanalytical
arguments which allow him to swerve away from the globe’s (phallo-)helio-
centrism. In a second step, I will unfold the political implications of Vers la
pensée planétaire and the understanding the book has of its own agency in the
passage to a ‘planetary era’. My closing remarks will turn to what I suggest
calling the prefigurative style of Axelos’s thinking and writing, a style whose
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figurative dimension does not point back (or forward) to a literal dimension.
As the future – or better: ‘what is to come’ (‘l’à-venir’) – remains structurally
open, the book uses prefigurations in a manner that anticipates the way Gay-
atri Spivak will later speak of literature’s planetary promise: it ‘cannot predict,
but it may prefigure’ (Spivak 2005: 49).
In order to outline what is at stake in the ‘planetary … leap’ (Axelos 1964: 27)
let me begin by outlining the globe as a different horizon of world-making.
The global horizon and total mobilization
Axelos rejects the global because it implies a model of circularity and circu-
lation bound to the emergence of heliocentrism. Although already implicit in
the metaphysical heliocentrism that goes back at least as far as Plato’s para-
ble of the sun and the cave, an actually global horizon can only emerge thanks
to the ‘Copernican and Galilean revolution’ (Axelos 1964: 311). Throughout the
Middle Ages the distinction between the sublunary realm of physics and the
superlunary world of astronomy (or metaphysics) developed in Greek thought
continued to prevail. It was only with modern astrophysics and its empir-
ical heliocentrism that the movements of heavenly and earthly bodies were
conceived of as following the same laws. One of the major points of Hans
Blumenberg’s monumental studyThe Genesis of the CopernicanWorld is that the
heliocentric model of the universe should not be misconstrued as a decentral-
ization and humiliation of the human being. On the contrary, the shift away
from a geocentric worldview allowed the human subject to imagine itself in
the solar centre of the world with the earth (and all other stars) revolving
around it (see Blumenberg 1987: 540ff.).
This imaginative dimension is complemented by the geographical and
technological inventions of the modern age. The discovery of the Americas,
the circumnavigation of earth and the innovations in cartography established
a global political economy that could be mapped onto the globe; in the words
of Carl Schmitt: ‘For the first time in history, man was holding the terres-
trial globe in his hand, the real one, as if it were a ball’ (Schmitt 1997: 33). The
universal model of bodies revolving around a solar centre and the political
economy of circulation and accumulation began to reinforce one another, let-
ting a global horizon emerge in which Europe could stage itself as a quasi-
solar centre that accumulated the surplus gained from the global circulation
of wares, persons, peoples and ideas. In other words, the figure of the globe
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is bound to a nascent Eurocentrism.The human being that Schmitt sees ven-
turing out to grasp the globe as a whole is clearly marked as a European male.
In The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum
(originally published in 1949), Schmitt argues that free trade in a liberal world
market is complicit with the emergence of Europe as a political geography
of nation-states set apart from the rest of the earth (Schmitt 2003: 140ff.),
which is why the modern world is both global and Eurocentric (see Schmitt
2003: 86f.). Schmitt here articulates an influential geopolitical argument that
ties the emergence of global capitalism to the political, legal, scientific and
technological developments in Modern Europe in a way that is already inti-
mated in Capital where Marx once speaks of a ‘terrestrial globe’ which has
been ‘monopolized’ by the ‘revenue’ system and its cycles (Marx 2000: 531).
In the 1990s, Jacques Derrida referred to precisely this geopolitical paradigm
when he addressed the European ‘cape’ as an articulation of ‘capital’ in the
monetary and in the political sense (as ‘capital’ and ‘capitale’) (Derrida 1992:
35f.). In the global horizon of a ‘European and Western Modernity’, scientific
objectification and economic reification from an outside – and in this sense
transcendent – point of view go hand in hand.The common logic of heavenly
and earthly cycles finds a philosophical justification in the (transcendental)
ego cogito that imaginatively positions itself at the centre of the universe in an
attempt to mobilize, and dispose of, everything (including all empirical egos)
around this phantasmatic Archimedean point.
The consequences of such a complicity of Copernican astrophysics, mod-
ern subject philosophy and the Eurocentric political economy of colonialism
and imperialism come to the fore once modernity has run its course and has,
in a certain sense, already moved beyond itself. What 20th-century history
shows for Axelos is that neither the universe, nor global capital, nor the so-
called subject has a fixed centre. As a result, these points of reference are de-
centralized and dispersed in multilateral networks. From now on ‘everything
influences everything else, opening the field for all possible combinations and
interferences’ (Axelos 1964: 303). The expansion of such networks follows a
‘double movement’ that ‘continues to accelerate,’ as it simultaneously fosters
‘abstraction’ and ‘automation’ as well as ‘dislocation’ and ‘non-adhesion’ (ibid.)
in such a way as to strip off any reference to an empirical centre (such as
Europe or the sun). However, it does so without breaking with the cyclical
model that initially arose from such a centre. The cycles continue to reinforce
one other because
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the interactions and interdependences, the connections, correlations and
the mutual concessions, the coordinations, the integrations, the operat-
ing, operative, and operational operations, the intercommunications and
telecommunications, the reciprocal implications, the causes and causalities
all act one upon the other and upon the whole of their ensemble. (ibid.: 303)
This network of networks (of networks…) sprawling across the entire global
sphere is an experience Axelos shares with the Weimar intellectuals as well as
with Derrida (1992: 42) who sees the European ‘cape’ paradoxically coming to a
head in the decentralized networks of an ‘extreme capillarity’. Consequently,
Axelos characterizes this double movement of automation and dislocation us-
ing a famous phrase coined, and popularized, by Ernst Jünger in 1930: ‘total
mobilization’ (Axelos 1964: 303). This is probably the most acclaimed formula-
tion by this right-wing German writer. Not only did Carl Schmitt and Martin
Heidegger readily embrace the phrase because it addressed the most urgent
developments of the 20th century (see Schmitt 1999: 10 and Heidegger 2004:
10ff.), it also made, as Beatrice Hanssen (2006: 86) has pointed out, ‘an indeli-
ble impression’ on Walter Benjamin. In a book review that deals with the col-
lection of essays in which Jünger’s essay on ‘The Total Mobilization’ appeared
– and that is extremely hostile to that volume in every possible respect – Ben-
jamin stated that all ‘precise formulations, genuine accents or solid reasoning’
speak to a ‘reality’ which is ‘that of Ernst Jünger’s “total mobilization”’ (Ben-
jamin 1979: 126; for Benjamin’s marginal role in the discourse of planetarity
see Wohlfahrt 2002: 70 and Auer 2013: 45ff.). That even Benjamin acknowl-
edged that Jünger’s phrase has a significant bearing on reality signals why
the term was later able to cross into the left-wing political camp, attracting,
for example, Paul Virilio (1995: 135) or Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000:
26, 421).
What Jünger means by total mobilization implies nothing less than the
end of the global worldmaking practices outlined above. Unbridled techno-
logical progress levels all political hierarchies and dissolves all geopolitical
boundaries, thus spelling the ruin of Eurocentrism and the sovereign nation-
state alike. Schmitt draws the consequences this has for international law
and politics. Western modernity distinguished between economy and poli-
tics along the legal lines of a liberal society (and its bourgeois) on the one hand
and the sovereign state (and its citoyen) on the other.These classifications were
all, in turn, mapped onto the geopolitical lines Europe drew to separate itself
from the rest of the world (cf. Schmitt 2003: 140ff.). As soon as these lines
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differentiating a European centre from its global periphery became obsolete,
the fundamental distinctions organizing the global horizon – such as pub-
lic vs. private sphere, domestic vs. foreign policy – were superseded as well.
For Schmitt, this moment was reached at the Washington Meridian Confer-
ence of 1884. The Greenwich Meridian agreed upon there drew a geopolitical
line that no longer defined legal spaces, but rather technologically unified the
earth in terms of time and space.That Schmitt so prominently referred to the
Meridian Conference is the reason that the discussion of planetarity in 1950s
Germany revolved around global and planetary lines (cf. Auer 2013).
Planetarity speaks to a situation in which technological and economic in-
novations override all conventional political categories. Jünger and Schmitt
see the end of the nation-state leading to a planetary ‘civil war’ in which
transnational nongovernment agents fight each other on the legally unreg-
ulated battlefields that modern technologies carry onto the entire planet: ‘For
the first time, earth as a ball, as a planet, has become a battleground, and
human history presses on towards a planetary order’ (Jünger 1948: 43). What
Schmitt and Jünger thus diagnosed in the 1930s to 1960s appears today in the
guise of failing states, Net Wars, (cyber)terrorism or GPS-based drone war-
fare. It is in addressing challenges such as these that a discourse of planetarity
develops which is not only interested in diagnostics, but also articulates a new
kind of politics in a time threatened by worldwide warfare. Needless to say,
the suggestions Schmitt, Jünger, and Heidegger, Virilio, Derrida and Spivak
make for a possible planetary ‘order’ or ‘disorder’ vary significantly (and not
even the German authors agree on this). In what follows I will focus on two
poles of this discourse: a politics of enmity associated primarily with Carl
Schmitt and a politics of friendship first introduced as such in Vers la pensée
planétaire (but already implicit in Jünger or Heidegger, although with different
consequences (cf. Auer 2013).
Axelos, who was introduced to the discourse of planetarity in the 1950s at
the very latest, is also convinced that Eurocentrism and the sovereign nation-
state belong to the past. ‘Planetary Politics’ (thus the title of the final chapter
of Vers la pensée planétaire) begins once the distinction between domestic and
foreign policy no longer holds (see Axelos 1964: 298). Since a globalized world
admits of ‘no outside anymore’ (ibid.: 298), ‘sovereignty’ has become a power
that ‘no person or institution could wield any longer’ (ibid.: 302). When inter-
preted within a global horizon, such a situation would inevitably call for an
‘administration’ – ormanagement, governance – ‘of the globe’ and its cycles of
‘production, distribution, and consumption’ (ibid.: 309). It is remarkable that
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the Cold War did not make a difference in this respect; despite the fact that
Vers la pensée planétairewas published in 1964 during the VietnamWar and only
a few years after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Beyond the ideological differences
however, Axelos sees both the United States and the USSR as headed towards
this kind of globalized management of circulation and accumulation.
That alone serves to show that planetarity was not a Cold War discourse
and explains why it revived after the fall of the Iron Curtain.That was the case
with Derrida, whose L’autre cap (translated into English as The Other Heading,
not literally as ‘the other cape’) was prompted by the end of the so-called Sec-
ond World. In it he mentions the articulation of the European cape and head
(caput) as political and economic capital because he sees himself witnessing
‘a planetarization of the European model’ (Derrida 1992: 36) which might be
opening itself ‘not only to the other cape and especially to the cape of the other,
but also perhaps to the other of the cape’ (Derrida 1992: 15, translation modified
by the author). The techno-political dispersal in networks of decentralized
capillaries fosters, and exacts, an orientation toward transnational and post-
Eurocentric encounters. And such is the case of Gayatri Spivak, whose plan
for a planetary study of literature, in a double twist, employs Area Studies to
wrest Comparative Literature from its Eurocentric bias and employs Compar-
ative Literature to wrest Area Studies from its Cold War investments in a US
raison d’État (see Spivak 2005: 1ff.). These are anti-state and anti-Eurocentric
strategies that seek to institutionalize the discourse that Axelos introduced
to France in the 1960s and that tries to conceive of ‘a universe that has sur-
passed the solar system’ (Axelos 1964: 307), instead ‘breaching the cape that
still conceals the abstract landscape of the planetary era’ (ibid.: 311).
Since this attempt to break with the political economy of the globe – and
the contemporary notion of globalization it gives rise to – raises the question
of how a planetary ‘avant-garde’ can gain and give orientation in such an ab-
stract landscape, it entails a new understanding not only of politics, but first
and foremost of thinking and its relation to action.
The errant trajectories of ‘planet-thought’
Axelos was probably introduced to the discourse of planetarity by Heideg-
ger with whom he studied in the 1950s and who approached it from a dis-
tinctly philosophical angle. For Heidegger, Jünger’s total mobilization is the
final form of Western metaphysics, which is why Jünger accomplished the
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feat of a reversal of Platonism set out for by Nietzsche. In his bookTheWorker:
Domination and Gestalt, Jünger fully wrests ‘that which is’ (the essence) from
the transcendence it was couched in by Plato and invests his planetary worker
avant-garde with it (cf. Jünger 2007; Heidegger 2004; for a reading of Jünger
in the context of the avant-garde see Groys 1999). In this reversal – that Hei-
degger sees preconceived in Marx – transcendence becomes what he critically
calls ‘rescendence [Reszendenz]’ (Heidegger 1996: 398). Instead of leading to a
genuinely planetary form of thinking and action, Jünger’s avant-garde fails to
move beyond the horizon of globalization it meant to leave behind. For, by es-
tablishing the ‘Gestalt of the Worker’ as the epistemological lynchpin and the
avant-garde agency of his soi-disant ‘planetary’ order, Jünger posits a central
figure around which everything is made to revolve. In other words, Jünger’s
practices of envisioning andmaking the world are intent on generating a new
solar system, except that now the central luminary is not a transcendent, but
an earthly, and hence ‘rescendent’, figure.
This is where Axelos enters the debate. To be sure, besides pointing out
thatTheWorker shows one facet only of a far more complex development (Ax-
elos 1964: 307), Axelos has very little to say about Jünger – but all the more
about Marx. And it is evident that his readings of Marx are inspired by Hei-
degger’s critique of Jünger. For example, when characterizingMarx as the last
philosopher because of his shift from a conventional ontology to a concep-
tion of ‘techno-logy’ (ibid.: 175), Axelos is obviously thinking in Heideggerian
terms. Marx brings philosophy to a close because he sees the onto-theology
of Western thought culminating in an ensemble of technologies that man-
age everything by means of autopoietic and self-regulatory cycles. This ‘cy-
berneticization of thought’ (ibid. 1964: 18) – and with it of economy and poli-
tics, culture and civilization – operates on a necessarily earth-encompassing
scale. Thanks to the abstraction and dislocation behind this mobilization of
earth itself, the circulation of cycles is not bound to a geographical centre or a
concrete ideological framework anymore. Since globalization has, as it were,
‘emptied’ out everything – and in this sense Axelos will call it ‘nihilistic’ – it
can be defined like Leonardo da Vinci’s void: ‘Its centre and circumference are
nowhere and everywhere’ (ibid.: 25).
And yet, Axelos stresses, the nexus of cybernetics and technology only
apparently overcomes the onto-theological horizon circumscribed by globe
and sun. Instead of moving beyond the Eurocentric system that implemented
heliocentrism economically and politically, globalization needs to be under-
stood as a specifically technological ‘occidentalization of the world’ (ibid.: 198).
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Technology, in other words, does not free the planet from the circulation
paradigm, it rather begins to ‘corset the entire periphery of the planet that is
precipitated into its rotatingmovement’ (ibid.: 303f.): ‘The circle seems vicious
and magical’ (ibid.: 17). Globalization admits of no outside anymore because,
in universalizing itself, technology always already occupies any Archimedean
point from where it could be called into question and thereby veils its onto-
theological character as the objectivity of a system that has stripped off any
empirical centre. Axelos’s term for this objectiveness is ‘dépouillement total’
(ibid.: 283): the original meaning of ‘dépouillement’ being ‘skinning’. Hence,
by being predicated on the nexus of dislocation and abstraction, globaliza-
tion’s alleged ‘total objectiveness’ amounts to the pseudo-objectivity of a ‘total
skinning.’
In pointing this out, Axelos calls attention to the implicit philosophical
presuppositions of globalization. Technology’s cybernetic grip on the world
is predicated on the Hegelian and Marxian dialectics of ‘absolute truth’ and
‘total reality’ (ibid.: 198), which assume that world history and the history of
thought converge in a common teleological movement. This brings the end
of history in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit to mind where absolute thinking
divests itself of history and externalizes historical progress as ‘a gallery of im-
ages’ because it can come to itself in a ‘circle that presupposes its beginning
and only reaches it at the end’ (Hegel 1977: 492, 802). Axelos sees this ‘total
and absolute spirit’ (Axelos 1964: 198) spinning everything in cycles while ab-
solving itself from any position within these cycles. Absolute thinking fully
reflects itself in itself by, simultaneously, dispersing in what Hegel called a
‘circle of circles’ (Hegel 1991: § 15). A totality thus constituted by subtracting
any localizable centre corresponds to technology’s global grip on the planet.
In a globalized framework – which has managed to seal itself off from any
difference that could make a difference – progress is reduced to the ever-in-
creasing technological and economic implementation of a dialectic that has,
in principle, already come to fulfilment.
Axelos addresses the philosophical presuppositions of such a global dis-
course in an equally philosophical manner. This is why he urges that the ego
cogito should not ‘interpret itself as a sun, but rather as a planet’ (Axelos 1964:
18). This paradigmatic shift would allow for a new understanding not only of
the human being and human thinking but also of the world as a whole. It
would thus perform the ‘planetary … leap’ (ibid.: 27) beyond the cyclical logic
of rotation, circulation, revolution or feedback loops, which all tie into the
onto-theological model of globe and solar system. Axelos was not the first,
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and will not be the last, to advocate a distinctly planetary thought. This call
was already articulated in Heidegger’s exhortation that Jünger follow through
with a truly ‘planetary thought’ (Heidegger 1996: 424) and it will be echoed in
Spivak’s ‘Imperatives’ of ‘Planet-thought’ (Spivak 1999: 49): ‘In our historical
moment, we must try persistently to reverse and displace globalization into
planetarity – an impossible figure’ (Spivak 2005: 97).
The question is how to trace such an impossible figure if even the avant-
garde remains trapped in a global horizon. Axelos tries to escape this problem
by drawing a planetary ‘trajectory’ (Axelos 1964: 46) that follows an ‘impossi-
ble necessity’ (ibid.: 294). Such a trajectory cannot presuppose a central body
for orientation or revolution. Instead, it has to conceive of a constellation of
wandering stars forever erring through a decentralized universe, or better:
pluriverse. This errancy of thought provides a continuity between conservative
revolution and deconstructive postcolonialism that lays inmore than themere
word ‘planetary.’ For, when Axelos speaks of planetarity’s ‘errant course’ – a
course which cannot, moreover, simply be understood as ‘aberrant’ – (ibid.:
46), he introduces a word that harks back to Heidegger’s ‘Irre’ (Heidegger 1996:
196f.) and anticipates the ‘grounding errancy’ that Spivak – by way of Der-
rida’s Politics of Friendship (which, in its turn, is a critique of Schmitt’s politics
of enmity) – sees guiding her model of planetarity as well (Spivak 2005: 30).
Achille Mbembe’s (2016) study Politiques de l’inimitié (Politics of Enmity) also
understands itself as an intervention in this planetary debate. Already in Hei-
degger, the grounding ‘errancy’ of human existence cannot be thought as an
‘ab-errancy’ because it is the precondition of ‘truth,’ not its opposite (Hei-
degger 1996: 197). Axelos – and after him Derrida and Spivak – will use the
term to implode what is left of a metaphysical notion of truth in Heidegger’s
1920s text.What Axelos will later say about planetary politics holds true for all
things planetary: ‘it is completely errant: its “truth” itself consists in errancy’
(Axelos 1964: 310).
As the remarks on Hegel and Marx have shown, overcoming metaphysics
implies distancing oneself from a dialectical logic of thinking and history.The
errancy of planetary thought, in other words, has to shatter the teleological
course implicit in globalization and thereby has to show that history cannot
have a preordained end. Accordingly, Axelos calls for an abandonment of all
hopes for an ‘eschatology’ (ibid.: 45) and supplants the dialectic of ‘absolute
truth’ and ‘total reality’ by a never-ending ‘dialogue’ (ibid.: 29) of thinking and
world. The word dialogue, however, is not meant to provide an answer or
a solution. Instead, it marks ‘a question and a problem’ (ibid.: 29) and thus
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gestures towards the re-conceptualization of thought and world program-
matically announced in the subtitle of Vers la pensée planétaire, a subtitle that
rewrites a quotation from the early Marx: Le devenir-pensée du monde et le de-
venir-monde de la pensée (‘the becoming-thought of the world and the becom-
ing-world of thought’).
In his dissertation on The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean
Philosophy of Nature, Marx speaks of the ‘becoming-philosophical of the world’
[das Philosophisch-Werden derWelt] and a concurrent ‘becoming-worldly of phi-
losophy’ [Weltlich-Werden der Philosophie] (Marx 1975: 85, translation modified
by the author). Marx uses the terms to critique the Hegelian school (including
the avant-garde of Junghegelianer) that he sees showing an increasing tendency
to dismantle itself. This observation leads Marx to posit a dialectic inherent
in philosophy which equates its realization and self-destruction:
By the way, I consider this unphilosophical turn in a large section of Hegel’s
school as a phenomenon which will always accompany the transition from
discipline to freedom.
It is a psychological law that the theoretical mind, once liberated in itself,
turns into practical energy, and, leaving the shadowy empire of … will,
turns itself against the reality of the world existing without it. (From a
philosophical point of view, however, it is important to specify these aspects
better, since from the specific manner of this turn we can reason back
towards the immanent determination and the universal historic character
of a philosophy. We see here, as it were, its curriculum vitae narrowed down
to its subjective point.) But the practice of philosophy is itself theoretical. It
is the critique that measures the individual existence by the essence, the
particular reality by the Idea. But this immediate realisation of philosophy is
in its deepest essence afflicted with contradictions […].
The result is that as the world becomes philosophical, philosophy also
becomes worldly, that its realisation is also its loss, that what it struggles
against on the outside is its own inner deficiency, that in the very struggle
it falls precisely into those defects which it fights as defects in the opposite
camp, and that it can only overcome these defects by falling into them. That
which opposes it and that which it fights is always the same as itself, only
with factors inverted. (Marx 1975: 85; translation modified by the author)
In this process inside and outside, self and other, action and reflection, friend
and foe implode – without leading to a final synthesis. The passage appeals
to Axelos because it envisions an a-teleological encounter of philosophy and
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reality setting free an ‘energy’ that overrides the distinction of theory and
practice. Here, Marx’s own critical discourse opens the space for a thinking
that withdraws the apparently safe foundations it relies upon. If all critique
indeed leads to self-annihilation then this must also be true for Marx’s cri-
tique of the Hegelian school. Axelos will follow the (impossible and yet nec-
essary) ‘trajectory’ this insight opens for a thinking which is, in its own self-
critical movement, already a political action that undermines a Schmittian
distinction of friend and foe.
The importance Axelos attributes to the anti-dialectical tendencies at work
in Marxian dialectics shows why Marx is a thoroughly ambiguous figure for
him. Although his dialectical theory of historical progress has fostered Marx-
ism and the totality and totalitarianism that this (both philosophical and po-
litical) ideology has led to, Axelos stresses that Marx himself escapes these
tendencies and rather gives in to a fundamental errancy: ‘Marx did not pre-
pare a new philosophy and he did not believe in worldviews.The truth he took
upon himself, which includes his errancy, can lead toward an open thinking
that is not philosophy anymore’ (Axelos 1964: 183).This is the reason Axelos en-
gages with Marx in order to prepare the planetary leap away from globe and
globalization, which means unleashing the practical energies theory contains
for Marx in such a way as to swerve away from what is known as Marxian
and Marxist philosophy. This is why Axelos rewrites Marx’s Feuerbach Theses,
amongst them the famous Eleventh Thesis. Where Marx stated that, instead
of interpreting the world as the philosophers have always done, it is time ‘to
change it’ (Marx 1976: 5), Axelos now holds that it is time ‘to think it’ (Axelos
1964: 177), with all the implications this has for Marx’s ‘theoretical mind’ that
is ‘liberated in itself ’ (Marx 1975: 85).
Thus, reading Marx against Marx, Axelos develops the aporetic a-teleo-
logical movement of liberation (whose critique of self and other remains sus-
pended between ideality and reality) into ‘a unique becoming that carries and
carries away [‘porte et emporte’] world-and-thought’ (Axelos 1964: 30) beyond
a global horizon. For, the reason ‘we cannot start with the world and reach
thought, or gather élan from thought in order to encounter the world’ is be-
cause this ‘we’ is always already ‘at odds [‘aux prises’] with the circularity and
the sinusoidal movement’ (ibid.: 30). Everything – from the economic model
of circulation to the multiple astronomic rotations of the solar system, from
the micro-technological feedback loops to the grand narratives of history and
philosophy – loses its self-evidence in this becoming. It is a ‘mystery’ that is,
at once, ‘cosmic and ontological, gnoseo-logical and anthropo-logical’ (Axelos
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1964: 30). All these ‘logical’ disciplines are undone by what Axelos here and
elsewhere calls the ‘jeu du monde’, the ‘game’ or ‘play’ of the world, that is, in
which ‘world’ is what is, simultaneously, ‘at stake’ and ‘at issue’ (‘l’enjeu’) (ibid.:
20; for the ‘jeu du monde’ cf. Malette 2014).
It is no coincidence that Axelos’ often playful language, which likes to en-
gage in the game it speaks of, is reminiscent of Derrida. In fact, as the thinker
of the ‘game of the world’ Axelos had a verifiable influence on nascent decon-
struction. In its attempt to ‘reach the point of a certain exteriority in relation
to the totality of the age of logocentrism’, Of Grammatology marginally refers
to Vers la pensée planétaire and its ‘game of the world’ (Derrida 1998: 161, 326).
The reason Derrida can name ‘jeu’ (game or play) ‘the absence of the transcen-
dental signified’ (ibid.: 73) is that this concept tries to overcome the problem
inherent in any attempt to gain access to a point external to logocentrism:
that assuming such an outside reinforces logocentrism inasmuch as it im-
plies an inside and a centre from which it tries to break away. It is only by
suspending the difference between inside and outside, centre and periphery,
Derrida holds, that one might be able to move away from logocentrism.Thus,
Derrida is faced with a problem that is (at the very least) analogous to Axelos’s
problem and Derrida formulates his solution in terms that seem taken from
Vers la pensée planétaire.The ‘errancy’ thatOfGrammatology envisions follows an
‘exorbitant’ course and undermines the distinction of inside and outside, cen-
tre and periphery by managing to ‘exceed the metaphysical orb in an attempt
to get out of the orbit (orbita)’ (ibid.: 161f.). That these parallels are more than
coincidental comes to the fore when Derrida explains why his grammatology
will never be able to attain the status of a science, because this would mean
setting itself up as yet another transcendental signified. When calling atten-
tion to this impossibility Derrida again refers to Axelos, playfully and self-
ironically founding grammatology on the ‘game of the world’ which, conse-
quently, haunts every ‘concept’ such a pseudo- and para-science works with,
first and foremost, its central category: the supplement. ‘The supplement can
only respond to the nonlogical logic of a game. That game is the play of the
world’ (ibid.: 259).
The stakes in Axelos’s planetary thought are at least as high as those of
Derrida’s Grammatology. The, in its own right, ‘exorbitant’ claim of Vers la pen-
sée planétaire is to seek an errancy that succeeds in remaining external to the
horizon circumscribed by sun and globe.This is why Axelos – just like Derrida
in his critique of logocentrism – does not critique globalization head-on (‘ca-
put’), as such a critique would itself get caught up in what it is critiquing. It
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would have to assume a stable position from where it could be voiced, falling
into the rescendent trap of the avant-garde. Instead, Axelos develops a strat-
egy of writing that inspires a new kind of thinking by trajectories found in the
texts of others, prefiguring something that runs counter and askance to the
apparent and official results of these texts. An effort to move beyond a global
horizon, thus, relies on a performance of thinking animated by unforeseen
encounters with others – and others’ texts – that unsettles commonly held
convictions in a much more radical way than a Jüngerian or Marxist avant-
garde could. Since Axelos’s errant thinking and world is put into practice in
a reading and writing process, the performative aspects of his own textual
trajectories already figure as an integral part of the political commitment he
is advocating. It is by means of a specific ‘performativity’ of writing that a
markedly planetary thought hopes to overcome what Spivak will call ‘the lo-
gofratrocentric notion of collectivity’ (Spivak 2005: 32).
From onto-theology to an onto-erotology
Given that he was writing in early 1960s France, it probably comes as no great
surprise that Axelos turns to psychoanalysis in order to conceive of such an
alternative notion of collectivity. Vers la pensée planétaire features a chapter-
length rereading of Freud as an ‘analyste de l’homme’ (Axelos 1964: 243) which
promises to prepare a shift from the onto-theological character of heliocentric
metaphysics to an ‘onto-erotology’ (ibid.: 294) intended to overcome the philo-
sophical fixation on the sun and, with it, the psychoanalytic fixation on the
‘phallus’ (ibid.: 291). The philosophical overtones of Eros are already present
in Freud who once pointed out that ‘the enlarged sexuality of psycho-anal-
ysis coincides with the Eros of the divine Plato’ (Freud 1953a: 134). Planetary
thought means swerving away from phallocentrism and heliocentrism alike,
that is from the phallo-heliocentrism that inevitably emerges on the horizon
of globe and globalization. Axelos’s plea that the human being should ‘not in-
terpret itself as a sun, but rather as a planet’ (Axelos 1964: 18) therefore involves
a gender aspect. The French word for planet (‘la planète’) is feminine, while
the word for sun (‘le soleil’) is masculine. Axelos is playing with this grammat-
ical circumstance when he suggests that the world’s (and, with it, thought’s)
gender ‘is becoming female, if it is permissible to speak in this manner’ (ibid.:
291). Spivak will take this game very seriously when she advises: ‘let us all
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imagine anew imperatives that structure all of us, as giver and taker, female
and male, planetary human beings’ (Spivak 1999: 88).
Just like Marx before him, Freud plays a pivotal, but also extremely am-
biguous, role in the passage from the global to the planetary. As an ‘analyste de
l’homme’ (Axelos 1964: 243), Freud remains an ‘analyst of man,’ not an ‘analyst
of the human being’ (the French word ‘homme’ means both). After all, Freud
infamously holds ‘that libido is invariably and necessarily of a masculine na-
ture’ (Freud 1953a: 219). Nevertheless, some passages of his writings can be
read as invitations to veer away from the heliocentric cycles of globalization.
Axelos here follows the path of Civilization and its Discontents where psycho-
analytical concepts are employed to account for the complexities of modern
society and its ‘global malaise [‘mal global’]’ (Axelos 1964: 243). In spite of this
approach, Freud markedly abstains from offering a medical or psychological
cure. This ‘merit of renouncing any enterprise of social therapeutics’ (ibid.:
271) allows Axelos to refer solely to the diagnosis which attracts him because
it introduces another non-teleological becoming. For in his text Freud calls at-
tention to an ‘antagonism of forces within Eros’ (ibid.: 268) tying it in a ‘more
than dialectical manner’ to its ‘opposing powers’ (ibid.: 295). As elsewhere, Ax-
elos again tries to release the ‘energetic’ potentials in this thought and is thus
able to read Freud’s interpretation of the 20th century’s global malaise as the
indication of a ‘civilization about to become planetary’ (ibid.: 262).
Civilization and its Discontents lends itself to such a strategy because it casts
‘the dispute within the economics of the libido’ (Freud 1953b: 141) in astro-
physical terms. Before distinguishing it from the ‘contradiction – probably
an irreconcilable one – between the primal instincts of Eros and death’ (ibid.:
141), Freud compares this ‘dispute’ to the movements within the solar system
and, at one and the same time, introduces the possibility of calling this entire
model into question:
Just as a planet revolves around a central body as well as rotating around its
own axis, so the human individual takes part in the course of the develop-
ment of mankind at the same time as he pursues his own path in life. But to
our dull eyes the play of forces in the heavens seems fixed in a never-chang-
ing order; in the field of organic life we can still see how the forces contend
with one another, and how the effects of the conflict are continually chang-
ing. (ibid.: 141)
These sentences are indicative of how Axelos sees Freud employing natural
phenomena in his arguments. At first, the natural order of the solar system
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seems to illustrate the forces at work in history, but the comparison with his-
tory ultimately serves to undermine the appearance of order in the natural
world.
That their movements – or again ‘trajectories’ – unsettle conventional no-
tions of history and nature alike is one of the most important reasons why
Freud’s writings appeal to Axelos.There are three things he gains by way of the
passage in question. Besides tracing a path that is not dialectically oriented,
Freud here suggests an ‘energetic nucleus’ of ‘love’ (Axelos 1964: 283) that con-
stitutes itself as its own self-division, and he does this by mapping nature and
culture onto each other in such a way as to undermine their distinction. In
overriding the heliocentrism of the analogy, Axelos adds a fourth aspect that
radicalizes Freud’s anti-dialectical trajectory. From now on, the contention
within Eros is not only supposed to suspend the fundamental empirical dis-
tinction of nature and culture, but also the fundamental logical distinction
of individual and universal. Inspired by Freud, Axelos does not simply use
the astrophysical language of constellations, suns, and wanderings stars in
order to illustrate the erotic forces in history and society or to render them
clearer by way of analogy. On the contrary, the way he brings the astrophysical
model to bear involves a kind of ‘backlash’ that calls into question the status
of the model itself. This backlash is supposed to undo a ‘language that speaks
in terms of predestination and reminiscence, of a terrestrial reprise of a ce-
lestial game’ (ibid.: 281). To this end, Axelos unhinges the ‘universal Eros’ and
the ‘individual Eros’ (ibid.: 288) from their association with the annual revo-
lution (of earth around sun) and diurnal revolution (of earth around its own
axis), making it unmistakably clear that the individual, or earthly, Eros does
not revolve around a universal, celestial Eros. Instead, ‘the ‘celestial’ and the
‘common’ guise [‘visage’] of Eros’ (ibid.: 288) infinitelymirror andmultiply one
another, dissociating into an infinite number of encounters with others. Eros
is split into a constitutive tension between a ‘universal Eros’ and a ‘particular,
individual Eros’.Their conflictual interaction within Eros renders the ‘fortune
of humankind open. What is to come remains unpredictable’ (ibid.: 288).
This movement of dispersal does more than simply change the interre-
lation of universe and individual, it calls into question what ‘individual’ or
‘universe’ canmean. Instead of envisioning an erotic solar system of global in-
dividuals revolving around the sun of a universal Eros, Axelos’s planetary Eros
moves within ‘a play of centrifugal and centripetal forces’ (ibid.: 279) that are
‘not centred on’ the ego cogito’s ‘axis of subjectivity’ (ibid.: 289). Drawing vec-
tors between ‘centering and decentering’ (ibid.: 276), this play of forces can
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give rise to ‘constellations’ (e.g. ibid.: 275, 279) – but it can certainly also lead
to ‘disaster’ (ibid.: 291), another astronomical pun since ‘aster’ is Greek for
star.
Against a phallo-heliocentric melancholy
Axelos’s ‘onto-erotology’ (Axelos 1964: 294) of wandering stars that do not re-
volve around a common centre or around themselves anymore goes a step fur-
ther than Freud. For, despite his gestures toward the devenir of an onto-erotol-
ogy, Freud does not abandon the onto-theological model of globe and sun. As
he did Marx, Axelos is reading Freud against the grain. His ensuing critique
of these two thinkers that are so crucial for him is modeled on Heidegger’s
critique of Jünger and Nietzsche (the two most prominent writers for the lat-
ter’s take on planetarity). Inasmuch as Marx’s and Freud’s ‘reversal of the per-
spective ofmetaphysics’ remains ‘beholden [‘tributaire’] tometaphysics’ (ibid.:
253) the reversal amounts to what Heidegger called a ‘rescendence’ (Heidegger
1996: 398) of transcendence: ‘Marx socializes the ego of the cogito, the subject,
and wants it to socialize the objects of the res extensa. Freud analyses the ego,
descending into its unconscious and sees it at odds [‘le voit aux prises’] with
its objects’ (Axelos 1964: 253). The consequences are a ‘brutally anti-dualistic
dualism’ (ibid.: 253), which, in Marx’s case, leads to a conception of the end of
history in a class Armageddon and, in Freud’s case, reintroduces a conception
of social dynamics following a ‘simple dialectic of love and hate’ (ibid.: 283).
Thus, the clear-cut distinction between friend and foe that Carl Schmitt did
not cease to advocate re-enters the stage. Since neither Marx nor Freud fol-
lows the openings provided by their own texts, they always swerve back into
the cyclical models they wanted to break away from and thus end up trying to
reconstitute lines that could separate inside and outside, self and other, friend
and foe. In this respect at least, they point back to Carl Schmitt’s global and
Eurocentric world where the ‘Self ’ was still able to subtract itself from what
it deemed to be a mere outside. Axelos’s post-Freudian planetary Eros and
post-Marxian planetary politics seek to undermine such distinctions, in the
hope that this will overcome the melancholy haunting every avant-garde.
Axelos parts ways with psychoanalysis when he characterizes Freud as a
‘melancholic’ with ‘anti-metaphysically metaphysical convictions’ (ibid.: 263).
While the latter knows that he is overcoming metaphysics, he does not know
what it is that he is thus overcoming; just like the melancholic who knows
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‘whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him’ (Freud 1953c: 245). Freud’s
debunking of the ego cogito shows the ‘ambivalence’ (ibid.: 251) inherent in the
way it models, and relates to, objects in the world (reifying everything includ-
ing itself). But because he cannot move beyond his fixation on the (mascu-
linely coded) I (to which he must always himself ‘regress’ – again just like a
melancholic), Freud has to conceive of this ambivalence in the dualistic terms
of ‘narcissism’ and ‘sadism’, ‘love’ and ‘hate’ (ibid.: 251). This also holds true for
all avant-garde movements (such as the ones articulated in Marx or Jünger).
Love (of the self, i.e. the either individual or collective identity) and hatred
(for the either individual or collective other, the enemy) give rise to ‘countless
separate struggles …, in which hate and love contend with each other’ (ibid.:
256). The 20th century has globalized the repetition compulsion fuelling these
conflicts by spinning the entire planet in an ‘infernal cycle of revenge and re-
sentment’ (Axelos 1964: 278). Such a globalization compulsion would indeed
be ruled by the Hobbesian ‘maxim’ Axelos attributes to Freud: ‘homo homini lu-
pus’ (ibid.: 259). The errant trajectories Axelos’ text follows are meant to evade
the civil war lurking on this horizon.
Such an eccentric errancy is necessary because Freud’s critique of a global-
ized modernity rides on the implicit assumption of an essence of man (which
is moreover defined as ‘the wolf of the other’). In order to veer away from
the dualisms of metaphysics, and the global conflicts such an assumption
gives rise to, one has to jettison the concept of an essence altogether. And,
since Freud’s essence of the human is modelled on an alleged essence of man
(‘homme’) – Axelos now argues with Lacan against Lacan – this will also mean
conceiving of a ‘phallus’ that is ‘owned’ by no-one (ibid.: 291). Thinking will
only be able to address the radically ‘historical’ character of any putative ‘on-
tological essence of the human being’ once the impossibility of ‘fixing the
essence of the male or the female’ has blurred sexual difference, instead testi-
fying to the ‘fundamental bisexuality’ of any human being (ibid.: 292). Jacques
Lacan, whom Axelos knew personally, famously argues that the phallus is not
an (albeit partial) object or a phantasm, but ‘the signifier that is destined to
designate meaning effects as a whole’ (Lacan 2006: 579).This process of signi-
fication constitutes the barred subject of psychoanalysis by means of a ‘not-
having [‘manque à avoir’]’ (ibid.: 582) that appears in males as the fear of cas-
tration and in females as penis envy. In the talk that Lacan gave on ‘The Sig-
nification of the Phallus’ in 1958 in Munich (and I am not sure whether Axelos
knew this precise piece), he used an astrophysical term dear to Axelos to refer
to the tension within the couple to which this manque à avoir gives rise. Ev-
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ery heterosexual relationship manifests ‘a centrifugal tendency of the genital
drive’ (ibid.: 583) on both the male and the female side, demonstrating that
Eros itself is not only defined by the centripetal tendency toward monogamy
andmonandry, but also by an opposite force toward polygamy and polyandry.
To conceive of a phallus owned by no-one means reappraising the role of
this centrifugal tendency, and with it the role of lack, privation and negativity
in Lacan’s thought. To this end, Axelos propagates a ‘negative onto-erotology
where plenitude and void are not distinguished by the criteria of a massively
positive reality or ideality’ (Axelos 1964: 294). In an onto-erotological perspec-
tive, any ‘fixation’ would appear as one possible ‘modality’ of the ‘fundamental
errancy’ of planetarity amongst others (ibid.: 294). Consequently, if the cen-
trifugal und centripetal forces are articulated here in terms of ‘a polygamous
monogamy and a polyandrous monandry’ (ibid.: 278f.), this is not only meant
to emancipate women from a patriarchal paradigm, but also to reconsider
the relation of Other, others, and selves. Instead of enabling all relationships
to the self and to others, Lacan’s Other is here dissolved into endless encoun-
ters with others that constellate, de-constellate, and re-constellate what could
be called selves. In other words, the centripetal and centrifugal forces inspir-
ing the planetary encounters in their ever-changing movements of (de- and
re-)constellation are not directed toward the (phallic) sun, but toward a de-
centralized pluriverse.
This is how, following certain trajectories of the Freudian text, Axelos is
able to dissolve the heliocentric fixations of metaphysics without having to
assume a rescendence. In an ‘encounter with another being,’ Axelos points
out, ‘it is as if we already knew what we are about to know and what we can-
not know because we do not know it’ (ibid.: 281). So far, this passage sim-
ply restates the paradox of seeking for knowledge formulated, for example,
in Plato’s Meno. However, since the planetary Eros has unmoored itself from
the anamnetic fixation on the sun, it does not follow Plato in positing a past
knowledge that could be retrieved in such a search. Instead, Axelos under-
scores that ‘we cannot know’ what we are on the verge of experiencing ‘be-
cause we did not know it beforehand’ (ibid.).
‘Perhaps’: the practical energies of planetary politics
Thus, the exorbitant claims planetarity is making should have become clearer.
Vers la pensée planétaire sets out to unsettle the fundamental distinctions be-
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tween nature and culture, individual and universe, self and other, man and
woman, friend and foe. This is supposed to contribute to a new form of pol-
itics that might meet the challenges of a world where all cycles are turning
into decentralized networks of technological feedback loops. Such a distinctly
planetary thinking and politics are all the more necessary because the techno-
logical revolution that has swept away the classical Eurocentric global world
order is in danger of reinforcing its onto-theological model of an absolute to-
tality, and of thereby leading to new forms of totalitarianism based on what
one might call a globalized ‘white’ ideology (cf. the ‘white mythology’ in Der-
rida 1974).
In order to meet the new and unforeseen challenges globalization poses,
thought and politics ‘must dare to be planetary’ (Axelos 1964: 182). For Axe-
los, the only hope that they will indeed be ‘in no way totalitarian’ (ibid.) re-
sides in the leap beyond the global horizon. A truly planetary thought comes
to a (paradoxically self-beheading) head (‘caput’) in a political activity that
unleashes the potentials granted by the dissolution of national borders and
the end of Eurocentrism.This means engaging the technological ensemble of
networks in ways that turn their graphs into open trajectories leading to en-
counters that cross all boundaries. In ‘breaching the cape that still conceals
the abstract landscape of the planetary era’ (ibid.: 311) these encounters at-
test to a decentralized, trans-national, post-sovereign, a-teleological thought
and world. When Axelos sketches the unforeseen opportunities the planetary
leap will afford, he again refers to Freud’s auto-antagonistic Eros. Genuinely
planetary politics will have become possible, he argues,
Once we remember that Eros is what connects the beings and things of the
world by opening a conflict with opposing forces that are more than just di-
alectically tied to it, and once we establish – now already and in anticipation
of what is to come – relations of camaraderie that are more profound and
more trembling [frémissante] (in which terms can we still speak of friendship
without lying?) between themen andwomen that we are and are becoming.
(ibid.: 295)
Whatever Axelos’s direct influence on Spivak might be, it is clear that the
hybrid camaraderie outlined here prefigures what she will – with reference
to Derrida’s critique of Schmitt’s notion of politics as a distinction of friend
and foe – call a ‘politics of friendship’: ‘I am not advocating the politicization
of the discipline. I am advocating a depoliticization of the politics of hostility
toward a politics of friendship to come’ (Spivak 2005: 13).
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Axelos sees this friendship stimulated by the aporetically ‘practical energy’
which, according to Marx’ dissertation, ‘accompan[ies] the transition’ from
theory to practice, ‘from discipline to freedom’ (Marx 1975: 85). That this en-
ergy does not fuel a new avant-garde, which would or could lead the way into
a better future, brings up the issue of what status Axelos’s own text has; how
a book whose title reads ‘toward planetary thinking’ is involved in the ‘plane-
tary step and leap’ (Axelos 1964: 27) it speaks of. Since Vers la pensée planétaire
is admittedly geared to giving attention and articulation to the ‘unique be-
coming that carries and carries away world-and-thought’ (ibid.: 30), it thus
in a sense, ‘enacts’ this devenir. This is why the constative and cognitive as-
pects of the text cannot be separated from its performative and rhetorical
aspects. Here the full philosophical implications of the planetary Eros come
into perspective. For, in order to articulate the ever-changing constellations
of a planetary era, Axelos sees the need to ‘prepare the way to a different lan-
guage’ (ibid.: 32), a language that has freed itself from the ‘copula’ just as Eros
has freed itself from ‘copulation’ (ibid.: 296). This argument again alludes to
Lacan for whom ‘sexual intercourse [‘copulation’]’ was signified by the phal-
lus which, in its turn, stood in a close relation to the ‘(logical) copula’ (Lacan
2006: 581). Deviating from the phallo-heliocentrism of the global model thus
entails a conception of language that disperses the ‘whole’ of Lacan’s ‘meaning
effects’ (ibid.: 579). Instead of subsuming the specific under the general, the
individual under the universal, (the ‘global’ under the ‘solar’), Axelos breaks
with a language that assumes subjects and objects brought in correlation by
‘copulative judgements’ (ibid.: 295).
Unmoored from their function within the totality of a universe meaning-
ful in and of itself, the chains of ‘signifiers’ would open trajectories leading
into the errancy of a decentred text (and in this movement the chains would
cease to be ‘signifiers’). In neither referring to a ‘reality’ nor signifying an
‘ideality’, such trajectories of language suspend the difference between literal
and figurative sense, becoming what Axelos calls ‘non-figurative figures’ (Axe-
los 1964: 47), figures, that is, that are neither imaginary nor simply real.This is
the language in which the always problematic and questionable ‘dialogue’ (Ax-
elos 1964: 29) of world and thought could take place. Thus, Axelos’s planetary
trajectories are populated by figures defying the distinction of the rhetorical
and imaginary on the one hand and the material and real on the other. They
are supposed to invert and displace the onto-theological model that assumes
a central being that could eminently embody being. Here it is the other way
around: Planetary trajectories give rise to figures that are poised, and open,
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toward what is to come, but cannot be decoded as if there were a plaintext
behind them.This is why the figures that populate such planetary trajectories
are prefigurations gesturing toward a future – an avenir – that necessarily
remains open. Or, one last time, in Spivak’s words: ‘The figure “is” irreducible’
(Spivak 2005: 52).
The necessary self-defiguration of any prefiguration is why Vers la pensée
planétaire will never establish a meta-discourse. Instead it sees itself – and
the figure of planetarity it argues for – as one among many non-figurative
figures. This is written into the figure of planetarity itself which, according
to its own aporetic (Derrida might have said: supplemental) logic, brackets
all its statements inasmuch as it shows that every apparent truth and reality
is a mere prefiguration open to an other that is not phallo-heliocentric. This
paradox is echoed in the tone of Axelos’s book which questions and probes,
suggests and alludes more than it pretends to give definitive answers. Entire
paragraphs aremere catalogues of questions thatmay bemaieutic, but are not
supposed to serve the establishment of a philosophical system. And instead of
giving closure to itself, Vers la pensée planétaire opens upon what is to come on
its final pages.The book ends with an ‘Interlude’ (Axelos 1964: 321) of markedly
‘Non-Final Remarks’ (ibid.: 319).
The key word in the bookmight be the probing word ‘perhaps’ (‘peut-être’).
At least, one has to take Axelos’s statement ‘perhaps we are on our way to a
planetary thought’ (ibid.: 45) seriously. The we that is speaking here is not a
pluralis maiestatis, it is the open place of encounter with others. Axelos invites
his readers to the dangerous and endangered space opened by this shifter (or
fader) because he hopes it can provide ‘a hotspot [‘foyer’] of resistance and at-
tack’ (ibid.: 277) against the self-veiling heliocentrism of the concept of glob-
alization, a hotspot in which a multitude might conceive of ‘a camaraderie’
that is ‘deeper and more trembling [‘frémissante’]’ (ibid.: 295) than the self-
veiling phallocentrism of a brotherhood of man.
Notes
1 On 5 August 2020 the Süddeutsche Zeitung published a German trans-
lation of what was allegedly the text Mbembe was going to present at the
Triennale. Its focus on Covid-19, however, makes it unlikely that this was
in fact the original text (cf. Mbembe 2020b).
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2 Since the book has not been translated into English yet, all translations
from Vers la pensée planétaire are my own.
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